From: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>
To: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
"Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@linux-iscsi.org>,
Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>,
open-iscsi@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
Date: Sun, 18 Jun 2017 10:04:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2639082.PtrrGWOPPL@positron.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <02d60ed4-4207-dd7d-8826-0f9f7f4e966d@suse.com>
Am Samstag, 17. Juni 2017, 05:45:57 CEST schrieb Lee Duncan:
Hi Lee,
> In your testing, how long might a process have to wait? Are we talking
> seconds? Longer? What about timeouts?
>
In current kernels (starting with 4.8) this timeout should clear within a few
seconds after boot.
In older kernels (pre 4.8), my KVM takes up to 90 seconds to reach that
seeding point. I have heard that on IBM System Z this trigger point requires
minutes to be reached.
Ciao
Stephan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-18 8:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 17:47 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 23:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 2:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 0:41 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17 3:45 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-17 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-06-17 18:50 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Antw: " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 8:04 ` Stephan Müller [this message]
2017-06-26 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30 6:02 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 2:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 5:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 5:04 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 12:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:05 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09 1:16 ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 8:19 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2017-06-15 11:59 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 15:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 12:33 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
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