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From: phcoder <phcoder@gmail.com>
To: The development of GRUB 2 <grub-devel@gnu.org>
Subject: Re: GRUB hardened boot framework
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 23:15:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <49A8660D.4020307@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <49A861A0.2000601@student.ethz.ch>

>> The last stage is much simpler.  Just put /boot/ in a crypted filesystem (we
>> have a patch liing around which is pending to merge).
> 
> Yes, that would also be an idea.
> Then the filesystem needs the authentication.
Encrypted filesystems don't prevent some attacks as inconsistent 
rollback. Suppose that some program is written like
if (!authenthicated)
    return error;
Let's say this is in sector X on disk. But then author added something 
before this function and this code is shifted to the sector X+1. However 
attacker has kept the previous sector X+1. Then he rewrites the sector 
X+1 with its previous version and bypasses the authentication. It's 
difficult attack but is still possible. Actually mac checksumming or 
signatures are better way to protect the system. Encrypting mainly 
protects from someone looking at data but isn't so good in 
detecting/protecting from modification. And normally you have no reason 
to hide you linux system partition. Additionally hashes are faster then 
encryptions.
> 
>> That only leaves MBR and core.img.  You can either check both from firmware
>> (does any BIOS allow this?) or do some funny gimmicks in MBR ;-)
> 
> There might be some boot virus protections, that could be abused. Or otherwise -
> coreboot.
Yes. My BIOS has boot virus protection but I haven't tested yet how it works

-- 

Regards
Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko



  reply	other threads:[~2009-02-27 22:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-02-22 13:27 GRUB trusted boot framework Jan Alsenz
2009-02-22 13:56 ` phcoder
2009-02-22 15:12   ` Jan Alsenz
2009-02-22 15:42     ` phcoder
2009-02-22 16:48       ` Jan Alsenz
2009-02-22 17:15         ` phcoder
2009-02-22 16:07 ` Vesa Jääskeläinen
2009-02-22 18:31   ` Jan Alsenz
2009-02-22 18:45     ` Vesa Jääskeläinen
2009-02-22 19:16       ` Jan Alsenz
2009-02-22 21:16         ` phcoder
2009-02-22 23:04           ` Jan Alsenz
2009-02-22 23:55             ` phcoder
2009-02-23  7:51               ` Jan Alsenz
2009-02-27 20:42 ` Robert Millan
2009-02-27 21:56   ` GRUB hardened " Jan Alsenz
2009-02-27 22:15     ` phcoder [this message]
2009-02-27 22:22     ` Robert Millan
2009-02-27 22:55       ` phcoder
2009-02-27 23:08         ` Robert Millan
2009-02-27 23:16           ` phcoder
2009-02-27 23:10         ` Jan Alsenz
2009-02-27 23:18           ` phcoder
2009-02-27 23:26             ` Robert Millan
2009-02-28  0:07               ` Jan Alsenz

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