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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99366: nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:24:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026111950-CVE-2026-99366-5dd4@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply

nfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE
under nn->client_lock. A reply served from the slot's reply cache does
not claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate->status, which
nfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c
("NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions") moved
nfsd4_proc_compound()'s cstate->status assignment below the out:
label, and the replay path's goto out was the one path that relied on
skipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer
identifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot.

NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every
sequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache()
runs. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the
same slot at once. One can read slot->sl_cred under nn->client_lock
while the other's completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR
encoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each
other and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves
cr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every
earlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info.
>From a 6.12.91 production server:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
  CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd
  RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd]
  RDX: 0000000000000000
  Call Trace:
   nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd]
   nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd]
   nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd]
   svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc]
   svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc]
   svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc]
   nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd]
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Since v6.14 a live session's slot table can shrink, and the unowned
store becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the
shrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a
replay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the
replay still holds in cstate->slot.

Record the claim in cstate->slot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a
request and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request
that claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound
response before each request, so the flag starts clear.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99366 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 5.10 with commit cc028a10a48c3c555d7772d02f56eea9f86fdf79 and fixed in 6.12.117 with commit 065764e256ebff20201dca5bc6ff075c6cb62e17
	Issue introduced in 5.10 with commit cc028a10a48c3c555d7772d02f56eea9f86fdf79 and fixed in 6.18.61 with commit 0b5149b7ad8ccd64c61e887e2cf1af068b6210c9
	Issue introduced in 5.10 with commit cc028a10a48c3c555d7772d02f56eea9f86fdf79 and fixed in 7.3.2 with commit 4e3c12151f13c4e51eb381f9377835fb94b9f56a
	Issue introduced in 5.10 with commit cc028a10a48c3c555d7772d02f56eea9f86fdf79 and fixed in 7.4-rc1 with commit 2987838317501ff67b672ac2a441fe34b7729f3d

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99366
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
	fs/nfsd/xdr4.h


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/065764e256ebff20201dca5bc6ff075c6cb62e17
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b5149b7ad8ccd64c61e887e2cf1af068b6210c9
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e3c12151f13c4e51eb381f9377835fb94b9f56a
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2987838317501ff67b672ac2a441fe34b7729f3d

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 14:40 UTC|newest]

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