From: Joshua Brindle <jbrindle@tresys.com>
To: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Ability to allow unknown class and permissions
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2006 18:20:48 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4574AD50.5090305@tresys.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <45749461.7050405@mentalrootkit.com>
Karl MacMillan wrote:
> Joshua Brindle wrote:
>>> From: Karl MacMillan [mailto:kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com]
>>> Joshua Brindle wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>>>
>>> Or Why would you need #1 if you have
>>>> #2? I thought the config flag was for the kernel..
>>> To allow the policy file to be analyzed without external reference.
>>>
>>
>> Second time analysis was mentioned and still wrong (IMO). You can't
>> analyze unknown permissions since the kernel which the kernel is
>> inserted into also decides whether the permissions are checked.
>>
>
> But you can tell if unknown permissions will be allowed (and even which
> object classes and permissions for a specific kernel) without reference
> to the _configuration_ of a specific system. You only need to look at
> the policy and the version of the kernel / userspace components. That
> is, in my opinion, an important difference.
>
Unless there is a permission associated with setting this option (via
semanage or similar) you don't buy anything. And I'm not sure what value
you get out of knowing unknown permissions are allowed or denied in an
analysis anyway.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-12-04 23:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-12-01 16:06 [RFC] Ability to allow unknown class and permissions Eric Paris
2006-12-01 17:18 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-01 18:41 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-02 3:28 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 14:46 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 15:11 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 15:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 18:13 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 18:49 ` Eric Paris
2006-12-04 19:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 20:06 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:11 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 20:15 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:18 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 20:25 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:28 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 20:34 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-04 21:05 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-05 13:31 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-05 13:59 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 20:33 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 21:19 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-12-04 21:34 ` Karl MacMillan
2006-12-04 23:20 ` Joshua Brindle [this message]
2006-12-05 13:41 ` Stephen Smalley
2006-12-05 13:33 ` Stephen Smalley
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