Re: X avcs

[Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>]

Ted X Toth wrote:
> I'll look at implementing a dixPropertyLookup function. Do any other 
> XACE hooks have value-return parameters, would it just be va_arg(ap, 
> PropertyPtr*)?
>   

No and yes, respectively.

> What about the idea of an exception list of single-instance root-window 
> properties?
>   

I'm examining the type_member policy statement to determine how we can 
use it to provide this information.  type_member was intented to support 
polyinstantiation but it's mls semantics have not been defined yet.



>   
>>> With respect to the root window drawable, it is protected at the 
>>> lowest label, so it is never modified. Applications like Nautilus are 
>>> polyinstantiated, too, and render their own background windows.
>>>
>>> Our implementation is all open-sourced using the Xorg license. A 
>>> summary of the X11 security policy implemented by Solaris Trusted 
>>> Extensions is described in Chapter 6 of the Developer's Guide,  
>>> http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/819-0869/6n391u3ru?a=view
>>>
>>> The configuration file for the polyinstantiation policy is described 
>>> in the TrustedExtensionsPolicy man page, 
>>> http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/819-7307/trustedextensionspolicy-4?a=view 
>>>
>>>
>>> The source code which implements this policy can be viewed in the 
>>> OpenSolaris browser using this link:
>>> http://src.opensolaris.org/source/xref/fox/fox-gate/XW_NV/open-src/xserver/xorg/sun-src/tsol/ 
>>>
>>>
>>> The hooks to the XACE extension layer (also used by SELinux) are in 
>>> the file tsolCompat.c, which can be viewed here:
>>> http://src.opensolaris.org/source/xref/fox/fox-gate/XW_NV/open-src/xserver/xorg/sun-src/Xext/tsolCompat.c 
>>>
>>>
>>> Although Trusted Extensions and SELinux have significant differences 
>>> with respect to their security models, both systems attempt to 
>>> implement MAC policy in a manner that is transparent to applications. 
>>> This should apply to the desktop, as well. In general, the user 
>>> experience running GNOME on Solaris (with or without Trusted 
>>> Extensions) or on Linux (with or without SELinux) should be almost 
>>> identical. So the underlying policies enforced by the X11 server 
>>> should follow the same general principles.
>>>   
>>>       
>> Our long-term goal is to make applications aware of and responsive to 
>> the security environment, particularly applications that could 
>> themselves be multi-level such as e-mail, web, office.
>>
>>     
>
>
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>   


-- 
Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency


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