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* login roles
@ 2004-01-27  5:07 Timothy Wood
  2004-01-28 15:02 ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Timothy Wood @ 2004-01-27  5:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: SELinux Mail List

I set the pam_selinux module to multiple and now I'm seeing three roles 
instead of the two defined in policy/users.  The third context is 
<username>:staff_r:system_chkpwd_t, is this normal? I diffed my current 
policy against the 1.4 tarball from the NSA site and the only 
differences are a couple of changes I've made for slackware.  Of those 
few changes none of them have anything to do with system_chkpwd_t.

Timothy,


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: login roles
  2004-01-27  5:07 login roles Timothy Wood
@ 2004-01-28 15:02 ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2004-01-28 15:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Timothy Wood; +Cc: SELinux Mail List, Russell Coker

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1091 bytes --]

On Tue, 2004-01-27 at 00:07, Timothy Wood wrote:
> I set the pam_selinux module to multiple and now I'm seeing three roles 
> instead of the two defined in policy/users.  The third context is 
> <username>:staff_r:system_chkpwd_t, is this normal? I diffed my current 
> policy against the 1.4 tarball from the NSA site and the only 
> differences are a couple of changes I've made for slackware.  Of those 
> few changes none of them have anything to do with system_chkpwd_t.

This is due to the fact that system_chkpwd_t is authorized for
<username>:staff_r and is also reachable from the login domains to
perform authentication, so that context is reachable (but not enterable
via the user shell, so it won't actually work when in enforcing mode). 
I've tightened the constraints to reduce this problem, but we may need
to change the getconlist logic to check entrypoint access to the shell
as well to fully address it.  My patch to the policy/constraints file is
attached, and this change is in the sourceforge CVS tree.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency

[-- Attachment #2: constraints.diff --]
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Index: policy/constraints
===================================================================
RCS file: /nfshome/pal/CVS/selinux-usr/policy/constraints,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -r1.2 -r1.4
--- policy/constraints	1 Jul 2003 13:35:42 -0000	1.2
+++ policy/constraints	21 Jan 2004 15:25:29 -0000	1.4
@@ -34,14 +34,18 @@
 #
 
 constrain process transition
-	( u1 == u2 or t1 == privuser
+	( u1 == u2 or ( t1 == privuser and t2 == userdomain )
 ifdef(`crond.te', `
          or (t1 == crond_t and t2 == user_crond_domain)
 ')
         );
 
 constrain process transition 
-	( r1 == r2 or t1 == privrole) ;
+	( r1 == r2 or ( t1 == privrole and t2 == userdomain )
+ifdef(`crond.te', `
+         or (t1 == crond_t and t2 == user_crond_domain)
+')
+        );
 
 #
 # Restrict the ability to label objects with other

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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2004-01-27  5:07 login roles Timothy Wood
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