From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 09:34:53 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3292783.lRT1C7ihKT@x2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170307211048.GE10258@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
On Tuesday, March 7, 2017 4:10:49 PM EST Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > one possibly audit-worth case which (if I read correctly) this will
> > > > > skip is where a setuid-root binary has filecaps which *limit* its
> > > > > privs.
> > > > > Does that matter?
> > > >
> > > > I hadn't thought of that case, but I did consider in the setuid case
> > > > comparing before and after without setuid forcing the drop of all
> > > > capabilities via "ambient". Mind you, this bug has been around before
> > > > Luto's patch that adds the ambient capabilities set.
> > >
> > > Can you suggest a scenario where that might happen?
> >
> > Sorry, do you mean the case I brought up, or the one you mentioned? I
> > don't quite understnad the one you brought up. For mine it's pretty
> > simple to reproduce, just
>
> I was talking about the case you brought up, but they could be the same
> case.
>
> I was thinking of a case where the caps actually change, but are
> overridden by the blanket full permissions of setuid.
If there actually is a change in capability bits besides the implied change of
capabilities based on the change of the uid alone, then it should be logged.
-Steve
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: sgrubb@redhat.com (Steve Grubb)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 09:34:53 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3292783.lRT1C7ihKT@x2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170307211048.GE10258@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
On Tuesday, March 7, 2017 4:10:49 PM EST Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > one possibly audit-worth case which (if I read correctly) this will
> > > > > skip is where a setuid-root binary has filecaps which *limit* its
> > > > > privs.
> > > > > Does that matter?
> > > >
> > > > I hadn't thought of that case, but I did consider in the setuid case
> > > > comparing before and after without setuid forcing the drop of all
> > > > capabilities via "ambient". Mind you, this bug has been around before
> > > > Luto's patch that adds the ambient capabilities set.
> > >
> > > Can you suggest a scenario where that might happen?
> >
> > Sorry, do you mean the case I brought up, or the one you mentioned? I
> > don't quite understnad the one you brought up. For mine it's pretty
> > simple to reproduce, just
>
> I was talking about the case you brought up, but they could be the same
> case.
>
> I was thinking of a case where the caps actually change, but are
> overridden by the blanket full permissions of setuid.
If there actually is a change in capability bits besides the implied change of
capabilities based on the change of the uid alone, then it should be logged.
-Steve
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-09 14:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-03 1:10 [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-03 2:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-03-03 2:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-07 17:22 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-07 18:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-03-07 21:10 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-07 21:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-03-09 14:34 ` Steve Grubb [this message]
2017-03-09 14:34 ` Steve Grubb
2017-03-29 10:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-03-29 10:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-11 19:36 ` Paul Moore
2017-04-11 19:36 ` Paul Moore
2017-04-12 6:43 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-12 6:43 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-12 14:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-12 14:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-12 18:49 ` Steve Grubb
2017-04-12 18:49 ` Steve Grubb
2017-04-13 8:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-13 8:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-04-13 19:36 ` Steve Grubb
2017-04-13 19:36 ` Steve Grubb
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