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* about type_change and type_transition
@ 2003-05-16 10:25 Giorgio Zanin
  2003-05-16 11:45 ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Giorgio Zanin @ 2003-05-16 10:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: selinux

is it correct to argue that
type_transition program the security server to provide a cetain SID (or 
better, a labelling decision)  for labelling process and objects created 
by legacy applications
type_change does the same thing but for security aware applications
?


It looks like the difference between auto and exec specification in DTE.

thanks


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* Re: about type_change and type_transition
  2003-05-16 10:25 about type_change and type_transition Giorgio Zanin
@ 2003-05-16 11:45 ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2003-05-16 11:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Giorgio Zanin; +Cc: selinux

On Fri, 2003-05-16 at 06:25, Giorgio Zanin wrote:
> is it correct to argue that
> type_transition program the security server to provide a cetain SID (or 
> better, a labelling decision)  for labelling process and objects created 
> by legacy applications
> type_change does the same thing but for security aware applications

No.  You are correct that type_transition defines a default labeling
behavior for the case where an application uses the ordinary API call
(e.g. execve, open, mkdir, etc).  Note that type_transition does NOT
authorize anything; you need to authorize the transition via appropriate
allow rules, and you'll see macros in the example policy that provide
common combinations of type_transition and allow rules, e.g.
domain_auto_trans, file_type_auto_trans.  type_change has a different
purpose; it defines a relabeling behavior for situations where a
security-aware application needs to relabel an object based on the
security context of a user process and the existing context of the
object, e.g. when login, newrole, or sshd relabels the tty for the user
shell.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency


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2003-05-16 10:25 about type_change and type_transition Giorgio Zanin
2003-05-16 11:45 ` Stephen Smalley

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