* Re: [PATCH, local root on 2.4, 2.6?] compute_creds race (fixed patch) [not found] <fa.fuv6lk6.1444ua6@ifi.uio.no> @ 2004-04-09 23:21 ` Andy Lutomirski 2004-04-10 4:22 ` Andrew Morton 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2004-04-09 23:21 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Kernel Mailing List, akpm, torvalds, chrisw; +Cc: Andy Lutomirski My previous patch broke LSM. Here's a fixed version, which also moves makes the various bprm_apply_creds implementations a little more readable. SELinux compiles, but I haven't tested it. I'd be surprised if it broke, but it may have a similar race. fs/exec.c | 31 +------------------------------ include/linux/security.h | 18 +++++++++--------- security/capability.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- security/dummy.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++---- 6 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) --- ./fs/exec.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:18:45.208241872 -0700 +++ ./fs/exec.c 2004-04-09 15:43:38.873194968 -0700 @@ -869,15 +869,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_old_exec); -/* - * We mustn't allow tracing of suid binaries, unless - * the tracer has the capability to trace anything.. - */ -static inline int must_not_trace_exec(struct task_struct * p) -{ - return (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP); -} - /* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes @@ -944,27 +935,7 @@ void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - task_lock(current); - if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { - current->mm->dumpable = 0; - - if (must_not_trace_exec(current) - || atomic_read(¤t->fs->count) > 1 - || atomic_read(¤t->files->count) > 1 - || atomic_read(¤t->sighand->count) > 1) { - if(!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - bprm->e_uid = current->uid; - bprm->e_gid = current->gid; - } - } - } - - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; - - task_unlock(current); - - security_bprm_compute_creds(bprm); + security_bprm_apply_creds(bprm); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(compute_creds); --- ./security/selinux/hooks.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:18:00.938971824 -0700 +++ ./security/selinux/hooks.c 2004-04-09 11:18:27.354955984 -0700 @@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); } -static void selinux_bprm_compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_security_struct *tsec, *psec; struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; @@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; - secondary_ops->bprm_compute_creds(bprm); + secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm); tsec = current->security; @@ -2561,7 +2561,7 @@ /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit - upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_compute_creds. */ + upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); @@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security, .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security, - .bprm_compute_creds = selinux_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security, .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, --- ./security/commoncap.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:16:21.766048400 -0700 +++ ./security/commoncap.c 2004-04-09 16:03:47.324482448 -0700 @@ -115,13 +115,15 @@ return 0; } -/* Copied from fs/exec.c */ static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { - return (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP); + return ((p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)) + || atomic_read(¤t->fs->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->files->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->sighand->count) > 1; } -void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working; @@ -132,18 +134,26 @@ new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working); task_lock(current); + + if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable = 0; + + if (must_not_trace_exec(current) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + if (!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { current->mm->dumpable = 0; - if (must_not_trace_exec (current) - || atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) > 1 - || atomic_read (¤t->files->count) > 1 - || atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) > 1) { - if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) { - new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted, - current-> - cap_permitted); - } + if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) { + new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted, + current-> + cap_permitted); } } @@ -315,7 +325,7 @@ vm_acct_memory(pages); - /* + /* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory == 1) @@ -377,7 +387,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capset_check); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capset_set); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_set_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_compute_creds); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_apply_creds); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_secureexec); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_setxattr); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_removexattr); --- ./security/dummy.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:17:16.964656936 -0700 +++ ./security/dummy.c 2004-04-09 15:52:03.433490144 -0700 @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ #include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/file.h> static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) { @@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ vm_acct_memory(pages); - /* + /* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory == 1) @@ -169,9 +171,30 @@ return; } -static void dummy_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { - return; + return ((p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)) + || atomic_read(¤t->fs->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->files->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->sighand->count) > 1; +} + +static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + task_lock(current); + if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable = 0; + + if (must_not_trace_exec(current) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + + task_unlock(current); } static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -887,7 +910,7 @@ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_compute_creds); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_apply_creds); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_set_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec); --- ./security/capability.c.orig 2004-04-09 15:52:30.144429464 -0700 +++ ./security/capability.c 2004-04-09 15:52:49.996411504 -0700 @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, - .bprm_compute_creds = cap_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security, .bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec, --- ./include/linux/security.h.orig 2004-04-09 11:12:10.991171976 -0700 +++ ./include/linux/security.h 2004-04-09 11:12:58.969878104 -0700 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ extern int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); extern void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags); extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name); @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ * @bprm_free_security: * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure to be modified. * Deallocate and clear the @bprm->security field. - * @bprm_compute_creds: + * @bprm_apply_creds: * Compute and set the security attributes of a process being transformed * by an execve operation based on the old attributes (current->security) * and the information saved in @bprm->security by the set_security hook. @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * @bprm_set_security: * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based - * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the compute_creds + * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for * transitions between security domains). * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for @@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ * Check permission before allowing the @parent process to trace the * @child process. * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check - * during an execve in the set_security or compute_creds hooks of + * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security * attributes would be changed by the execve. * @parent contains the task_struct structure for parent process. @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ int (*bprm_alloc_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); void (*bprm_free_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); - void (*bprm_compute_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); + void (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_set_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); @@ -1290,9 +1290,9 @@ { security_ops->bprm_free_security (bprm); } -static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - security_ops->bprm_compute_creds (bprm); + security_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm); } static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { @@ -1962,9 +1962,9 @@ static inline void security_bprm_free (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { } -static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - cap_bprm_compute_creds (bprm); + cap_bprm_apply_creds (bprm); } static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm) ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH, local root on 2.4, 2.6?] compute_creds race (fixed patch) 2004-04-09 23:21 ` [PATCH, local root on 2.4, 2.6?] compute_creds race (fixed patch) Andy Lutomirski @ 2004-04-10 4:22 ` Andrew Morton 2004-04-10 7:20 ` Andy Lutomirski 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Andrew Morton @ 2004-04-10 4:22 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Andy Lutomirski; +Cc: linux-kernel, torvalds, chrisw, luto Andy Lutomirski <luto@myrealbox.com> wrote: > > User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.5 (Windows/20040207) uh-oh. > My previous patch broke LSM. Here's a fixed version, patching file fs/exec.c Hunk #1 FAILED at 869. Hunk #2 FAILED at 935. 2 out of 2 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file fs/exec.c.rej patching file security/selinux/hooks.c Hunk #1 FAILED at 1746. Hunk #2 succeeded at 1755 with fuzz 2 (offset -1 lines). Hunk #3 FAILED at 2560. Hunk #4 FAILED at 3971. 3 out of 4 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/selinux/hooks.c.rej patching file security/commoncap.c Hunk #1 FAILED at 115. Hunk #2 FAILED at 134. Hunk #3 FAILED at 325. Hunk #4 FAILED at 387. 4 out of 4 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/commoncap.c.rej patching file security/dummy.c Hunk #1 FAILED at 26. Hunk #2 FAILED at 118. Hunk #3 FAILED at 171. Hunk #4 FAILED at 910. 4 out of 4 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/dummy.c.rej patching file security/capability.c Hunk #1 FAILED at 35. 1 out of 1 hunk FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/capability.c.rej patching file include/linux/security.h patch: **** malformed patch at line 289: *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); Please resend as an attachment. These fancypants mailers just can't keep their sticky paws off plain text. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH, local root on 2.4, 2.6?] compute_creds race (fixed patch) 2004-04-10 4:22 ` Andrew Morton @ 2004-04-10 7:20 ` Andy Lutomirski 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2004-04-10 7:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Kernel Mailing List, akpm; +Cc: Andy Lutomirski Andrew Morton wrote: > Andy Lutomirski <luto@myrealbox.com> wrote: > > > > User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.5 (Windows/20040207) > > uh-oh. caught me. I swear it's worked before. This one better work, though. fs/exec.c | 31 +------------------------------ include/linux/security.h | 18 +++++++++--------- security/capability.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- security/dummy.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++---- 6 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) --- ./fs/exec.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:18:45.208241872 -0700 +++ ./fs/exec.c 2004-04-09 15:43:38.873194968 -0700 @@ -869,15 +869,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_old_exec); -/* - * We mustn't allow tracing of suid binaries, unless - * the tracer has the capability to trace anything.. - */ -static inline int must_not_trace_exec(struct task_struct * p) -{ - return (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP); -} - /* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes @@ -944,27 +935,7 @@ void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - task_lock(current); - if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { - current->mm->dumpable = 0; - - if (must_not_trace_exec(current) - || atomic_read(¤t->fs->count) > 1 - || atomic_read(¤t->files->count) > 1 - || atomic_read(¤t->sighand->count) > 1) { - if(!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - bprm->e_uid = current->uid; - bprm->e_gid = current->gid; - } - } - } - - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; - - task_unlock(current); - - security_bprm_compute_creds(bprm); + security_bprm_apply_creds(bprm); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(compute_creds); --- ./security/selinux/hooks.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:18:00.938971824 -0700 +++ ./security/selinux/hooks.c 2004-04-09 11:18:27.354955984 -0700 @@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); } -static void selinux_bprm_compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_security_struct *tsec, *psec; struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; @@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; - secondary_ops->bprm_compute_creds(bprm); + secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm); tsec = current->security; @@ -2561,7 +2561,7 @@ /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit - upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_compute_creds. */ + upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); @@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security, .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security, - .bprm_compute_creds = selinux_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security, .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, --- ./security/commoncap.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:16:21.766048400 -0700 +++ ./security/commoncap.c 2004-04-09 16:03:47.324482448 -0700 @@ -115,13 +115,15 @@ return 0; } -/* Copied from fs/exec.c */ static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { - return (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP); + return ((p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)) + || atomic_read(¤t->fs->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->files->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->sighand->count) > 1; } -void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working; @@ -132,18 +134,26 @@ new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working); task_lock(current); + + if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable = 0; + + if (must_not_trace_exec(current) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + if (!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { current->mm->dumpable = 0; - if (must_not_trace_exec (current) - || atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) > 1 - || atomic_read (¤t->files->count) > 1 - || atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) > 1) { - if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) { - new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted, - current-> - cap_permitted); - } + if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) { + new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted, + current-> + cap_permitted); } } @@ -315,7 +325,7 @@ vm_acct_memory(pages); - /* + /* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory == 1) @@ -377,7 +387,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capset_check); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capset_set); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_set_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_compute_creds); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_apply_creds); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_secureexec); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_setxattr); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_inode_removexattr); --- ./security/dummy.c.orig 2004-04-09 11:17:16.964656936 -0700 +++ ./security/dummy.c 2004-04-09 15:52:03.433490144 -0700 @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ #include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/file.h> static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) { @@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ vm_acct_memory(pages); - /* + /* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory == 1) @@ -169,9 +171,30 @@ return; } -static void dummy_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { - return; + return ((p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP)) + || atomic_read(¤t->fs->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->files->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(¤t->sighand->count) > 1; +} + +static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + task_lock(current); + if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable = 0; + + if (must_not_trace_exec(current) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + + task_unlock(current); } static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -887,7 +910,7 @@ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_free_security); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_compute_creds); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_apply_creds); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_set_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec); --- ./security/capability.c.orig 2004-04-09 15:52:30.144429464 -0700 +++ ./security/capability.c 2004-04-09 15:52:49.996411504 -0700 @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, - .bprm_compute_creds = cap_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security, .bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec, --- ./include/linux/security.h.orig 2004-04-09 11:12:10.991171976 -0700 +++ ./include/linux/security.h 2004-04-09 11:12:58.969878104 -0700 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ extern int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); extern void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags); extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name); @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ * @bprm_free_security: * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure to be modified. * Deallocate and clear the @bprm->security field. - * @bprm_compute_creds: + * @bprm_apply_creds: * Compute and set the security attributes of a process being transformed * by an execve operation based on the old attributes (current->security) * and the information saved in @bprm->security by the set_security hook. @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * @bprm_set_security: * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based - * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the compute_creds + * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for * transitions between security domains). * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for @@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ * Check permission before allowing the @parent process to trace the * @child process. * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check - * during an execve in the set_security or compute_creds hooks of + * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security * attributes would be changed by the execve. * @parent contains the task_struct structure for parent process. @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ int (*bprm_alloc_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); void (*bprm_free_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); - void (*bprm_compute_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); + void (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_set_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); @@ -1290,9 +1290,9 @@ { security_ops->bprm_free_security (bprm); } -static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - security_ops->bprm_compute_creds (bprm); + security_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm); } static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { @@ -1962,9 +1962,9 @@ static inline void security_bprm_free (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { } -static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - cap_bprm_compute_creds (bprm); + cap_bprm_apply_creds (bprm); } static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm) ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2004-04-10 7:19 UTC | newest]
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[not found] <fa.fuv6lk6.1444ua6@ifi.uio.no>
2004-04-09 23:21 ` [PATCH, local root on 2.4, 2.6?] compute_creds race (fixed patch) Andy Lutomirski
2004-04-10 4:22 ` Andrew Morton
2004-04-10 7:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
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