Re: [PATCH 3/4] AUDIT: audit when fcaps increase the permitted or inheritable capabilities

["Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>]

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[s/viro@...ok/viro@...uk/]

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Logging execve()s where there is only an increase in capabilities seems
>> wrong to me. To me it seems equally important to log any event where an
>> execve() yields pP != 0.
> 
> True.
> 
> ... except if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && uid==0) I guess?
> 
> And then it also might be interesting in the case where
> (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && uid==0) and pP is not full.

I guess so, although this seems like a case of being interested in a
(unusual) non-privileged execve().

>>>  	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm);
>>>  
>>> +	audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &vcaps);
>>> +
>> When rc != 0, the execve() will fail. Is it appropriate to log in this case?
> 
> It might fail because fP contains bits not in pP', right?  That's
> probably interesting to auditors.

In which case, how is the fact it didn't execute captured in the audit log?

Cheers

Andrew
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