From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@TrustedCS.com
Subject: [RFC 1/3] secid reconciliation on inbound
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 2006 17:08:26 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <44CFD0DA.9060205@trustedcs.com> (raw)
Currently a packet accumulates multiple security identifiers, each of a
different class, as it enters the system. This patch set reconciles these
identifiers into a single identifier while also allowing LSM (SELinux is
addressed in this patch set) to impose flow control checks based on the
identifiers.
The reconciliation steps for SELinux are explained in the Labeled Networking
document at:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=115136637800361&w=2
The following are the identifiers handled here:
1. secmark on the skb
2. xfrm security identifier associated with the skb if it used any xfrms,
a zero secid otherwise.
This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux
Adds a new avperm "come_thru" to arbitrate among the identifiers on the
inbound (input/forward). Also adds a new avperm "go_thru" to enable flow
control checks on the outbound (output/forward), addressed in a later
patch.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
---
av_perm_to_string.h | 2 ++
av_permissions.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- linux-2.6.17.child_sock/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-07-31 09:36:24.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-07-31 10:20:16.000000000 -0500
@@ -962,6 +962,8 @@
#define PACKET__SEND 0x00000001UL
#define PACKET__RECV 0x00000002UL
#define PACKET__RELABELTO 0x00000004UL
+#define PACKET__COME_THRU 0x00000008UL
+#define PACKET__GO_THRU 0x00000010UL
#define KEY__VIEW 0x00000001UL
#define KEY__READ 0x00000002UL
--- linux-2.6.17.child_sock/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-07-31 09:36:24.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-07-31 10:20:16.000000000 -0500
@@ -245,6 +245,8 @@
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send")
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv")
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__COME_THRU, "come_thru")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__GO_THRU, "go_thru")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, "view")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__READ, "read")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__WRITE, "write")
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@trustedcs.com
Subject: [RFC 1/3] secid reconciliation on inbound
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 2006 17:08:26 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <44CFD0DA.9060205@trustedcs.com> (raw)
Currently a packet accumulates multiple security identifiers, each of a
different class, as it enters the system. This patch set reconciles these
identifiers into a single identifier while also allowing LSM (SELinux is
addressed in this patch set) to impose flow control checks based on the
identifiers.
The reconciliation steps for SELinux are explained in the Labeled Networking
document at:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=115136637800361&w=2
The following are the identifiers handled here:
1. secmark on the skb
2. xfrm security identifier associated with the skb if it used any xfrms,
a zero secid otherwise.
This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux
Adds a new avperm "come_thru" to arbitrate among the identifiers on the
inbound (input/forward). Also adds a new avperm "go_thru" to enable flow
control checks on the outbound (output/forward), addressed in a later
patch.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
---
av_perm_to_string.h | 2 ++
av_permissions.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- linux-2.6.17.child_sock/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-07-31 09:36:24.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-07-31 10:20:16.000000000 -0500
@@ -962,6 +962,8 @@
#define PACKET__SEND 0x00000001UL
#define PACKET__RECV 0x00000002UL
#define PACKET__RELABELTO 0x00000004UL
+#define PACKET__COME_THRU 0x00000008UL
+#define PACKET__GO_THRU 0x00000010UL
#define KEY__VIEW 0x00000001UL
#define KEY__READ 0x00000002UL
--- linux-2.6.17.child_sock/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-07-31 09:36:24.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-07-31 10:20:16.000000000 -0500
@@ -245,6 +245,8 @@
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send")
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv")
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__COME_THRU, "come_thru")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__GO_THRU, "go_thru")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, "view")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__READ, "read")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__WRITE, "write")
next reply other threads:[~2006-08-01 22:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-08-01 22:08 Venkat Yekkirala [this message]
2006-08-01 22:08 ` [RFC 1/3] secid reconciliation on inbound Venkat Yekkirala
2006-08-01 23:19 ` James Morris
2006-08-01 23:19 ` James Morris
2006-08-02 4:19 ` James Morris
2006-08-02 4:19 ` James Morris
2006-08-02 13:49 ` Stephen Smalley
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-08-02 12:57 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-08-02 12:57 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-08-02 15:55 Venkat Yekkirala
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