From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 21:03:48 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <871sqlpl63.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170608081919.zbtwdjl32vbvd7jt@thunk.org>
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> writes:
> On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:48:04PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> This enables an important dmesg notification about when drivers have
>> used the crng without it being seeded first. Prior, these errors would
>> occur silently, and so there hasn't been a great way of diagnosing these
>> types of bugs for obscure setups. By adding this as a config option, we
>> can leave it on by default, so that we learn where these issues happen,
>> in the field, will still allowing some people to turn it off, if they
>> really know what they're doing and do not want the log entries.
...
>
> This patch is pretty spammy. On my KVM test kernel:
>
> random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
> random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
> random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
> random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
...
>
> At the very least we probably should do a logical "uniq" on the output
> (e.g., if we have complained about the previous callsite, don't whinge
> about it again).
>
> commit 9d9035bc6d7871a73d7f9aada4e63cb190874a68
> Author: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Date: Thu Jun 8 04:16:59 2017 -0400
>
> random: suppress duplicate crng_init=0 warnings
>
> Suppress duplicate CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM warnings to avoid
> spamming dmesg.
>
> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Even with this patch, it's still pretty spammy (today's linux-next):
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
Initializing random number generator... random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_mmap_rnd+0x78/0xb0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: load_elf_binary+0x57c/0x1550 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
random: arch_randomize_brk+0xa4/0xd0 get_random_u64 called with crng_init=0
Do I need to be doing anything to fix these? (this is on powerpc)
cheers
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-15 11:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 17:47 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 23:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 2:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 0:41 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17 3:45 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-17 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-06-17 18:50 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Antw: " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 8:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Stephan Müller
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30 6:02 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 2:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 5:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 5:04 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 12:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:05 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09 1:16 ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 8:19 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03 ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2017-06-15 11:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 15:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 12:33 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
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