All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Cc: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org,
	sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] secid reconcialiation: Replace unlabeled_t with	the network_t
Date: Wed, 04 Oct 2006 10:53:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4523CAEB.4070200@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1159973254.14831.71.camel@sgc>

Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Wed, 2006-10-04 at 10:33 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> 
>>Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
>>
>>>The following replaces unlabeled_t with network_t for
>>>better characterization of the flow out/in checks in
>>>SELinux, as well as to allow for mls packets to
>>>flow out/in from the network since network_t would allow
>>>the full range of MLS labels, as opposed to the unlabeled init sid
>>>that only allows system-hi.
>>>
>>>Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
>>>---
>>>This is an incremental patch the secid-reconcilation v4 patchset.
>>>
>>>--- net-2.6.sid3/security/selinux/hooks.c	2006-10-01 15:43:12.000000000 -0500
>>>+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c	2006-10-03 16:43:21.000000000 -0500
>>>@@ -3703,7 +3703,8 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>>> 	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
>>> 	BUG_ON(err);
>>> 
>>>-	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>>+	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark? : SECINITSID_NETMSG,
>>>+					SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>> 					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
>>> 	if (err)
>>> 		goto out;
>>>@@ -3900,7 +3901,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
>>> 				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>>> 			}
>>> 		}
>>>-		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
>>>+		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_NETMSG,
>>> 				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
>>> 	}
>>> out:
>>
>>Considering the above change, I wonder if it would also make sense to
>>update the secmark to SECINITSID_UNLABELED in the abscence of any
>>external labeling (labeled IPsec or NetLabel)?
>  
> Wouldn't that make secmark useless in the non labeled networking case?
> 

Sorry, I didn't do a very good job explaining things in my first email
so let me try it again ...

If there is no external labeling, i.e. labeled IPsec or NetLabel, *and*
the secmark is equal to zero/SECSID_NULL I think it might be a good idea
to set the secmark to SECINITSID_NETMSG.

This not affect either local or external labels if they are present, but
if both are not it would give the secmark some meaningful value.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
To: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Cc: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org,
	sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] secid reconcialiation: Replace unlabeled_t with	the network_t
Date: Wed, 04 Oct 2006 10:53:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4523CAEB.4070200@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1159973254.14831.71.camel@sgc>

Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Wed, 2006-10-04 at 10:33 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> 
>>Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
>>
>>>The following replaces unlabeled_t with network_t for
>>>better characterization of the flow out/in checks in
>>>SELinux, as well as to allow for mls packets to
>>>flow out/in from the network since network_t would allow
>>>the full range of MLS labels, as opposed to the unlabeled init sid
>>>that only allows system-hi.
>>>
>>>Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
>>>---
>>>This is an incremental patch the secid-reconcilation v4 patchset.
>>>
>>>--- net-2.6.sid3/security/selinux/hooks.c	2006-10-01 15:43:12.000000000 -0500
>>>+++ net-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c	2006-10-03 16:43:21.000000000 -0500
>>>@@ -3703,7 +3703,8 @@ static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk
>>> 	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
>>> 	BUG_ON(err);
>>> 
>>>-	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>>+	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark? : SECINITSID_NETMSG,
>>>+					SECCLASS_PACKET,
>>> 					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
>>> 	if (err)
>>> 		goto out;
>>>@@ -3900,7 +3901,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
>>> 				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
>>> 			}
>>> 		}
>>>-		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
>>>+		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_NETMSG,
>>> 				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
>>> 	}
>>> out:
>>
>>Considering the above change, I wonder if it would also make sense to
>>update the secmark to SECINITSID_UNLABELED in the abscence of any
>>external labeling (labeled IPsec or NetLabel)?
>  
> Wouldn't that make secmark useless in the non labeled networking case?
> 

Sorry, I didn't do a very good job explaining things in my first email
so let me try it again ...

If there is no external labeling, i.e. labeled IPsec or NetLabel, *and*
the secmark is equal to zero/SECSID_NULL I think it might be a good idea
to set the secmark to SECINITSID_NETMSG.

This not affect either local or external labels if they are present, but
if both are not it would give the secmark some meaningful value.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

  reply	other threads:[~2006-10-04 14:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-10-04  2:41 [PATCH 1/1] secid reconcialiation: Replace unlabeled_t with the network_t Venkat Yekkirala
2006-10-04  2:41 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-10-04 14:33 ` Paul Moore
2006-10-04 14:33   ` Paul Moore
2006-10-04 14:43   ` Paul Moore
2006-10-04 14:43     ` Paul Moore
2006-10-04 14:47   ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2006-10-04 14:47     ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2006-10-04 14:53     ` Paul Moore [this message]
2006-10-04 14:53       ` Paul Moore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=4523CAEB.4070200@hp.com \
    --to=paul.moore@hp.com \
    --cc=cpebenito@tresys.com \
    --cc=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.