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From: Michael Ellerman <patch-notifications@ellerman.id.au>
To: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>, Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10a 3/9] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 20:08:24 +1100 (AEDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47DFyK2l6Jz9sSl@ozlabs.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e9eeee6b-b9bf-1e41-2954-61dbd6fbfbcf@linux.ibm.com>

On Tue, 2019-11-05 at 23:02:07 UTC, Eric Richter wrote:
> From: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> 
> While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be
> booted, trusted boot calculates the file hash of the kernel image and
> stores the measurement prior to boot, that can be subsequently compared
> against good known values via attestation services.
> 
> This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state
> is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the IMA
> arch-specific policies.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>

Applied to powerpc next, thanks.

https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/2702809a4a1ab414d75c00936cda70ea77c8234e

cheers

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Michael Ellerman <patch-notifications@ellerman.id.au>
To: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>, Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10a 3/9] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 20:08:24 +1100 (AEDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47DFyK2l6Jz9sSl@ozlabs.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e9eeee6b-b9bf-1e41-2954-61dbd6fbfbcf@linux.ibm.com>

On Tue, 2019-11-05 at 23:02:07 UTC, Eric Richter wrote:
> From: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> 
> While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be
> booted, trusted boot calculates the file hash of the kernel image and
> stores the measurement prior to boot, that can be subsequently compared
> against good known values via attestation services.
> 
> This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state
> is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the IMA
> arch-specific policies.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>

Applied to powerpc next, thanks.

https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/2702809a4a1ab414d75c00936cda70ea77c8234e

cheers

  reply	other threads:[~2019-11-14  9:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-31  3:31 [PATCH v10 0/9] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 1/9] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-05  5:14   ` Eric Richter
2019-11-05  5:14     ` Eric Richter
2019-11-05 23:00   ` [PATCH v10a " Eric Richter
2019-11-05 23:00     ` Eric Richter
2019-11-14  9:08     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-11-14  9:08       ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 2/9] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-14  9:08   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 3/9] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-05 23:02   ` [PATCH v10a " Eric Richter
2019-11-05 23:02     ` Eric Richter
2019-11-14  9:08     ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2019-11-14  9:08       ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 4/9] powerpc/ima: define trusted boot policy Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-14  9:08   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 5/9] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31 17:02   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 17:02     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 17:22     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-10-31 17:22       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-11-14  9:08   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 6/9] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-14  9:08   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 7/9] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-14  9:08   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-11-14  9:08     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [PATCH v10 8/9] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-14  9:08   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-11-14  9:08     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-31  3:31 ` [RFC PATCH v10 9/9] powerpc/ima: indicate kernel modules appended signatures are enforced Mimi Zohar
2019-10-31  3:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-14  9:08   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-11-14  9:08     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-09 20:27 ` [PATCH v10 0/9] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-12-09 20:27   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2019-12-09 21:36   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-12-09 21:36     ` Mimi Zohar
     [not found]     ` <3322befc-d1b9-41cf-aabf-0259fe3adb2b@linux.microsoft.com>
2019-12-09 23:33       ` Verified the key measurement patches in v5.5-rc1 Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

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