* Revocation Support
@ 2006-05-28 11:50 Mohammad Mahmoudi
2006-05-28 21:18 ` Erich Schubert
2006-05-28 21:54 ` Joshua Brindle
0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mohammad Mahmoudi @ 2006-05-28 11:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: SELinux
Does SELinux support revocation of permissions?
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* Re: Revocation Support
2006-05-28 11:50 Revocation Support Mohammad Mahmoudi
@ 2006-05-28 21:18 ` Erich Schubert
2006-05-28 21:54 ` Joshua Brindle
1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Erich Schubert @ 2006-05-28 21:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mohammad Mahmoudi; +Cc: SELinux
Hi,
> Does SELinux support revocation of permissions?
Be more verbose _what_ you want to do, please.
best regards,
Erich Schubert
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--- Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach
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* Re: Revocation Support
2006-05-28 11:50 Revocation Support Mohammad Mahmoudi
2006-05-28 21:18 ` Erich Schubert
@ 2006-05-28 21:54 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-05-28 22:14 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-05-30 15:12 ` Stephen Smalley
1 sibling, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Joshua Brindle @ 2006-05-28 21:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mohammad Mahmoudi; +Cc: SELinux
Mohammad Mahmoudi wrote:
> Does SELinux support revocation of permissions?
>
The FLASK architecture, which SELinux is based on, does indeed support
revocation by allowing object managers to register callbacks with the
security server. However, on SELinux, this is not currently in use. So
direct revocation where the object managers actively remove access to
objects after a policy change doesn't happen.
However, on some object classes permission is revalidated on every
object use (like files and file descriptors). So, even though a process
has a file descriptor to a file it previously had access top open, if
the permissions change to that file type the next read or write
operation will fail which essentially revokes access to it. This should
be the case on a file types, fds, sockets, ipc (except shared memory).
Hope this helps..
<http://us.rd.yahoo.com/mymod/showtimes/X-Men:%20The%20Last%20Stand/SIG=13eg95e87/*https://www.movietickets.com/purchase.asp?afid=myyah&house_id=8612&movie_id=44681&perfd=05282006&perft=23:30>
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* Re: Revocation Support
2006-05-28 21:54 ` Joshua Brindle
@ 2006-05-28 22:14 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-05-30 15:12 ` Stephen Smalley
1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Joshua Brindle @ 2006-05-28 22:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mohammad Mahmoudi; +Cc: SELinux
Joshua Brindle wrote:
> Mohammad Mahmoudi wrote:
>> Does SELinux support revocation of permissions?
>>
> The FLASK architecture, which SELinux is based on, does indeed support
> revocation by allowing object managers to register callbacks with the
> security server. However, on SELinux, this is not currently in use. So
> direct revocation where the object managers actively remove access to
> objects after a policy change doesn't happen.
>
> However, on some object classes permission is revalidated on every
> object use (like files and file descriptors). So, even though a
> process has a file descriptor to a file it previously had access top
> open, if the permissions change to that file type the next read or
> write operation will fail which essentially revokes access to it. This
> should be the case on a file types, fds, sockets, ipc (except shared
> memory).
>
> Hope this helps..
> <http://us.rd.yahoo.com/mymod/showtimes/X-Men:%20The%20Last%20Stand/SIG=13eg95e87/*https://www.movietickets.com/purchase.asp?afid=myyah&house_id=8612&movie_id=44681&perfd=05282006&perft=23:30>
>
>
Neat, I dont' know how that link got in my email but it was obviously an
accident :)
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* Re: Revocation Support
2006-05-28 21:54 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-05-28 22:14 ` Joshua Brindle
@ 2006-05-30 15:12 ` Stephen Smalley
1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2006-05-30 15:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joshua Brindle; +Cc: Mohammad Mahmoudi, SELinux
On Sun, 2006-05-28 at 17:54 -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> Mohammad Mahmoudi wrote:
> > Does SELinux support revocation of permissions?
> >
> The FLASK architecture, which SELinux is based on, does indeed support
> revocation by allowing object managers to register callbacks with the
> security server. However, on SELinux, this is not currently in use. So
> direct revocation where the object managers actively remove access to
> objects after a policy change doesn't happen.
>
> However, on some object classes permission is revalidated on every
> object use (like files and file descriptors). So, even though a process
> has a file descriptor to a file it previously had access top open, if
> the permissions change to that file type the next read or write
> operation will fail which essentially revokes access to it. This should
> be the case on a file types, fds, sockets, ipc (except shared memory).
Further, SELinux checks access to descriptors upon execve when the
security context changes, and when descriptors are received via local
IPC. This controls propagation of the access rights among security
contexts.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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end of thread, other threads:[~2006-05-30 15:12 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2006-05-28 11:50 Revocation Support Mohammad Mahmoudi
2006-05-28 21:18 ` Erich Schubert
2006-05-28 21:54 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-05-28 22:14 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-05-30 15:12 ` Stephen Smalley
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