Java Legacy problem

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* Java Legacy problem
@ 2005-02-20 14:45 Ivan Gyurdiev
  2005-02-20 15:44 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  2005-02-22 13:36 ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ivan Gyurdiev @ 2005-02-20 14:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: selinux; +Cc: dwalsh

Hi, 

As previously discussed on this list, Java does not work properly. 
It's a legacy domain that produces all kinds of execmod/execute denials.
Stephen Smalley suggested that it be placed in its own domain.

Daniel Walsh's Java policy, however, only works for the Mozilla plugin.
I think the argument was that a Java policy would have to permit most
things in the user domain.

So, what is the recommended strategy for dealing with Java, so
that those denials will go away?

user_t (java):
denied { execute } ld_so_cache_t:file (/etc/ld.so.cache) 
denied { execute } locale_t:file      (/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive)
denied { execmod } shlib_t:file       (/lib/libc-2.3.4.so)
denied { execmod } ld_so_t:file       (/lib/ld-2.3.4.so)

-- 
Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
Cornell University

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-20 14:45 Java Legacy problem Ivan Gyurdiev
@ 2005-02-20 15:44 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  2005-02-20 15:53   ` Ivan Gyurdiev
  2005-02-22 13:36 ` Stephen Smalley
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton @ 2005-02-20 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ivan Gyurdiev; +Cc: selinux, dwalsh

if i was dealing with it, i would create a macro - mozilla_java_domain
with an argument $1 which takes the role (see usage of mozilla_domain).

it'd create a type mozilla_java_$1_t which would then
have things like this:

uses_shlib($1)

which would get rid of most of the things you list, below, as a
start, and then you could move on to the _next_ lot :)

the key bit is to then identify which program is being
run which gets you _into_ that domain so that you can
do a domain_auto_trans(), something like this:

domain_auto_trans($1_mozilla_t, java_program_thing_exec_t,
			mozilla_java_$1_t)


the $1_mozilla_t i _assume_ is what mozilla gets executed
in, looking at macros/program/mozilla_macros.te.

if so, and _assuming_ it executes a program
/usr/java/j2re1.4.2_05/bin/java which will need to be given
a context java_program_thing_exec_t _then_ you will
end up executing that program in mozilla_java_user_t
(or whatever - mozilla_java_sysadm_t if you're mad enough).


if of course mozilla doesn't bother to exec the program
/usr/java/..../bin/java, and instead does something stupid
like load the java libraries itself, then of course you're in
trouble because you'd need to modify mozilla to use the new
setcon() dynamic transition thing, in which case, good luck.

l.

On Sun, Feb 20, 2005 at 09:45:13AM -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> Hi, 
> 
> As previously discussed on this list, Java does not work properly. 
> It's a legacy domain that produces all kinds of execmod/execute denials.
> Stephen Smalley suggested that it be placed in its own domain.
> 
> Daniel Walsh's Java policy, however, only works for the Mozilla plugin.
> I think the argument was that a Java policy would have to permit most
> things in the user domain.
> 
> So, what is the recommended strategy for dealing with Java, so
> that those denials will go away?
> 
> user_t (java):
> denied { execute } ld_so_cache_t:file (/etc/ld.so.cache) 
> denied { execute } locale_t:file      (/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive)
> denied { execmod } shlib_t:file       (/lib/libc-2.3.4.so)
> denied { execmod } ld_so_t:file       (/lib/ld-2.3.4.so)
> 
> 
> -- 
> Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
> Cornell University
> 
> 
> --
> This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
> If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

-- 
--
<a href="http://lkcl.net">http://lkcl.net</a>
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-20 15:44 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
@ 2005-02-20 15:53   ` Ivan Gyurdiev
  2005-02-20 17:17     ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ivan Gyurdiev @ 2005-02-20 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton; +Cc: selinux, dwalsh

On Sun, 2005-02-20 at 15:44 +0000, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
>if i was dealing with it, i would create a macro - mozilla_java_domain
>with an argument $1 which takes the role (see usage of mozilla_domain).

Hi Luke. 
Perhaps my mail did not make it clear - I am interested in java usage
outside mozilla. The mozilla java policy already exists and works.
However that policy is not used to transition from user_t/staff_t. 
Furthermore, Dan Walsh has argued that it should not be used
for that purpose.
>
-- 
Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
Cornell University


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* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-20 15:53   ` Ivan Gyurdiev
@ 2005-02-20 17:17     ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  2005-02-21 13:01       ` Daniel J Walsh
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton @ 2005-02-20 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ivan Gyurdiev; +Cc: selinux, dwalsh

On Sun, Feb 20, 2005 at 10:53:58AM -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> On Sun, 2005-02-20 at 15:44 +0000, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
> >if i was dealing with it, i would create a macro - mozilla_java_domain
> >with an argument $1 which takes the role (see usage of mozilla_domain).
> 
> Hi Luke. 
> Perhaps my mail did not make it clear - I am interested in java usage
> outside mozilla. The mozilla java policy already exists and works.

 ah, right.

 okayyy... well, you would do well to follow the same approach
 (but this time with a macro called java_domain),
 such that any program you intend to be capable of using java
 you could use the macro to give that program the rights it
 needs when executing java.

 however, the point i believe that is being made is that 1) is
 user_t sufficient protection and if so don't bother 2) be
 careful if you create a new domain that you don't give it
 _more_ rights than user_t is normally allowed.

 l.

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* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-20 17:17     ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
@ 2005-02-21 13:01       ` Daniel J Walsh
  2005-02-21 13:24         ` Ivan Gyurdiev
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Daniel J Walsh @ 2005-02-21 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton; +Cc: Ivan Gyurdiev, selinux

Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:

>On Sun, Feb 20, 2005 at 10:53:58AM -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
>  
>
>>On Sun, 2005-02-20 at 15:44 +0000, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
>>    
>>
>>>if i was dealing with it, i would create a macro - mozilla_java_domain
>>>with an argument $1 which takes the role (see usage of mozilla_domain).
>>>      
>>>
>>Hi Luke. 
>>Perhaps my mail did not make it clear - I am interested in java usage
>>outside mozilla. The mozilla java policy already exists and works.
>>    
>>
>
> ah, right.
>
> okayyy... well, you would do well to follow the same approach
> (but this time with a macro called java_domain),
> such that any program you intend to be capable of using java
> you could use the macro to give that program the rights it
> needs when executing java.
>
> however, the point i believe that is being made is that 1) is
> user_t sufficient protection and if so don't bother 2) be
> careful if you create a new domain that you don't give it
> _more_ rights than user_t is normally allowed.
>
> l.
>  
>

This is a case where we may want to give an application more rights then 
user_t.
The java_user_t should be user_t + (execmem/execmod privs)

>
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>This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
>If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
>the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
>  
>


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* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-21 13:01       ` Daniel J Walsh
@ 2005-02-21 13:24         ` Ivan Gyurdiev
  2005-02-21 13:59           ` Daniel J Walsh
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ivan Gyurdiev @ 2005-02-21 13:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Daniel J Walsh; +Cc: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton, selinux


>
>This is a case where we may want to give an application more rights then 
>user_t.
>The java_user_t should be user_t + (execmem/execmod privs)

Maybe we should just ask Sun to fix it?

-- 
Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
Cornell University


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* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-21 13:24         ` Ivan Gyurdiev
@ 2005-02-21 13:59           ` Daniel J Walsh
  2005-02-21 14:24             ` Ivan Gyurdiev
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Daniel J Walsh @ 2005-02-21 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: ivg2; +Cc: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton, selinux

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 691 bytes --]

Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:

>>This is a case where we may want to give an application more rights then 
>>user_t.
>>The java_user_t should be user_t + (execmem/execmod privs)
>>    
>>
>
>Maybe we should just ask Sun to fix it?
>
>  
>
I don't think java can be fixed,   I think it is doing this stuff by 
design. 
A couple of things to try.

How about we rename java_domain to javap_domain (java_plugin).
Then we create a java_domain like the following

define(`java_domain',`
type $1_java_t, domain, privlog , nscd_client_domain, transitionbool;
legacy_domain($1_java)
base_user_domain($1_java)
domain_auto_trans($1_t, java_exec_t, $1_java_t)
')

Attached latest diffs to make these changes.




[-- Attachment #2: diff --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 28666 bytes --]

diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/ChangeLog policy-1.21.14/ChangeLog
--- nsapolicy/ChangeLog	2005-02-17 10:16:42.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/ChangeLog	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 1.21 2005-02-07
 	* Added secure_file_type attribute from Dan Walsh
-	* Added access_terminal() macro from Dan Walsh
+	* Added access_terminal() macro from Ivan Gyurdiev
 	* Updated capability access vector for audit capabilities.
 	* Added mlsconvert Makefile target to help generate MLS policies
 	  (see selinux-doc/README.MLS for instructions).
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/ldconfig.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/ldconfig.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/ldconfig.te	2005-02-10 14:48:38.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/ldconfig.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -38,14 +38,14 @@
 dontaudit ldconfig_t httpd_modules_t:dir search;
 ')
 
-ifdef(`distro_suse', `
-# because of libraries in /var/lib/samba/bin
 allow ldconfig_t { var_t var_lib_t }:dir search;
-')
-
 allow ldconfig_t proc_t:file read;
 ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
 ifdef(`unconfined.te',`
 dontaudit ldconfig_t unconfined_t:tcp_socket { read write };
-')
+');
 ')dnl end hide_broken_symptoms
+ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
+allow ldconfig_t lib_t:file r_file_perms;
+unconfined_domain(ldconfig_t) 
+')
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/amanda.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/amanda.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/amanda.te	2005-02-10 14:48:39.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/amanda.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 # General declarations
 ######################
 
-type amanda_t, domain, privlog;
+type amanda_t, domain, privlog, nscd_client_domain ;
 role system_r types amanda_t;
 
 # type for the amanda executables
@@ -304,3 +304,7 @@
 type amanda_port_t, port_type;
 allow inetd_t amanda_port_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } name_bind;
 
+allow amanda_t file_type:dir {getattr read search };
+allow amanda_t file_type:file {getattr read };
+var_log_domain(amanda)
+
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/apache.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/apache.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/apache.te	2005-02-17 10:16:43.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/apache.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -307,6 +307,7 @@
 #
 typealias httpd_log_t  alias httpd_runtime_t;
 allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t } httpd_runtime_t:file { getattr append };
+dontaudit httpd_t httpd_runtime_t:file ioctl;
 ') dnl distro_redhat
 #
 # Customer reported the following
@@ -323,8 +324,9 @@
 allow httpd_sys_script_t httpd_squirrelmail_t:file { append read };
 # File Type of squirrelmail attachments
 type squirrelmail_spool_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile;
-allow httpd_t var_spool_t:dir { getattr search };
+allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t } var_spool_t:dir { getattr search };
 create_dir_file(httpd_t, squirrelmail_spool_t)
+r_dir_file(httpd_sys_script_t, squirrelmail_spool_t)
 
 ifdef(`mta.te', `
 dontaudit system_mail_t httpd_log_t:file { append getattr };
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/cups.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/cups.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/cups.te	2005-02-17 10:16:43.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/cups.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
 
 # Use capabilities.
 allow cupsd_t self:capability { dac_read_search kill setgid setuid fsetid net_bind_service fowner chown dac_override sys_tty_config };
+dontaudit cupsd_t self:capability net_admin;
 
 allow cupsd_t self:process setsched;
 
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/dovecot.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/dovecot.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/dovecot.te	2005-02-09 15:01:29.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/dovecot.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 
 allow dovecot_t pop_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
 allow dovecot_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
+allow dovecot_t cert_t:dir search;
 allow dovecot_t dovecot_cert_t:file { getattr read };
 
 allow dovecot_t { self proc_t }:file { getattr read };
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/java.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/java.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/java.te	2005-02-16 14:34:10.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/java.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -10,5 +10,8 @@
 # Allow java to read files in the user home directory
 bool disable_java false;
 
+# Allow java to read files in the user home directory
+bool disable_javap false;
+
 # Everything else is in the java_domain macro in
 # macros/program/java_macros.te.
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/nscd.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/nscd.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/nscd.te	2005-02-10 14:48:39.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/nscd.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -72,4 +72,4 @@
 allow nscd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
 allow nscd_t tmp_t:dir { search getattr };
 allow nscd_t tmp_t:lnk_file read;
-allow nscd_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
+allow nscd_t { urandom_device_t random_device_t }:chr_file { getattr read };
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/ping.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/ping.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/ping.te	2005-02-09 15:01:29.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/ping.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 # ping_t is the domain for the ping program.
 # ping_exec_t is the type of the corresponding program.
 #
-type ping_t, domain, privlog;
+type ping_t, domain, privlog, nscd_client_domain;
 role sysadm_r types ping_t;
 role system_r types ping_t;
 in_user_role(ping_t)
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/privoxy.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/privoxy.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/privoxy.te	2005-02-09 15:01:29.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/privoxy.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 allow privoxy_t self:capability net_bind_service;
 
 # Use the network.
-can_network_server(privoxy_t)
+can_network(privoxy_t)
 allow privoxy_t port_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } name_bind;
 allow privoxy_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
 allow privoxy_t self:capability { setgid setuid };
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/samba.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/samba.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/samba.te	2005-02-17 10:16:44.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/samba.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -176,12 +176,7 @@
 
 # Terminal
 read_locale(smbmount_t) 
-allow smbmount_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow smbmount_t devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow smbmount_t devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow smbmount_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow smbmount_t sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-#FIXME: what about user_tty_device_t, user_devpts_t?
+access_terminal(smbmount_t, sysadm)
 allow smbmount_t userdomain:fd use;
 allow smbmount_t local_login_t:fd use;
 ')
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/utempter.te policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/utempter.te
--- nsapolicy/domains/program/unused/utempter.te	2005-02-09 15:01:28.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/domains/program/unused/utempter.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 # executed by xterm to update utmp and wtmp.
 # utempter_exec_t is the type of the utempter binary.
 #
-type utempter_t, domain;
+type utempter_t, domain, nscd_client_domain;
 in_user_role(utempter_t)
 role sysadm_r types utempter_t;
 uses_shlib(utempter_t)
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/file_contexts/program/amanda.fc policy-1.21.14/file_contexts/program/amanda.fc
--- nsapolicy/file_contexts/program/amanda.fc	2005-02-09 15:01:30.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/file_contexts/program/amanda.fc	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -67,3 +67,4 @@
 /var/lib/amanda/disklist	--	system_u:object_r:amanda_data_t
 /var/lib/amanda/gnutar-lists(/.*)?	system_u:object_r:amanda_gnutarlists_t
 /var/lib/amanda/index			system_u:object_r:amanda_data_t
+/var/log/amanda(/.*)?			system_u:object_r:amanda_log_t
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/global_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/global_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/global_macros.te	2005-02-17 10:16:46.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/global_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@
 #Required when starting with /lib/tls/libc-
 allow $1_t { texrel_shlib_t shlib_t }:file execmod;
 allow $1_t ld_so_t:file execmod;
+allow $1_t ld_so_cache_t:file execmod;
 }
 ')
 
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/games_domain.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/games_domain.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/games_domain.te	2005-02-10 14:48:42.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/games_domain.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
 allow $1_games_t xdm_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow $1_games_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
 allow $1_games_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
-allow $1_games_t xdm_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
 ')dnl end if xdm.te
 
 can_unix_connect($1_t, $1_games_t)
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/gpg_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/gpg_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/gpg_macros.te	2005-02-17 10:16:46.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/gpg_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 allow $1_gpg_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
 
 access_terminal($1_gpg_t, $1)
+allow $1_gpg_t { $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t }:chr_file ioctl;
 ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_gpg_t $1_gph_t:fd use;')
 
 # Inherit and use descriptors
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/java_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/java_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/java_macros.te	2005-02-16 14:34:31.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/java_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -1,117 +1,134 @@
 #
-# Macros for java/java (or other browser) domains.
+# Authors:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 
 #
-
 #
-# Authors:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> and Timothy Fraser 
+# Macros for java domains.
 #
-
 #
-# java_domain(domain_prefix, user)
+# java_domain(domain_prefix)
 #
-# Define a derived domain for the java/java program when executed by
-# a web browser.  
+# Define a derived domain for the java program when executed by
+# a user.
 #
 # The type declaration for the executable type for this program is
 # provided separately in domains/program/java.te. 
 #
+
 define(`java_domain',`
 type $1_java_t, domain, privlog , nscd_client_domain, transitionbool;
+legacy_domain($1_java)
+base_user_domain($1_java)
+domain_auto_trans($1_t, java_exec_t, $1_java_t)
+')
+
+#
+# Macros for javap (java plugin) domains.
+#
+#
+# javap_domain(domain_prefix, user)
+#
+# Define a derived domain for the javap program when executed by
+# a web browser.  
+#
+# The type declaration for the executable type for this program is
+# provided separately in domains/program/java.te. 
+#
+define(`javap_domain',`
+type $1_javap_t, domain, privlog , nscd_client_domain, transitionbool;
 
 # The user role is authorized for this domain.
-role $2_r types $1_java_t;
-domain_auto_trans($1_t, java_exec_t, $1_java_t)
+role $2_r types $1_javap_t;
+domain_auto_trans($1_t, java_exec_t, $1_javap_t)
 
-allow $1_java_t sound_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow $1_javap_t sound_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 # Unrestricted inheritance from the caller.
-allow $1_t $1_java_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
-allow $1_java_t $1_t:process signull;
+allow $1_t $1_javap_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
+allow $1_javap_t $1_t:process signull;
 
-can_unix_connect($1_java_t, $1_t)
-allow $1_java_t $1_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+can_unix_connect($1_javap_t, $1_t)
+allow $1_javap_t $1_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
 
 # This domain is granted permissions common to most domains (including can_net)
-can_network_client($1_java_t)
-can_ypbind($1_java_t)
-allow $1_java_t self:process { fork signal_perms getsched setsched };
-allow $1_java_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
-allow $1_java_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow $1_java_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-allow $1_java_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-read_locale($1_java_t)
-r_dir_file($1_java_t, { proc_t proc_net_t })
-allow $1_java_t self:dir search;
-allow $1_java_t self:lnk_file read;
-allow $1_java_t self:file { getattr read };
-
-read_sysctl($1_java_t)
-
-tmp_domain($1_java)
-r_dir_file($1_java_t,{ fonts_t usr_t etc_t })
-
-# Search bin directory under java for java executable
-allow $1_java_t bin_t:dir search;
-can_exec($1_java_t, java_exec_t)
+can_network_client($1_javap_t)
+can_ypbind($1_javap_t)
+allow $1_javap_t self:process { fork signal_perms getsched setsched };
+allow $1_javap_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
+allow $1_javap_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+allow $1_javap_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
+allow $1_javap_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
+r_dir_file($1_javap_t, { proc_t proc_net_t })
+allow $1_javap_t self:dir search;
+allow $1_javap_t self:lnk_file read;
+allow $1_javap_t self:file { getattr read };
+
+read_sysctl($1_javap_t)
+
+tmp_domain($1_javap)
+r_dir_file($1_javap_t,{ fonts_t usr_t etc_t })
+
+# Search bin directory under javap for javap executable
+allow $1_javap_t bin_t:dir search;
+can_exec($1_javap_t, javap_exec_t)
 
 # Allow connections to X server.
 ifdef(`xserver.te', `
 
 ifdef(`xdm.te', `
 # for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system
-allow $1_java_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
-allow $1_java_t xdm_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow $1_java_t xdm_tmp_t:dir search;
-allow $1_java_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+allow $1_javap_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
+allow $1_javap_t xdm_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+allow $1_javap_t xdm_tmp_t:dir search;
+allow $1_javap_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file write;
 ')
 
 ifdef(`startx.te', `
 # for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the X server
-allow $1_java_t $2_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
+allow $1_javap_t $2_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
 
 # for /tmp/.X0-lock
-allow $1_java_t $2_xserver_tmp_t:file getattr;
+allow $1_javap_t $2_xserver_tmp_t:file getattr;
 
-allow $1_java_t $2_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
-can_unix_connect($1_java_t, $2_xserver_t)
+allow $1_javap_t $2_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
+can_unix_connect($1_javap_t, $2_xserver_t)
 ')dnl end startx
 
-can_unix_connect($1_java_t, xdm_xserver_t)
-allow xdm_xserver_t $1_java_t:fd use;
-allow xdm_xserver_t $1_java_t:shm { associate getattr read unix_read };
-dontaudit xdm_xserver_t $1_java_t:shm { unix_write write };
+can_unix_connect($1_javap_t, xdm_xserver_t)
+allow xdm_xserver_t $1_javap_t:fd use;
+allow xdm_xserver_t $1_javap_t:shm { associate getattr read unix_read };
+dontaudit xdm_xserver_t $1_javap_t:shm { unix_write write };
 
 ')dnl end xserver
 
-allow $1_java_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
+allow $1_javap_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
 
-legacy_domain($1_java)
+legacy_domain($1_javap)
 
-uses_shlib($1_java_t)
-read_locale($1_java_t)
-rw_dir_file($1_java_t, $1_rw_t)
-
-allow $1_java_t ld_so_cache_t:file execute;
-allow $1_java_t lib_t:file execute;
-allow $1_java_t locale_t:file execute;
-allow $1_java_t $1_java_tmp_t:file execute;
-
-allow $1_java_t { random_device_t urandom_device_t }:chr_file ra_file_perms;
-
-allow $1_java_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search };
-file_type_auto_trans($1_java_t, $2_home_dir_t, $1_rw_t)
-allow $1_java_t $2_home_xauth_t:file { getattr read };
-allow $1_java_t $2_tmp_t:sock_file write;
-allow $1_java_t $2_t:fd use;
-
-allow $1_java_t var_t:dir getattr;
-allow $1_java_t var_lib_t:dir { getattr search };
-
-dontaudit $1_java_t fonts_t:file execute;
-dontaudit $1_java_t sound_device_t:chr_file execute;
-dontaudit $1_java_t $2_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
-dontaudit $1_java_t sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
-dontaudit $1_java_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-dontaudit $1_java_t tmpfs_t:file { execute read write };
-dontaudit $1_java_t $1_rw_t:file { execute setattr };
+uses_shlib($1_javap_t)
+read_locale($1_javap_t)
+rw_dir_file($1_javap_t, $1_rw_t)
+
+allow $1_javap_t ld_so_cache_t:file execute;
+allow $1_javap_t lib_t:file execute;
+allow $1_javap_t locale_t:file execute;
+allow $1_javap_t $1_javap_tmp_t:file execute;
+
+allow $1_javap_t { random_device_t urandom_device_t }:chr_file ra_file_perms;
+
+allow $1_javap_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search };
+file_type_auto_trans($1_javap_t, $2_home_dir_t, $1_rw_t)
+allow $1_javap_t $2_home_xauth_t:file { getattr read };
+allow $1_javap_t $2_tmp_t:sock_file write;
+allow $1_javap_t $2_t:fd use;
+
+allow $1_javap_t var_t:dir getattr;
+allow $1_javap_t var_lib_t:dir { getattr search };
+
+dontaudit $1_javap_t fonts_t:file execute;
+dontaudit $1_javap_t sound_device_t:chr_file execute;
+dontaudit $1_javap_t $2_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
+dontaudit $1_javap_t sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
+dontaudit $1_javap_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
+dontaudit $1_javap_t tmpfs_t:file { execute read write };
+dontaudit $1_javap_t $1_rw_t:file { execute setattr };
 
 ')
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/mozilla_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/mozilla_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/mozilla_macros.te	2005-02-17 10:16:46.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/mozilla_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
 dontaudit $1_mozilla_t $1_home_t:dir setattr;
 dontaudit $1_mozilla_t $1_home_t:file setattr;
 }
+allow $1_mozilla_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
 file_type_auto_trans($1_mozilla_t, tmp_t, $1_mozilla_rw_t)
 file_type_auto_trans($1_mozilla_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_mozilla_rw_t)
 
@@ -111,8 +112,9 @@
 
 #
 # Rules needed to run java apps
-
-java_domain($1_mozilla, $1)
+ifdef(`java.te', `
+javap_domain($1_mozilla, $1)
+')
 
 # Mplayer plugin
 ifdef(`mplayer.te', `
@@ -123,12 +125,6 @@
 allow $1_mplayer_t $1_mozilla_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
 ')dnl end if mplayer.te  
 
-ifdef(`xdm.te', `
-allow $1_mozilla_t xdm_t:fifo_file { write read };
-allow $1_mozilla_t xdm_tmp_t:dir search;
-allow $1_mozilla_t xdm_tmp_t:file { getattr read };
-allow $1_mozilla_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file write;
-')dnl end if xdm.te
 if (allow_execmem) {
 allow $1_mozilla_t self:process { execmem };
 }
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/mplayer_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/mplayer_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/mplayer_macros.te	2005-02-14 14:49:20.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/mplayer_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 uses_shlib($1_$2_t)
 read_locale($1_$2_t)
 access_terminal($1_$2_t, $1)
+allow $1_$2_t { $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t }:chr_file ioctl;
 
 # Required for win32 binary loader 
 allow $1_$2_t zero_device_t:chr_file { read write execute };
@@ -79,11 +80,6 @@
 # Mplayer common stuff
 mplayer_common($1, mplayer)
 
-# Additional rules for search /tmp/.X11-unix
-ifdef(`xdm.te', `
-allow $1_mplayer_t xdm_tmp_t:dir search;
-')dnl end if xdm.te
-
 # Audio
 allow $1_mplayer_t sound_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/ssh_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te	2005-02-17 10:16:46.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/ssh_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@
 
 # Write to the user domain tty.
 access_terminal($1_ssh_t, $1)
+allow $1_ssh_t { $1_devpts_t $1_tty_device_t devtty_t }:chr_file ioctl;
 
 # Allow the user shell to signal the ssh program.
 allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:process signal;
@@ -138,7 +139,8 @@
 allow $1_ssh_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
 ')dnl end if startx
 ifdef(`xdm.te', `
-allow $1_ssh_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
+allow $1_ssh_t { xdm_xserver_tmp_t xdm_tmp_t }:dir search;
+allow $1_ssh_t { xdm_tmp_t }:sock_file write;
 ')
 ')dnl end if xserver
 
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/tvtime_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/tvtime_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/tvtime_macros.te	2005-02-09 15:01:31.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/tvtime_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -33,9 +33,6 @@
 allow $1_tvtime_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice sys_resource };
 allow $1_tvtime_t self:process setsched;
 allow $1_tvtime_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-ifdef(`xdm.te', `
-allow $1_tvtime_t xdm_tmp_t:dir search;
-')
 
 ')dnl end tvtime_domain
 
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/program/x_client_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/program/x_client_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/program/x_client_macros.te	2005-02-17 10:16:46.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/program/x_client_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
 allow $1_$2_t xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file r_file_perms;
 
 can_unix_connect($1_$2_t, xdm_xserver_t)
-allow $1_$2_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
+allow $1_$2_t { xdm_xserver_tmp_t xdm_tmp_t }:dir search;
 allow $1_$2_t { xdm_xserver_tmp_t xdm_tmp_t }:sock_file { read write };
 allow $1_$2_t xdm_t:fd use;
 dontaudit $1_$2_t xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write };
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/macros/user_macros.te policy-1.21.14/macros/user_macros.te
--- nsapolicy/macros/user_macros.te	2005-02-17 10:16:46.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/macros/user_macros.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 ifdef(`apache.te', `apache_domain($1)')
 ifdef(`slocate.te', `locate_domain($1)')
 ifdef(`lockdev.te', `lockdev_domain($1)')
+ifdef(`java.te', `java_domain($1)')
 
 can_kerberos($1_t)
 # allow port_t name binding for UDP because it is not very usable otherwise
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/Makefile policy-1.21.14/Makefile
--- nsapolicy/Makefile	2005-02-17 15:52:02.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/Makefile	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -21,21 +21,25 @@
 SBINDIR = $(PREFIX)/sbin
 LOADPOLICY  = $(SBINDIR)/load_policy
 CHECKPOLICY = $(BINDIR)/checkpolicy
+GENHOMEDIRCON = $(SBINDIR)/genhomedircon
 SETFILES = $(SBINDIR)/setfiles
 VERS := $(shell $(CHECKPOLICY) $(POLICYCOMPAT) -V |cut -f 1 -d ' ')
 KERNVERS := $(shell cat /selinux/policyvers)
 POLICYVER := policy.$(VERS)
+TOPDIR = $(DESTDIR)/etc/selinux
 ifeq ($(MLS),y)
-INSTALLDIR = $(DESTDIR)/etc/selinux/mls
+TYPE=mls
 else
-INSTALLDIR = $(DESTDIR)/etc/selinux/strict
+TYPE=strict
 endif
+INSTALLDIR = $(TOPDIR)/$(TYPE)
 POLICYPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/policy
 SRCPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/src
 USERPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/users
 CONTEXTPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/contexts
 LOADPATH = $(POLICYPATH)/$(POLICYVER)
 FCPATH = $(CONTEXTPATH)/files/file_contexts
+HOMEDIRPATH = $(CONTEXTPATH)/files/homedir_template
 
 ALL_PROGRAM_MACROS := $(wildcard macros/program/*.te)
 ALL_MACROS := $(ALL_PROGRAM_MACROS) $(wildcard macros/*.te)
@@ -50,15 +54,18 @@
 POLICYFILES += mls
 CHECKPOLMLS += -M
 endif
+DEFCONTEXTFILES = initial_sid_contexts fs_use genfs_contexts net_contexts
 POLICYFILES += $(ALL_TUNABLES) $(TE_RBAC_FILES)
 POLICYFILES += $(USER_FILES)
 POLICYFILES += constraints
-POLICYFILES += initial_sid_contexts fs_use genfs_contexts net_contexts
-CONTEXTFILES = initial_sid_contexts fs_use genfs_contexts net_contexts
+POLICYFILES += $(DEFCONTEXTFILES)
+CONTEXTFILES = $(DEFCONTEXTFILES)
+POLICY_DIRS = domains/program domains/misc
 
 UNUSED_TE_FILES := $(wildcard domains/program/unused/*.te)
 
 FC = file_contexts/file_contexts
+HOMEDIR_TEMPLATE = file_contexts/homedir_template
 FCFILES=file_contexts/types.fc $(patsubst domains/program/%.te,file_contexts/program/%.fc, $(wildcard domains/program/*.te)) file_contexts/distros.fc $(wildcard file_contexts/misc/*.fc)
 CONTEXTFILES += $(FCFILES)
 
@@ -169,9 +176,9 @@
 	grep -v dontaudit policy.conf > policy.audit
 	mv policy.audit policy.conf
 
-policy.conf: $(POLICYFILES) 
+policy.conf: $(POLICYFILES) $(POLICY_DIRS)
 	mkdir -p tmp
-	m4 $(M4PARAM) -Imacros -s $^ > $@.tmp
+	m4 $(M4PARAM) -Imacros -s $(POLICYFILES) > $@.tmp
 	mv $@.tmp $@
 
 install-src: 
@@ -203,14 +210,15 @@
 $(FCPATH): $(FC) 
 	@mkdir -p $(CONTEXTPATH)/files
 	install -m 644 $(FC) $(FCPATH)
+	install -m 644 $(HOMEDIR_TEMPLATE) $(HOMEDIRPATH)
+	@$(GENHOMEDIRCON) -d $(TOPDIR) -t $(TYPE) $(USEPWD)
 
 $(FC): $(ALL_TUNABLES) tmp/program_used_flags.te $(FCFILES) domains/program domains/misc file_contexts/program file_contexts/misc users /etc/passwd
 	@echo "Building file_contexts ..."
 	@m4 $(M4PARAM) $(ALL_TUNABLES) tmp/program_used_flags.te $(FCFILES) > $@.tmp
-	@grep -v "^/root" $@.tmp > $@.root
-	@/usr/sbin/genhomedircon . $@.root  > $@
-	@grep "^/root" $@.tmp >> $@
-	@-rm $@.tmp $@.root
+	@grep -v -e HOME -e ROLE $@.tmp > $@
+	@grep -e HOME -e ROLE $@.tmp  > $(HOMEDIR_TEMPLATE)
+	@-rm $@.tmp
 
 # Create a tags-file for the policy:
 # we need exuberant ctags; unfortunately it is named differently on different distros, sigh...
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/targeted/domains/unconfined.te policy-1.21.14/targeted/domains/unconfined.te
--- nsapolicy/targeted/domains/unconfined.te	2005-02-09 15:01:45.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/targeted/domains/unconfined.te	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 role user_r types unconfined_t;
 role sysadm_r types unconfined_t;
 unconfined_domain(unconfined_t)
+allow domain unconfined_t:fd use;
+allow domain unconfined_t:process sigchld;
 
 # Define some type aliases to help with compatibility with
 # macros and domains from the "strict" policy.
@@ -37,6 +39,9 @@
 user_typealias(sysadm)
 user_typealias(staff)
 user_typealias(user)
+attribute user_file_type;
+attribute staff_file_type;
+attribute sysadm_file_type;
 
 allow unconfined_t unlabeled_t:filesystem *;
 allow unlabeled_t self:filesystem associate;
@@ -45,14 +50,19 @@
 bool use_nfs_home_dirs false;
 
 # Allow execution of anonymous mappings, e.g. executable stack.
-bool allow_execmem false;
+bool allow_execmem true;
 
 # Support Share libraries with Text Relocation
-bool allow_execmod false;
+bool allow_execmod true;
 
 # Support SAMBA home directories
 bool use_samba_home_dirs false;
 
+if (allow_execmod) {
+allow unconfined_t { ld_so_t shlib_t }:file execmod;
+allow unconfined_t { bin_t sbin_t exec_type }:file execmod;
+}
+
 ifdef(`samba.te', `samba_domain(user)')
 
 # Allow system to run with NIS
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/tunables/distro.tun policy-1.21.14/tunables/distro.tun
--- nsapolicy/tunables/distro.tun	2005-02-09 15:01:31.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/tunables/distro.tun	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # appropriate ifdefs.
 
 
-dnl define(`distro_redhat')
+define(`distro_redhat')
 
 dnl define(`distro_suse')
 
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsapolicy/tunables/tunable.tun policy-1.21.14/tunables/tunable.tun
--- nsapolicy/tunables/tunable.tun	2005-02-09 15:01:31.000000000 -0500
+++ policy-1.21.14/tunables/tunable.tun	2005-02-21 08:58:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
 # Allow users to execute the mount command
-dnl define(`user_can_mount')
+define(`user_can_mount')
 
 # Allow rpm to run unconfined.
-dnl define(`unlimitedRPM')
+define(`unlimitedRPM')
 
 # Allow privileged utilities like hotplug and insmod to run unconfined.
-dnl define(`unlimitedUtils')
+define(`unlimitedUtils')
 
 # Allow rc scripts to run unconfined, including any daemon
 # started by an rc script that does not have a domain transition
 # explicitly defined.
-dnl define(`unlimitedRC')
+define(`unlimitedRC')
 
 # Allow sysadm_t to directly start daemons
 define(`direct_sysadm_daemon')
 
 # Do not audit things that we know to be broken but which
 # are not security risks
-dnl define(`hide_broken_symptoms')
+define(`hide_broken_symptoms')
 
 # Allow user_r to reach sysadm_r via su, sudo, or userhelper.
 # Otherwise, only staff_r can do so.
-dnl define(`user_canbe_sysadm')
+define(`user_canbe_sysadm')
 
 # Allow xinetd to run unconfined, including any services it starts
 # that do not have a domain transition explicitly defined.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-21 13:59           ` Daniel J Walsh
@ 2005-02-21 14:24             ` Ivan Gyurdiev
  2005-02-21 15:06               ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Ivan Gyurdiev @ 2005-02-21 14:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Daniel J Walsh; +Cc: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton, selinux

>I don't think java can be fixed,   I think it is doing this stuff by 
>design. 

I thought it was a question of compiling with a newer toolchain that
supports PT_GNU_STACK... is that not the case? 

>A couple of things to try.
>
>How about we rename java_domain to javap_domain (java_plugin).

javap is the java profiler - bad name.

>Then we create a java_domain like the following
>
>define(`java_domain',`
>type $1_java_t, domain, privlog , nscd_client_domain, transitionbool;
>legacy_domain($1_java)
>base_user_domain($1_java)

That looks like a hack - Java is not an actual user. 
You're giving it permissions for user_java_t, while
the whole filesystem is labeled with `respect to user_t.

For example, code that writes to the home directory
still has to write to user_home_t, and you've given
Java permissions to user_java_home_t, which does not
exist in the fs, since java's not a real user. I don't think
this will work.

-- 
Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
Cornell University

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-21 14:24             ` Ivan Gyurdiev
@ 2005-02-21 15:06               ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  2005-02-21 15:12                 ` Daniel J Walsh
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton @ 2005-02-21 15:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ivan Gyurdiev; +Cc: Daniel J Walsh, selinux

On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 09:24:29AM -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> 
> >I don't think java can be fixed,   I think it is doing this stuff by 
> >design. 
> 
> I thought it was a question of compiling with a newer toolchain that
> supports PT_GNU_STACK... is that not the case? 
> 
> >A couple of things to try.
> >
> >How about we rename java_domain to javap_domain (java_plugin).
> 
> javap is the java profiler - bad name.
> 
> >Then we create a java_domain like the following
> >
> >define(`java_domain',`
> >type $1_java_t, domain, privlog , nscd_client_domain, transitionbool;
> >legacy_domain($1_java)
> >base_user_domain($1_java)
> 
> That looks like a hack 

 not sure.

> - Java is not an actual user. 
 
 the concept of user doesn't exist in selinux, only domains,
 contexts etc.

 therefore this statement is rather ambiguous: could you possibly
 clarify, just for the record?

> You're giving it permissions for user_java_t, while
> the whole filesystem is labeled with `respect to user_t.

 or more specifically, user_t is given certain rights to access
 specific parts of the filesystem, whereas at present,
 user_java_t is given none, yes?

 so... that suggests that user_java_t should be given some, yes?

> For example, code that writes to the home directory
> still has to write to user_home_t, and you've given
> Java permissions to user_java_home_t, which does not
> exist in the fs, since java's not a real user. I don't think
> this will work.
 
 two, maybe three options are available:

 1) typealias user_java_home_t to user_home_t

 2) run it, go looking for places where $1_home_t is used
    and where _appropriate_ add $1_java_home_t as well.

    mostly these places will be in user_macros, and you'd
    do instead of oh i dunno:

	    allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;
    
    you'd do this:

	    allow xdm_t { $1_home_t $1_java_home_t} :lnk_file read; 

    (except that's possibly a bad example).

 3) don't use base_user_domain() although i wouldn't have a 
    clue what to put in its place.


 i'm not sure what daniel intends by the use of base_user_domain()
 so i can't really say if 2) is actually appropriate or not.

 l.

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--
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-21 15:06               ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
@ 2005-02-21 15:12                 ` Daniel J Walsh
  2005-02-21 15:38                   ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Daniel J Walsh @ 2005-02-21 15:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton; +Cc: Ivan Gyurdiev, selinux

Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:

>On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 09:24:29AM -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
>  
>
>>>I don't think java can be fixed,   I think it is doing this stuff by 
>>>design. 
>>>      
>>>
>>I thought it was a question of compiling with a newer toolchain that
>>supports PT_GNU_STACK... is that not the case? 
>>
>>    
>>
>>>A couple of things to try.
>>>
>>>How about we rename java_domain to javap_domain (java_plugin).
>>>      
>>>
>>javap is the java profiler - bad name.
>>
>>    
>>
>>>Then we create a java_domain like the following
>>>
>>>define(`java_domain',`
>>>type $1_java_t, domain, privlog , nscd_client_domain, transitionbool;
>>>legacy_domain($1_java)
>>>base_user_domain($1_java)
>>>      
>>>
>>That looks like a hack 
>>    
>>
>
> not sure.
>
>  
>
>>- Java is not an actual user. 
>>    
>>
> 
> the concept of user doesn't exist in selinux, only domains,
> contexts etc.
>
> therefore this statement is rather ambiguous: could you possibly
> clarify, just for the record?
>
>  
>
>>You're giving it permissions for user_java_t, while
>>the whole filesystem is labeled with `respect to user_t.
>>    
>>
>
> or more specifically, user_t is given certain rights to access
> specific parts of the filesystem, whereas at present,
> user_java_t is given none, yes?
>
> so... that suggests that user_java_t should be given some, yes?
>
>  
>
>>For example, code that writes to the home directory
>>still has to write to user_home_t, and you've given
>>Java permissions to user_java_home_t, which does not
>>exist in the fs, since java's not a real user. I don't think
>>this will work.
>>    
>>
> 
> two, maybe three options are available:
>
> 1) typealias user_java_home_t to user_home_t
>
> 2) run it, go looking for places where $1_home_t is used
>    and where _appropriate_ add $1_java_home_t as well.
>
>    mostly these places will be in user_macros, and you'd
>    do instead of oh i dunno:
>
>	    allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;
>    
>    you'd do this:
>
>	    allow xdm_t { $1_home_t $1_java_home_t} :lnk_file read; 
>
>    (except that's possibly a bad example).
>
> 3) don't use base_user_domain() although i wouldn't have a 
>    clue what to put in its place.
>
>
> i'm not sure what daniel intends by the use of base_user_domain()
> so i can't really say if 2) is actually appropriate or not.
>
> l.
>
>  
>
My goal is to have a user domain and the equivalent userdomain + legacy 
stuff.

So only applications that are marked legacy can do the execmod/execmem 
stuff.  But have the same privs as any other userdomain
executable.

This is one of the things that SELinux does not handle well.    When a 
user runs this app, add these privs to his existing privs.
I envision we could so something similar in targeted where we have two 
unconfined domains.

unconfined_t and legacy_unconfined_t which would allow us to prevent 
"unmarked" legacy domains from being run by the normal
user.


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-21 15:12                 ` Daniel J Walsh
@ 2005-02-21 15:38                   ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton @ 2005-02-21 15:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Daniel J Walsh; +Cc: Ivan Gyurdiev, selinux

On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 10:12:56AM -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:

> My goal is to have a user domain and the equivalent userdomain + legacy 
> stuff.
> 
> So only applications that are marked legacy can do the execmod/execmem 
> stuff.  But have the same privs as any other userdomain
> executable.
> 
> This is one of the things that SELinux does not handle well.    

 no.  *sigh*.  it has to be explicitly spelled out.

> When a 
> user runs this app, add these privs to his existing privs.

 the solutions to this proposed so far [add these privs] have been
 ruled out on the grounds that it is exceptionally difficult to do
 the off-line policy analysis.

 ... which reminds me of another potential solution i thought of.

 you know how linux security modules are stackable, right?

 well... how about stacking policies as well?

 so you could define a list of binary policies that must be
 applied, and the order in which they must be applied, and
 whether (like PAM) they are "sufficient" or "required".

 so you could have _two_ policies, one which allowed legacy
 stuff on user_t _and_ user_java_t (yes, note carefully,
 i said _both_!), and one which allowed legacy stuff on ONLY
 user_java_t.

 the effect of having to go through both policies (which in all other
 respects would be identical) would be that, other than a performance
 hit, you'd end up with the apparent result that user_t is not
 allowed to do legacy stuff, but user_java_t is.

 i believe that the task of "combining" the policy.conf plus the
 rules for off-line auditing checking would be a lot simpler than
 previously proposed solutions.

 l.

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

* Re: Java Legacy problem
  2005-02-20 14:45 Java Legacy problem Ivan Gyurdiev
  2005-02-20 15:44 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
@ 2005-02-22 13:36 ` Stephen Smalley
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2005-02-22 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: ivg2; +Cc: selinux, dwalsh, James Morris

On Sun, 2005-02-20 at 09:45 -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> So, what is the recommended strategy for dealing with Java, so
> that those denials will go away?
> 
> user_t (java):
> denied { execute } ld_so_cache_t:file (/etc/ld.so.cache) 
> denied { execute } locale_t:file      (/usr/lib/locale/locale-archive)
> denied { execmod } shlib_t:file       (/lib/libc-2.3.4.so)
> denied { execmod } ld_so_t:file       (/lib/ld-2.3.4.so)

It has been suggested that SELinux should not be checking execute-
related permissions when the kernel automatically adds execute via the
read-implies-execute logic for legacy binaries.  To achieve that, we
would need to modify the core kernel to pass the original requested
protection to the security hooks in mmap and mprotect and have SELinux
perform its checking based on that requested protection (as specified by
the application) rather than the actual protection applied by the kernel
_if_ some setting were enabled, e.g. echo 1 > /selinux/legacycompat.
What do people think about that?  

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2005-02-22 13:36 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2005-02-20 14:45 Java Legacy problem Ivan Gyurdiev
2005-02-20 15:44 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-20 15:53   ` Ivan Gyurdiev
2005-02-20 17:17     ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-21 13:01       ` Daniel J Walsh
2005-02-21 13:24         ` Ivan Gyurdiev
2005-02-21 13:59           ` Daniel J Walsh
2005-02-21 14:24             ` Ivan Gyurdiev
2005-02-21 15:06               ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-21 15:12                 ` Daniel J Walsh
2005-02-21 15:38                   ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-22 13:36 ` Stephen Smalley

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