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* [LTP] [PATCH v1] network/sockets: Add handshake01
@ 2026-11-17 23:20 Stephen Bertram via ltp
  2026-11-18  4:51 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Bertram via ltp @ 2026-11-17 23:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: ltp; +Cc: Stephen Bertram

From: Stephen Bertram <sbertram@redhat.com>

Add a regression test for CVE-2026-74270 (81246a65303d "handshake:
Require admin permission for DONE command"). Verify that
HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE returns -EPERM for a sender without CAP_NET_ADMIN,
while root reaches the handler and gets -EINVAL for the missing sockfd.

Register it as cve-2026-74270 in runtest/cve.

Reviewed and tested before submission: builds, passes check-handshake01,
fails on the unfixed kernel and passes on the fixed kernel.

Assisted-by: ClaudeCode:DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash
Signed-off-by: Stephen Bertram <sbertram@redhat.com>
---
 runtest/cve                             |   1 +
 testcases/network/sockets/.gitignore    |   1 +
 testcases/network/sockets/handshake01.c | 243 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 245 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/network/sockets/handshake01.c

diff --git a/runtest/cve b/runtest/cve
index 0fe25cd83..fb31cd76f 100644
--- a/runtest/cve
+++ b/runtest/cve
@@ -105,3 +105,4 @@ cve-2026-46300 xfrm02
 cve-2026-46300-skb-segment xfrm03
 cve-2026-46331 cve-2026-46331
 cve-2026-64564 sctphantom
+cve-2026-74270 handshake01
diff --git a/testcases/network/sockets/.gitignore b/testcases/network/sockets/.gitignore
index 3e8962bbf..c7d784d36 100644
--- a/testcases/network/sockets/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/network/sockets/.gitignore
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/handshake01
 /xfrm01
 /xfrm02
 /xfrm03
diff --git a/testcases/network/sockets/handshake01.c b/testcases/network/sockets/handshake01.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..68384edec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/network/sockets/handshake01.c
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Test for CVE-2026-74270 fixed by:
+ * 81246a65303d ("handshake: Require admin permission for DONE command")
+ *
+ * The handshake generic netlink family exposes the ACCEPT and DONE downcalls
+ * for the trusted handshake agent (tlshd). ACCEPT requires GENL_ADMIN_PERM;
+ * DONE had no privilege check. An unprivileged process that knows a socket
+ * with a pending handshake could send a forged DONE and make the kernel
+ * consumer proceed as if the handshake succeeded, or tear down a legitimate
+ * handshake with a non-zero status.
+ *
+ * The test resolves the ``handshake`` family and sends ``HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE``
+ * without attributes. The generic netlink permission check runs before
+ * attribute parsing, so no pending handshake is needed: the kernel rejects
+ * the request with ``-EPERM`` for a sender without ``CAP_NET_ADMIN``. A root
+ * control must instead reach the handler and fail with ``-EINVAL`` because
+ * ``HANDSHAKE_A_DONE_SOCKFD`` is missing.
+ *
+ * On an unfixed kernel the unprivileged request reaches the handler and
+ * returns ``-EINVAL`` as well, so the test fails.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/genetlink.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_netlink.h"
+
+/*
+ * Values from include/uapi/linux/handshake.h. Define them locally so the
+ * test builds against kernel headers older than 6.7.
+ */
+#ifndef HANDSHAKE_FAMILY_NAME
+# define HANDSHAKE_FAMILY_NAME "handshake"
+#endif
+#ifndef HANDSHAKE_FAMILY_VERSION
+# define HANDSHAKE_FAMILY_VERSION 1
+#endif
+#ifndef HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE
+# define HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE 3
+#endif
+
+static int nl_family_id;
+static uid_t nobody_uid;
+static gid_t nobody_gid;
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+
+	nobody_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	nobody_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+}
+
+static int resolve_family(const char *name)
+{
+	struct tst_netlink_context *ctx;
+	struct tst_netlink_message *msgs, *m;
+	struct nlmsghdr nlh = {
+		.nlmsg_type = GENL_ID_CTRL,
+		.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST,
+	};
+	struct genlmsghdr gh = {
+		.cmd = CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY,
+		.version = 1,
+	};
+	char *p;
+	int id = -1, rem;
+	uint16_t fid;
+
+	ctx = NETLINK_CREATE_CONTEXT(NETLINK_GENERIC);
+	NETLINK_ADD_MESSAGE(ctx, &nlh, &gh, sizeof(gh));
+	NETLINK_ADD_ATTR_STRING(ctx, CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME, name);
+
+	if (NETLINK_SEND(ctx) < 0)
+		tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO, "send(CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY) failed");
+
+	if (NETLINK_WAIT(ctx) <= 0)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "no response to CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY");
+
+	msgs = NETLINK_RECV(ctx);
+	if (!msgs)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "no response to CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY");
+
+	for (m = msgs; m->header; m++) {
+		if (m->err) {
+			if (m->err->error == -ENOENT)
+				tst_brk(TCONF, "family '%s' is not available", name);
+			if (m->err->error)
+				tst_brk(TBROK, "CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY failed: %s",
+					strerror(-m->err->error));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (m->header->nlmsg_type != GENL_ID_CTRL)
+			continue;
+		if (m->payload_size < GENL_HDRLEN)
+			continue;
+
+		p = (char *)m->payload + GENL_HDRLEN;
+		rem = (int)m->payload_size - GENL_HDRLEN;
+
+		while (rem >= (int)sizeof(struct nlattr)) {
+			struct nlattr *a = (struct nlattr *)p;
+			int alen;
+
+			if (a->nla_len < NLA_HDRLEN)
+				break;
+
+			alen = NLA_ALIGN(a->nla_len);
+			if (alen > rem)
+				break;
+
+			if ((a->nla_type & NLA_TYPE_MASK) == CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID) {
+				if (a->nla_len < NLA_HDRLEN + (int)sizeof(fid))
+					break;
+
+				memcpy(&fid, (char *)a + NLA_HDRLEN, sizeof(fid));
+				id = fid;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			p += alen;
+			rem -= alen;
+		}
+
+		if (id >= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	NETLINK_FREE_MESSAGE(msgs);
+	NETLINK_DESTROY_CONTEXT(ctx);
+
+	if (id < 0)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_ID not found for '%s'", name);
+
+	return id;
+}
+
+static int send_done(void)
+{
+	struct tst_netlink_context *ctx;
+	struct nlmsghdr nlh = {
+		.nlmsg_type = nl_family_id,
+		.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK,
+	};
+	struct genlmsghdr gh = {
+		.cmd = HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE,
+		.version = HANDSHAKE_FAMILY_VERSION,
+	};
+	int ret;
+
+	ctx = NETLINK_CREATE_CONTEXT(NETLINK_GENERIC);
+	NETLINK_ADD_MESSAGE(ctx, &nlh, &gh, sizeof(gh));
+
+	ret = NETLINK_SEND_VALIDATE(ctx);
+	NETLINK_DESTROY_CONTEXT(ctx);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* No ACK and no error means the kernel never replied. */
+	if (!tst_netlink_errno)
+		return -ETIMEDOUT;
+
+	return -tst_netlink_errno;
+}
+
+static int unprivileged_done(void)
+{
+	int fds[2], err = 0;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	SAFE_PIPE(fds);
+	pid = SAFE_FORK();
+
+	if (!pid) {
+		int ret;
+
+		SAFE_CLOSE(fds[0]);
+
+		SAFE_SETGROUPS(0, NULL);
+		SAFE_SETGID(nobody_gid);
+		SAFE_SETUID(nobody_uid);
+
+		ret = send_done();
+
+		SAFE_WRITE(SAFE_WRITE_ALL, fds[1], &ret, sizeof(ret));
+		_exit(0);
+	}
+
+	SAFE_CLOSE(fds[1]);
+	SAFE_READ(SAFE_READ_ALL, fds[0], &err, sizeof(err));
+	SAFE_CLOSE(fds[0]);
+	SAFE_WAITPID(pid, NULL, 0);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+	int root_err, child_err;
+
+	nl_family_id = resolve_family(HANDSHAKE_FAMILY_NAME);
+
+	root_err = send_done();
+	if (root_err == -EPERM)
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "root was denied HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE");
+	if (root_err != -EINVAL)
+		tst_brk(TBROK,
+			"root HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE returned %d (%s), expected EINVAL",
+			root_err, strerror(-root_err));
+
+	child_err = unprivileged_done();
+
+	if (child_err == -EPERM)
+		tst_res(TPASS, "unprivileged HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE rejected with EPERM");
+	else
+		tst_res(TFAIL,
+			"unprivileged HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE returned %d (%s), expected EPERM",
+			child_err, strerror(-child_err));
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+	.setup = setup,
+	.test_all = run,
+	.needs_root = 1,
+	.forks_child = 1,
+	.needs_kconfigs = (const char *[]) {
+		"CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE",
+		NULL
+	},
+	.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+		{"linux-git", "81246a65303d9635266b1334490142caaf86a11f"},
+		{"CVE", "2026-74270"},
+		{}
+	},
+};
-- 
2.56.0


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