[PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for explicite ipc object labeling

[PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for explicite ipc object labeling

[Eric Paris]

At this point in time IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc) were
labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This patch
introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a program to
set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may be useful
in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know of any
application which needs this functionality, but it should allow better
more understandable policy to control access to ipc objects.

In security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h the patch also adds a blank
line at the end.  This was the output after the change to the
access_vectors in policy and I did not edit that file by hand.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

 fs/proc/base.c                               |    6 ++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c                     |   12 ++++++++++--
 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |    1 +
 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h    |    2 ++
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h            |    1 +

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 243a94a..5b8ed50 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
+	PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	PROC_TGID_LOGINUID,
@@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
 	PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
 	PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
+	PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	PROC_TID_LOGINUID,
@@ -293,6 +295,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_attr_stuff[
 	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE, "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	{0,0,NULL,0}
 };
 static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[] = {
@@ -302,6 +305,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[]
 	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,  "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	{0,0,NULL,0}
 };
 #endif
@@ -1769,6 +1773,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
 		case PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
 		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
+		case PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
+		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
 			inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_operations;
 			break;
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2e8b4df..717c6c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1618,10 +1618,11 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str
 	/* Default to the current task SID. */
 	bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 
-	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
+	/* Reset fs, key, ipc, and sock SIDs on execve. */
 	tsec->create_sid = 0;
 	tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
 	tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+	tsec->ipccreate_sid = 0;
 
 	if (tsec->exec_sid) {
 		newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
@@ -2679,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(s
 	tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
 	tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
 	tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
+	tsec2->ipccreate_sid = tsec1->ipccreate_sid;
 
 	/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
 	   This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
@@ -3789,7 +3791,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct tas
 
 	isec->sclass = sclass;
 	isec->ipc_perm = perm;
-	isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+	isec->sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
 	perm->security = isec;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -4280,6 +4282,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct ta
 		sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
 		sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
+		sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid;
 	else
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -4316,6 +4320,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
 	else
@@ -4352,6 +4358,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
 		tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
 	} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
 		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
+		tsec->ipccreate_sid = sid;
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
 		struct av_decision avd;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 7c9b583..08a26db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE, "setipccreate")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 69fd4b4..0bc6fca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ #define PROCESS__EXECSTACK              
 #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP                         0x08000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE                     0x10000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE                    0x20000000UL
+#define PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE                     0x40000000UL
 
 #define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
@@ -969,3 +970,4 @@ #define KEY__SEARCH                     
 #define KEY__LINK                                 0x00000010UL
 #define KEY__SETATTR                              0x00000020UL
 #define KEY__CREATE                               0x00000040UL
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 9401788..a14c2f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct task_security_struct {
 	u32 create_sid;      /* fscreate SID */
 	u32 keycreate_sid;   /* keycreate SID */
 	u32 sockcreate_sid;  /* fscreate SID */
+	u32 ipccreate_sid;   /* ipccreate SID */
 	u32 ptrace_sid;      /* SID of ptrace parent */
 };
 



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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for explicite ipc object labeling

[Karl MacMillan]

On Tue, 2006-07-18 at 15:36 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> At this point in time IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc) were
> labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This patch
> introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a program to
> set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may be useful
> in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know of any
> application which needs this functionality, but it should allow better
> more understandable policy to control access to ipc objects.
> 

I know of applications that could benefit from this code that are not
available in source form. Unfortunately, nothing that I can point to
publicly, but I think that this change is helpful.

Karl

> In security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h the patch also adds a blank
> line at the end.  This was the output after the change to the
> access_vectors in policy and I did not edit that file by hand.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> 
>  fs/proc/base.c                               |    6 ++++++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                     |   12 ++++++++++--
>  security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |    1 +
>  security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h    |    2 ++
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h            |    1 +
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 243a94a..5b8ed50 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  	PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
>  	PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
>  	PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
> +	PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>  	PROC_TGID_LOGINUID,
> @@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  	PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
>  	PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
>  	PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
> +	PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>  	PROC_TID_LOGINUID,
> @@ -293,6 +295,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_attr_stuff[
>  	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE, "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	{0,0,NULL,0}
>  };
>  static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[] = {
> @@ -302,6 +305,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[]
>  	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,  "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	{0,0,NULL,0}
>  };
>  #endif
> @@ -1769,6 +1773,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
>  		case PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
>  		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
> +		case PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
> +		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
>  			inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_operations;
>  			break;
>  #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 2e8b4df..717c6c8 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1618,10 +1618,11 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str
>  	/* Default to the current task SID. */
>  	bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
>  
> -	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
> +	/* Reset fs, key, ipc, and sock SIDs on execve. */
>  	tsec->create_sid = 0;
>  	tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
>  	tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
> +	tsec->ipccreate_sid = 0;
>  
>  	if (tsec->exec_sid) {
>  		newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
> @@ -2679,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(s
>  	tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
>  	tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
>  	tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
> +	tsec2->ipccreate_sid = tsec1->ipccreate_sid;
>  
>  	/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
>  	   This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
> @@ -3789,7 +3791,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct tas
>  
>  	isec->sclass = sclass;
>  	isec->ipc_perm = perm;
> -	isec->sid = tsec->sid;
> +	isec->sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
>  	perm->security = isec;
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -4280,6 +4282,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct ta
>  		sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
>  		sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
> +	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
> +		sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid;
>  	else
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> @@ -4316,6 +4320,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
>  		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
>  		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
> +	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
> +		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE);
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
>  		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
>  	else
> @@ -4352,6 +4358,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
>  		tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
>  	} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
>  		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
> +	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
> +		tsec->ipccreate_sid = sid;
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
>  		struct av_decision avd;
>  
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> index 7c9b583..08a26db 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
>     S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap")
>     S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate")
>     S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate")
> +   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE, "setipccreate")
>     S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
>     S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
>     S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> index 69fd4b4..0bc6fca 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> @@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ #define PROCESS__EXECSTACK              
>  #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP                         0x08000000UL
>  #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE                     0x10000000UL
>  #define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE                    0x20000000UL
> +#define PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE                     0x40000000UL
>  
>  #define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
>  #define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
> @@ -969,3 +970,4 @@ #define KEY__SEARCH                     
>  #define KEY__LINK                                 0x00000010UL
>  #define KEY__SETATTR                              0x00000020UL
>  #define KEY__CREATE                               0x00000040UL
> +
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 9401788..a14c2f5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct task_security_struct {
>  	u32 create_sid;      /* fscreate SID */
>  	u32 keycreate_sid;   /* keycreate SID */
>  	u32 sockcreate_sid;  /* fscreate SID */
> +	u32 ipccreate_sid;   /* ipccreate SID */
>  	u32 ptrace_sid;      /* SID of ptrace parent */
>  };
>  
> 
> 
> 
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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for explicite ipc object labeling

[Stephen Smalley]

On 7/18/06, Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> wrote:
> At this point in time IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc) were
> labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This patch
> introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a program to
> set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may be useful
> in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know of any
> application which needs this functionality, but it should allow better
> more understandable policy to control access to ipc objects.
>
> In security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h the patch also adds a blank
> line at the end.  This was the output after the change to the
> access_vectors in policy and I did not edit that file by hand.

In that case, we should fix the script.

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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for explicite ipc object labeling

[Joshua Brindle]

Eric Paris wrote:
> At this point in time IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc) were
> labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This patch
> introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a program to
> set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may be useful
> in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know of any
> application which needs this functionality, but it should allow better
> more understandable policy to control access to ipc objects.
>
> In security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h the patch also adds a blank
> line at the end.  This was the output after the change to the
> access_vectors in policy and I did not edit that file by hand.
>
>   
This patch only adds a process permission for setipccreate, I think you 
need a permission check for the destination type (what you are labeling 
the ipc to), there are lots of potential info leaks even if the process 
can't subsequently write to the ipc.

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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for explicite ipc object labeling

[Karl MacMillan]

On Wed, 2006-07-19 at 10:22 -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> Eric Paris wrote:
> > At this point in time IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc) were
> > labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This patch
> > introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a program to
> > set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may be useful
> > in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know of any
> > application which needs this functionality, but it should allow better
> > more understandable policy to control access to ipc objects.
> >
> > In security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h the patch also adds a blank
> > line at the end.  This was the output after the change to the
> > access_vectors in policy and I did not edit that file by hand.
> >
> >   
> This patch only adds a process permission for setipccreate, I think you 
> need a permission check for the destination type (what you are labeling 
> the ipc to), there are lots of potential info leaks even if the process 
> can't subsequently write to the ipc.
> 

This is covered by the existing create permissions on the IPC objects
since this is not a relabel but object creation.

Karl

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RE: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[Joshua Brindle]

> From: Karl MacMillan [mailto:kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com] 
> 
> On Wed, 2006-07-19 at 10:22 -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> > Eric Paris wrote:
> > > At this point in time IPC objects (semaphores, message 
> queues, etc) 
> > > were labeled with the label of the process which created 
> them.  This 
> > > patch introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which 
> will allow a 
> > > program to set the label on ipc objects it is about to 
> create.  This 
> > > may be useful in future trusted applications but at this 
> time I do 
> > > not know of any application which needs this 
> functionality, but it 
> > > should allow better more understandable policy to control 
> access to ipc objects.
> > >
> > > In security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h the patch 
> also adds a 
> > > blank line at the end.  This was the output after the 
> change to the 
> > > access_vectors in policy and I did not edit that file by hand.
> > >
> > >   
> > This patch only adds a process permission for setipccreate, I think 
> > you need a permission check for the destination type (what you are 
> > labeling the ipc to), there are lots of potential info 
> leaks even if 
> > the process can't subsequently write to the ipc.
> > 
> 
> This is covered by the existing create permissions on the IPC 
> objects since this is not a relabel but object creation.
> 

Ah, you are right, somehow I forgot that those checks already existed.
Is this intended to only do sysv IPC or will it be expanded later? I ask
because there are more IPC types than just sysv so if a user thinks this
will label their posix message queues they would be misled.


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[PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[Eric Paris]

At this point in time SysV IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc)
are labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This
patch introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a
program to set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may
be useful in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know
of any application which needs this functionality.  It should allow for
better more understandable policy to control access to ipc objects.

I also decided to leave the name ipccreate even though this does not
clearly express that the patch does not cover posix message queues.  The
only name that seemed descriptive enough was sysvipccreate which just
seemed incredibly long for little to no gain.  I will address the issue
of controlling posix message queue explicit labeling in a future patch.

A note of interest, this only leaves 1 bit in the process security
class.  I don't currently have any plans to use any more, but it is
something to remember.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

 fs/proc/base.c                               |    6 ++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c                     |   12 ++++++++++--
 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |    1 +
 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h    |    1 +
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h            |    1 +
 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 243a94a..5b8ed50 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
 	PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
+	PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	PROC_TGID_LOGINUID,
@@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
 	PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
 	PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
+	PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 	PROC_TID_LOGINUID,
@@ -293,6 +295,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_attr_stuff[
 	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE, "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	{0,0,NULL,0}
 };
 static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[] = {
@@ -302,6 +305,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[]
 	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,  "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
+	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
 	{0,0,NULL,0}
 };
 #endif
@@ -1769,6 +1773,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
 		case PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
 		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
+		case PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
+		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
 			inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_operations;
 			break;
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2e8b4df..717c6c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1618,10 +1618,11 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str
 	/* Default to the current task SID. */
 	bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 
-	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
+	/* Reset fs, key, ipc, and sock SIDs on execve. */
 	tsec->create_sid = 0;
 	tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
 	tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
+	tsec->ipccreate_sid = 0;
 
 	if (tsec->exec_sid) {
 		newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
@@ -2679,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(s
 	tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
 	tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
 	tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
+	tsec2->ipccreate_sid = tsec1->ipccreate_sid;
 
 	/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
 	   This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
@@ -3789,7 +3791,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct tas
 
 	isec->sclass = sclass;
 	isec->ipc_perm = perm;
-	isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+	isec->sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
 	perm->security = isec;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -4280,6 +4282,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct ta
 		sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
 		sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
+		sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid;
 	else
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -4316,6 +4320,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
 	else
@@ -4352,6 +4358,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
 		tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
 	} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
 		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
+		tsec->ipccreate_sid = sid;
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
 		struct av_decision avd;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 7c9b583..08a26db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE, "setipccreate")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 69fd4b4..0bc6fca 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ #define PROCESS__EXECSTACK              
 #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP                         0x08000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE                     0x10000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE                    0x20000000UL
+#define PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE                     0x40000000UL
 
 #define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 9401788..a14c2f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct task_security_struct {
 	u32 create_sid;      /* fscreate SID */
 	u32 keycreate_sid;   /* keycreate SID */
 	u32 sockcreate_sid;  /* fscreate SID */
+	u32 ipccreate_sid;   /* ipccreate SID */
 	u32 ptrace_sid;      /* SID of ptrace parent */
 };
 




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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[Stephen Smalley]

On Thu, 2006-07-27 at 12:58 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> At this point in time SysV IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc)
> are labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This
> patch introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a
> program to set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may
> be useful in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know
> of any application which needs this functionality.  It should allow for
> better more understandable policy to control access to ipc objects.
> 
> I also decided to leave the name ipccreate even though this does not
> clearly express that the patch does not cover posix message queues.  The
> only name that seemed descriptive enough was sysvipccreate which just
> seemed incredibly long for little to no gain.  I will address the issue
> of controlling posix message queue explicit labeling in a future patch.
> 
> A note of interest, this only leaves 1 bit in the process security
> class.  I don't currently have any plans to use any more, but it is
> something to remember.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

> 
>  fs/proc/base.c                               |    6 ++++++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                     |   12 ++++++++++--
>  security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |    1 +
>  security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h    |    1 +
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h            |    1 +
>  5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 243a94a..5b8ed50 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  	PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
>  	PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
>  	PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
> +	PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>  	PROC_TGID_LOGINUID,
> @@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  	PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,
>  	PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE,
>  	PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE,
> +	PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE,
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>  	PROC_TID_LOGINUID,
> @@ -293,6 +295,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_attr_stuff[
>  	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_FSCREATE, "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	E(PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	{0,0,NULL,0}
>  };
>  static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[] = {
> @@ -302,6 +305,7 @@ static struct pid_entry tid_attr_stuff[]
>  	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_FSCREATE,  "fscreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_KEYCREATE, "keycreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE, "sockcreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	E(PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE, "ipccreate", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  	{0,0,NULL,0}
>  };
>  #endif
> @@ -1769,6 +1773,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
>  		case PROC_TID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
>  		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
> +		case PROC_TID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
> +		case PROC_TGID_ATTR_IPCCREATE:
>  			inode->i_fop = &proc_pid_attr_operations;
>  			break;
>  #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 2e8b4df..717c6c8 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1618,10 +1618,11 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str
>  	/* Default to the current task SID. */
>  	bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
>  
> -	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
> +	/* Reset fs, key, ipc, and sock SIDs on execve. */
>  	tsec->create_sid = 0;
>  	tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
>  	tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
> +	tsec->ipccreate_sid = 0;
>  
>  	if (tsec->exec_sid) {
>  		newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
> @@ -2679,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(s
>  	tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
>  	tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
>  	tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
> +	tsec2->ipccreate_sid = tsec1->ipccreate_sid;
>  
>  	/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
>  	   This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
> @@ -3789,7 +3791,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct tas
>  
>  	isec->sclass = sclass;
>  	isec->ipc_perm = perm;
> -	isec->sid = tsec->sid;
> +	isec->sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
>  	perm->security = isec;
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -4280,6 +4282,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct ta
>  		sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
>  		sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
> +	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
> +		sid = tsec->ipccreate_sid;
>  	else
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> @@ -4316,6 +4320,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
>  		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
>  		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
> +	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
> +		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE);
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
>  		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
>  	else
> @@ -4352,6 +4358,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
>  		tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
>  	} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
>  		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
> +	else if (!strcmp(name, "ipccreate"))
> +		tsec->ipccreate_sid = sid;
>  	else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
>  		struct av_decision avd;
>  
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> index 7c9b583..08a26db 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
> @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
>     S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap")
>     S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate")
>     S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate")
> +   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE, "setipccreate")
>     S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
>     S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
>     S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> index 69fd4b4..0bc6fca 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
> @@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ #define PROCESS__EXECSTACK              
>  #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP                         0x08000000UL
>  #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE                     0x10000000UL
>  #define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE                    0x20000000UL
> +#define PROCESS__SETIPCCREATE                     0x40000000UL
>  
>  #define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
>  #define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 9401788..a14c2f5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct task_security_struct {
>  	u32 create_sid;      /* fscreate SID */
>  	u32 keycreate_sid;   /* keycreate SID */
>  	u32 sockcreate_sid;  /* fscreate SID */
> +	u32 ipccreate_sid;   /* ipccreate SID */
>  	u32 ptrace_sid;      /* SID of ptrace parent */
>  };
>  
> 
> 
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[Valdis.Kletnieks]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 678 bytes --]

On Thu, 27 Jul 2006 12:58:49 EDT, Eric Paris said:

> I also decided to leave the name ipccreate even though this does not
> clearly express that the patch does not cover posix message queues.  The
> only name that seemed descriptive enough was sysvipccreate which just
> seemed incredibly long for little to no gain.  I will address the issue
> of controlling posix message queue explicit labeling in a future patch.

Will that require another bit?

> A note of interest, this only leaves 1 bit in the process security
> class.  I don't currently have any plans to use any more, but it is
> something to remember.

Does anybody have a good plan for what to do when we run out?

[-- Attachment #2: Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 226 bytes --]

Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[James Morris]

On Thu, 27 Jul 2006, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:

> > A note of interest, this only leaves 1 bit in the process security
> > class.  I don't currently have any plans to use any more, but it is
> > something to remember.
> 
> Does anybody have a good plan for what to do when we run out?

Probably create another process class and abstract it so policy just sees 
a single class.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[James Morris]

On Thu, 27 Jul 2006, Eric Paris wrote:

> At this point in time SysV IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc)
> are labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This
> patch introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a
> program to set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may
> be useful in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know
> of any application which needs this functionality.

This makes it difficult to justify upstream.



-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[Russell Coker]

On Friday 28 July 2006 14:19, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Jul 2006, Eric Paris wrote:
> > At this point in time SysV IPC objects (semaphores, message queues, etc)
> > are labeled with the label of the process which created them.  This
> > patch introduces a new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate which will allow a
> > program to set the label on ipc objects it is about to create.  This may
> > be useful in future trusted applications but at this time I do not know
> > of any application which needs this functionality.
>
> This makes it difficult to justify upstream.

The X server creates shared memory regions that are used by the user.

If the X server is run from xdm_t then the user needs access to 
xdm_xserver_t:shm, which means that multiple roles can communicate via that 
shared memory type.

It seems ideal to me to have the X server create shared memory regions on 
behalf of the user with user_t as the type.  At the moment this would not be 
convenient, but when we get Security Enhanced X going (something that I want 
to work on when I get Debian SE Linux in a good shape again) it will be 
practical.

I believe that PostgreSQL will on occasion perform operations that operate in 
a similar manner but don't have proof.

IMHO the X server alone is enough justification for this feature.  PostgreSQL 
is merely supporting evidence of such interfaces being a reasonable way of 
solving certain classes of problem.

-- 
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http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/  Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/    Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/  My home page

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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[Stephen Smalley]

On Fri, 2006-07-28 at 00:17 -0400, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Jul 2006, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> 
> > > A note of interest, this only leaves 1 bit in the process security
> > > class.  I don't currently have any plans to use any more, but it is
> > > something to remember.
> > 
> > Does anybody have a good plan for what to do when we run out?
> 
> Probably create another process class and abstract it so policy just sees 
> a single class.

Yes, that is the plan.  The class/permission distinction is fairly
arbitrary anyway; abstractly, there is really only a set of permissions,
where file__read and chr_file__read are two different permissions.

-- 
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Re: [PATCH] SELinux: new /proc/self/attr/ipccreate for expliciteipc object labeling

[Eric Paris]

On Thu, 2006-07-27 at 17:16 -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Jul 2006 12:58:49 EDT, Eric Paris said:
> 
> > I also decided to leave the name ipccreate even though this does not
> > clearly express that the patch does not cover posix message queues.  The
> > only name that seemed descriptive enough was sysvipccreate which just
> > seemed incredibly long for little to no gain.  I will address the issue
> > of controlling posix message queue explicit labeling in a future patch.
> 
> Will that require another bit?

The thought at the moment does not require another bit.

-Eric


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