[PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[Vlad Yasevich]

Hi David

Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.

Thanks
-vlad

[PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[Vlad Yasevich]

Hi David

Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.

Thanks
-vlad

[PATCH 1/5] [SCTP]: Add check for hmac_algo parameter in sctp_verify_param()

[Vlad Yasevich]

From: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>

RFC 4890 has the following text:

  The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and
  included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.

As a result, we need to check in sctp_verify_param() that HMAC_SHA1 is
present in the list.  If not, we should probably treat this as a
protocol violation.

It should also be a protocol violation if the HMAC parameter is empty.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 578630e..36ebb39 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1982,7 +1982,10 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 					struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
 					struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk)
 {
+	struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
 	int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
+	__u16 n_elt, id = 0;
+	int i;
 
 	/* FIXME - This routine is not looking at each parameter per the
 	 * chunk type, i.e., unrecognized parameters should be further
@@ -2056,9 +2059,29 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		break;
 
 	case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
-		if (sctp_auth_enable)
-			break;
-		/* Fall Through */
+		if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+			goto fallthrough;
+
+		hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p;
+		n_elt = (ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) >> 1;
+
+		/* SCTP-AUTH: Section 6.1
+		 * The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and
+		 * included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < n_elt; i++) {
+			id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
+
+			if (id = SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
+			sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk,
+						     err_chunk);
+			retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+		}
+		break;
 fallthrough:
 	default:
 		SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Unrecognized param: %d for chunk %d.\n",
-- 
1.5.3.5

[PATCH 1/5] [SCTP]: Add check for hmac_algo parameter in sctp_verify_param()

[Vlad Yasevich]

From: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>

RFC 4890 has the following text:

  The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and
  included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.

As a result, we need to check in sctp_verify_param() that HMAC_SHA1 is
present in the list.  If not, we should probably treat this as a
protocol violation.

It should also be a protocol violation if the HMAC parameter is empty.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 578630e..36ebb39 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1982,7 +1982,10 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 					struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
 					struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk)
 {
+	struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
 	int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
+	__u16 n_elt, id = 0;
+	int i;
 
 	/* FIXME - This routine is not looking at each parameter per the
 	 * chunk type, i.e., unrecognized parameters should be further
@@ -2056,9 +2059,29 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		break;
 
 	case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
-		if (sctp_auth_enable)
-			break;
-		/* Fall Through */
+		if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+			goto fallthrough;
+
+		hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p;
+		n_elt = (ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) >> 1;
+
+		/* SCTP-AUTH: Section 6.1
+		 * The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST be supported and
+		 * included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < n_elt; i++) {
+			id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
+
+			if (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
+			sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk,
+						     err_chunk);
+			retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+		}
+		break;
 fallthrough:
 	default:
 		SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Unrecognized param: %d for chunk %d.\n",
-- 
1.5.3.5

[PATCH 2/5] [SCTP]: Fix protocol violation when receiving an error lenght INIT-ACK

[Vlad Yasevich]

From: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>

When receiving an error length INIT-ACK during COOKIE-WAIT,
a 0-vtag ABORT will be responsed. This action violates the
protocol apparently. This patch achieves the following things.
1 If the INIT-ACK contains all the fixed parameters, use init-tag
  recorded from INIT-ACK as vtag.
2 If the INIT-ACK doesn't contain all the fixed parameters,
  just reflect its vtag.

Signed-off-by: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 include/net/sctp/command.h |    1 +
 net/sctp/outqueue.c        |    3 +++
 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c   |    3 +++
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/command.h b/include/net/sctp/command.h
index 10ae2da..35b1e83 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/command.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/command.h
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	SCTP_CMD_ADAPTATION_IND, /* generate and send adaptation event */
 	SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY,    /* generate the association shared keys */
 	SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN,	 /* Mark for retransmission after T1 timeout  */
+	SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG, /* Update peer inittag */
 	SCTP_CMD_LAST
 } sctp_verb_t;
 
diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
index 1bb3c5c..c071446 100644
--- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
@@ -793,6 +793,9 @@ int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int rtx_timeout)
 			break;
 
 		case SCTP_CID_ABORT:
+			if (sctp_test_T_bit(chunk)) {
+				packet->vtag = asoc->c.my_vtag;
+			}
 		case SCTP_CID_SACK:
 		case SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT:
 		case SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT_ACK:
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
index 28eb38e..a4763fd 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
@@ -1536,6 +1536,9 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(sctp_event_t event_type,
 			error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc,
 						GFP_ATOMIC);
 			break;
+		case SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG:
+			asoc->peer.i.init_tag = cmd->obj.u32;
+			break;
 
 		default:
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "Impossible command: %u, %p\n",
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index f2ed647..3ef9749 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -4144,6 +4144,24 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
 		goto nomem;
 
 	if (asoc) {
+		/* Treat INIT-ACK as a special case during COOKIE-WAIT. */
+		if (chunk->chunk_hdr->type = SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK &&
+		    !asoc->peer.i.init_tag) {
+			sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack;
+
+			initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
+			if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk,
+						     sizeof(sctp_initack_chunk_t)))
+				abort->chunk_hdr->flags |= SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T;
+			else {
+				unsigned int inittag;
+
+				inittag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag);
+				sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG,
+						SCTP_U32(inittag));
+			}
+		}
+
 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
 		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
 
-- 
1.5.3.5

[PATCH 2/5] [SCTP]: Fix protocol violation when receiving an error lenght INIT-ACK

[Vlad Yasevich]

From: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>

When receiving an error length INIT-ACK during COOKIE-WAIT,
a 0-vtag ABORT will be responsed. This action violates the
protocol apparently. This patch achieves the following things.
1 If the INIT-ACK contains all the fixed parameters, use init-tag
  recorded from INIT-ACK as vtag.
2 If the INIT-ACK doesn't contain all the fixed parameters,
  just reflect its vtag.

Signed-off-by: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 include/net/sctp/command.h |    1 +
 net/sctp/outqueue.c        |    3 +++
 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c   |    3 +++
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c    |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/command.h b/include/net/sctp/command.h
index 10ae2da..35b1e83 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/command.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/command.h
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	SCTP_CMD_ADAPTATION_IND, /* generate and send adaptation event */
 	SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY,    /* generate the association shared keys */
 	SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN,	 /* Mark for retransmission after T1 timeout  */
+	SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG, /* Update peer inittag */
 	SCTP_CMD_LAST
 } sctp_verb_t;
 
diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
index 1bb3c5c..c071446 100644
--- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
@@ -793,6 +793,9 @@ int sctp_outq_flush(struct sctp_outq *q, int rtx_timeout)
 			break;
 
 		case SCTP_CID_ABORT:
+			if (sctp_test_T_bit(chunk)) {
+				packet->vtag = asoc->c.my_vtag;
+			}
 		case SCTP_CID_SACK:
 		case SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT:
 		case SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT_ACK:
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
index 28eb38e..a4763fd 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
@@ -1536,6 +1536,9 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(sctp_event_t event_type,
 			error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc,
 						GFP_ATOMIC);
 			break;
+		case SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG:
+			asoc->peer.i.init_tag = cmd->obj.u32;
+			break;
 
 		default:
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "Impossible command: %u, %p\n",
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index f2ed647..3ef9749 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -4144,6 +4144,24 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
 		goto nomem;
 
 	if (asoc) {
+		/* Treat INIT-ACK as a special case during COOKIE-WAIT. */
+		if (chunk->chunk_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK &&
+		    !asoc->peer.i.init_tag) {
+			sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack;
+
+			initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
+			if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk,
+						     sizeof(sctp_initack_chunk_t)))
+				abort->chunk_hdr->flags |= SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T;
+			else {
+				unsigned int inittag;
+
+				inittag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag);
+				sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG,
+						SCTP_U32(inittag));
+			}
+		}
+
 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
 		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
 
-- 
1.5.3.5

[PATCH 3/5] [SCTP]: Fix compiler warning about const qualifiers

[Vlad Yasevich]

Fix 3 warnings about discarding const qualifiers:

net/sctp/ulpevent.c:862: warning: passing argument 1 of 'sctp_event2skb' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c:4393: warning: passing argument 1 of 'SCTP_ASOC' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
net/sctp/socket.c:5874: warning: passing argument 1 of 'cmsg_nxthdr' discards qualifiers from pointer target type

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h |    2 +-
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c     |    5 +++--
 net/sctp/socket.c           |    5 +++--
 net/sctp/ulpevent.c         |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h b/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
index 9bcfc12..7ea12e8 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent {
 };
 
 /* Retrieve the skb this event sits inside of. */
-static inline struct sk_buff *sctp_event2skb(struct sctp_ulpevent *ev)
+static inline struct sk_buff *sctp_event2skb(const struct sctp_ulpevent *ev)
 {
 	return container_of((void *)ev, struct sk_buff, cb);
 }
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 3ef9749..07194c2 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -4367,6 +4367,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 				       sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
 {
 	struct sctp_chunk *repl;
+	struct sctp_association* my_asoc;
 
 	/* The comment below says that we enter COOKIE-WAIT AFTER
 	 * sending the INIT, but that doesn't actually work in our
@@ -4390,8 +4391,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 	/* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just
 	 * rerun it through as a sideffect.
 	 */
-	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC,
-			SCTP_ASOC((struct sctp_association *) asoc));
+	my_asoc = (struct sctp_association *)asoc;
+	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(my_asoc));
 
 	/* Choose transport for INIT. */
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_CHOOSE_TRANSPORT,
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index d994d82..998e63a 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -5868,11 +5868,12 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg,
 				  sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
 {
 	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+	struct msghdr *my_msg = (struct msghdr *)msg;
 
 	for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg);
 	     cmsg != NULL;
-	     cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR((struct msghdr*)msg, cmsg)) {
-		if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
+	     cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(my_msg, cmsg)) {
+		if (!CMSG_OK(my_msg, cmsg))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		/* Should we parse this header or ignore?  */
diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
index b43f1f1..ce6cda6 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ __u16 sctp_ulpevent_get_notification_type(const struct sctp_ulpevent *event)
 	union sctp_notification *notification;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
-	skb = sctp_event2skb((struct sctp_ulpevent *)event);
+	skb = sctp_event2skb(event);
 	notification = (union sctp_notification *) skb->data;
 	return notification->sn_header.sn_type;
 }
-- 
1.5.3.5

[PATCH 3/5] [SCTP]: Fix compiler warning about const qualifiers

[Vlad Yasevich]

Fix 3 warnings about discarding const qualifiers:

net/sctp/ulpevent.c:862: warning: passing argument 1 of 'sctp_event2skb' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c:4393: warning: passing argument 1 of 'SCTP_ASOC' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
net/sctp/socket.c:5874: warning: passing argument 1 of 'cmsg_nxthdr' discards qualifiers from pointer target type

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h |    2 +-
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c     |    5 +++--
 net/sctp/socket.c           |    5 +++--
 net/sctp/ulpevent.c         |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h b/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
index 9bcfc12..7ea12e8 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent {
 };
 
 /* Retrieve the skb this event sits inside of. */
-static inline struct sk_buff *sctp_event2skb(struct sctp_ulpevent *ev)
+static inline struct sk_buff *sctp_event2skb(const struct sctp_ulpevent *ev)
 {
 	return container_of((void *)ev, struct sk_buff, cb);
 }
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 3ef9749..07194c2 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -4367,6 +4367,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 				       sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
 {
 	struct sctp_chunk *repl;
+	struct sctp_association* my_asoc;
 
 	/* The comment below says that we enter COOKIE-WAIT AFTER
 	 * sending the INIT, but that doesn't actually work in our
@@ -4390,8 +4391,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 	/* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just
 	 * rerun it through as a sideffect.
 	 */
-	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC,
-			SCTP_ASOC((struct sctp_association *) asoc));
+	my_asoc = (struct sctp_association *)asoc;
+	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(my_asoc));
 
 	/* Choose transport for INIT. */
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_CHOOSE_TRANSPORT,
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index d994d82..998e63a 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -5868,11 +5868,12 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_msghdr_parse(const struct msghdr *msg,
 				  sctp_cmsgs_t *cmsgs)
 {
 	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+	struct msghdr *my_msg = (struct msghdr *)msg;
 
 	for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg);
 	     cmsg != NULL;
-	     cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR((struct msghdr*)msg, cmsg)) {
-		if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
+	     cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(my_msg, cmsg)) {
+		if (!CMSG_OK(my_msg, cmsg))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		/* Should we parse this header or ignore?  */
diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
index b43f1f1..ce6cda6 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ __u16 sctp_ulpevent_get_notification_type(const struct sctp_ulpevent *event)
 	union sctp_notification *notification;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
-	skb = sctp_event2skb((struct sctp_ulpevent *)event);
+	skb = sctp_event2skb(event);
 	notification = (union sctp_notification *) skb->data;
 	return notification->sn_header.sn_type;
 }
-- 
1.5.3.5

[PATCH 4/5] [SCTP]: IPv4 vs IPv6 addresses mess in sctp_inet[6]addr_event.

[Vlad Yasevich]

From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>

All IP addresses that are present in a system are duplicated on
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry. They are linked in the global list
called sctp_local_addr_list. And this struct unions IPv4 and IPv6
addresses.

So, there can be rare case, when a sockaddr_in.sin_addr coincides
with the corresponding part of the sockaddr_in6 and the notifier
for IPv4 will carry away an IPv6 entry.

The fix is to check the family before comparing the addresses.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/ipv6.c     |    5 +++--
 net/sctp/protocol.c |    4 +++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index b1e05d7..85f1495 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -110,8 +110,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long ev,
 		spin_lock_bh(&sctp_local_addr_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(addr, temp,
 					&sctp_local_addr_list, list) {
-			if (ipv6_addr_equal(&addr->a.v6.sin6_addr,
-					     &ifa->addr)) {
+			if (addr->a.sa.sa_family = AF_INET6 &&
+					ipv6_addr_equal(&addr->a.v6.sin6_addr,
+						&ifa->addr)) {
 				found = 1;
 				addr->valid = 0;
 				list_del_rcu(&addr->list);
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index f90091a..c2dd65d 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -647,7 +647,9 @@ static int sctp_inetaddr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long ev,
 		spin_lock_bh(&sctp_local_addr_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(addr, temp,
 					&sctp_local_addr_list, list) {
-			if (addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local) {
+			if (addr->a.sa.sa_family = AF_INET &&
+					addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr =
+					ifa->ifa_local) {
 				found = 1;
 				addr->valid = 0;
 				list_del_rcu(&addr->list);
-- 
1.5.3.5

[PATCH 4/5] [SCTP]: IPv4 vs IPv6 addresses mess in sctp_inet[6]addr_event.

[Vlad Yasevich]

From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>

All IP addresses that are present in a system are duplicated on
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry. They are linked in the global list
called sctp_local_addr_list. And this struct unions IPv4 and IPv6
addresses.

So, there can be rare case, when a sockaddr_in.sin_addr coincides
with the corresponding part of the sockaddr_in6 and the notifier
for IPv4 will carry away an IPv6 entry.

The fix is to check the family before comparing the addresses.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/ipv6.c     |    5 +++--
 net/sctp/protocol.c |    4 +++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index b1e05d7..85f1495 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -110,8 +110,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long ev,
 		spin_lock_bh(&sctp_local_addr_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(addr, temp,
 					&sctp_local_addr_list, list) {
-			if (ipv6_addr_equal(&addr->a.v6.sin6_addr,
-					     &ifa->addr)) {
+			if (addr->a.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
+					ipv6_addr_equal(&addr->a.v6.sin6_addr,
+						&ifa->addr)) {
 				found = 1;
 				addr->valid = 0;
 				list_del_rcu(&addr->list);
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index f90091a..c2dd65d 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -647,7 +647,9 @@ static int sctp_inetaddr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long ev,
 		spin_lock_bh(&sctp_local_addr_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(addr, temp,
 					&sctp_local_addr_list, list) {
-			if (addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr == ifa->ifa_local) {
+			if (addr->a.sa.sa_family == AF_INET &&
+					addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr ==
+					ifa->ifa_local) {
 				found = 1;
 				addr->valid = 0;
 				list_del_rcu(&addr->list);
-- 
1.5.3.5

Re: [PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[David Miller]

From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:18:29 -0400

> Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.

I don't have patch 5/5 in my inbox, any ideas?
Or were there really only 4 patches?

Re: [PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[David Miller]

From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:18:29 -0400

> Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.

I don't have patch 5/5 in my inbox, any ideas?
Or were there really only 4 patches?

Re: [PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[Vlad Yasevich]

David Miller wrote:
> From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
> Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:18:29 -0400
> 
>> Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.
> 
> I don't have patch 5/5 in my inbox, any ideas?
> Or were there really only 4 patches?
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> 

There are only 4.  There used to be 5, but one moved to the 2.6.26
set.

Sorry.
-vlad

Re: [PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[Vlad Yasevich]

David Miller wrote:
> From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
> Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:18:29 -0400
> 
>> Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.
> 
> I don't have patch 5/5 in my inbox, any ideas?
> Or were there really only 4 patches?
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> 

There are only 4.  There used to be 5, but one moved to the 2.6.26
set.

Sorry.
-vlad

Re: [PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[David Miller]

From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:18:29 -0400

> Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.

All applied, thanks Vlad.

Re: [PATCH] [SCTP]: Bug fixes

[David Miller]

From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:18:29 -0400

> Here is a set of SCTP bugfixes for net-2.6.  Please apply.

All applied, thanks Vlad.