Re: [PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>]

Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
> This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks as well
> as related changes elsewhere in the SELinux code.
> 
> This also now keeps track of the peersid thru the establishment
> of a connection on the server (tracking peersid on the client
> is covered later in this patch set).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
> 
> {snip}
>
> +static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
> +{
> +	u32 xfrm_sid;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	if (selinux_compat_net)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * loopback traffic already labeled and
> +	 * flow-controlled on outbound. We may
> +	 * need to flow-control on the inbound
> +	 * as well if there's ever a use-case for it.
> +	 */
> +	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
> +	BUG_ON(err);

Just a quick question that has been nagging me for awhile - any
particular reason why this is a BUG_ON() and not an "if (err) goto out;"?

> +	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
> +					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	if (xfrm_sid)
> +		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
> +
> +	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
> +
> +out:
> +	return err ? 0 : 1;
> +};

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.