From: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
To: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>,
Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>,
linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
Phoebe Buckheister <phoebe.buckheister@itwm.fraunhofer.de>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
lvc-project@linuxtesting.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 12:06:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y0arlntu.fsf@bootlin.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116065235.27348-1-petrvaganoff@gmail.com> (Petr Vaganov's message of "Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:52:34 +0700")
On 16/11/2026 at 13:52:34 +07, Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com> wrote:
> During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
>
> BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
> BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
> ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
> ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
> ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
> wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
> dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
> ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
> ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
> ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
> __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
> __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
> __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
> __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
> x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>
> Uninit was stored to memory at:
> ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:51 [inline]
> ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa5b/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
> ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
> wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
> dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
> ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
> ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
> ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
> __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
> __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
> __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
> __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
> x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>
> Commit f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
> introduced mac802154_set_header_security() as the sole function
> responsible for enabling frame-level security: it sets both
> hdr->fc.security_enabled = 1 and initializes hdr->sec together,
> maintaining the invariant that security_enabled = 1 implies hdr->sec
> is initialized.
>
> However, ieee802154_header_create() was left with a pre-existing
> assignment:
>
> hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
>
> This assignment can set security_enabled = 1 (from a stale cb->secen)
> even when mac802154_set_header_security() returns 0 without initializing
> hdr.sec, violating that invariant. ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() then
> reads uninitialized hdr.sec fields.
>
> The stale value in cb->secen arises from a specific setsockopt()
> sequence: calling WPAN_SECURITY_ON (secen_override=1, secen=1) and
> then WPAN_SECURITY_DEFAULT (secen_override=0, secen unchanged at 1).
> This undocumented combination likely explains why the bug was rarely
> triggered.
>
> Remove the redundant assignment; mac802154_set_header_security() is the
> only correct place to set security_enabled.
>
> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
>
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=60a66d44892b66b56545
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=23f21e76e9d2d1ed587cb5e71515260d6d025b63
> Fixes: f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
> ---
> net/mac802154/iface.c | 1 -
> 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/mac802154/iface.c b/net/mac802154/iface.c
> index f437b8daa00d..7b7332805ecc 100644
> --- a/net/mac802154/iface.c
> +++ b/net/mac802154/iface.c
> @@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ static int ieee802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
> hdr.fc.type = cb->type;
> - hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
> hdr.fc.ack_request = cb->ackreq;
> hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
There has been a similar patch in 2023 but it was never updated by the
author. Fixes tag is better here, it should be taken.
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Thanks,
Miquèl
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 11:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-16 6:52 [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment Petr Vaganov
2026-11-17 11:06 ` Miquel Raynal [this message]
2026-11-18 2:04 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
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