From: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
To: SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Refpolicy <refpolicy@oss.tresys.com>
Subject: Re: [refpolicy] [RFC] mod_selinux security policy
Date: Thu, 07 May 2009 12:56:51 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4A025C03.50907@ak.jp.nec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <49F69A33.2070601@ak.jp.nec.com>
KaiGai Kohei wrote:
> Folks,
>
> Nowadays, I'm also under development for a loadable module on apache/httpd,
> named as mod_selinux.so. It enables to launch web-applications with an
> individual security context based on http-authenticated users.
> It internally uses a one-time worker thread for each connections to perform
> as a restrictive domain bounded to httpd_t due to the hard-wired rule for
> multi-threading process.
>
> In the LCA2009 demonstration, all we can show was individual MCS category
> per http-users because of lack of TE policy.
> The following ugly policy is an example of TE policy for mod_selinux.so.
>
> http://code.google.com/p/sepgsql/source/browse/misc/mod_selinux/mod_selinux.te
> http://code.google.com/p/sepgsql/source/browse/misc/mod_selinux/mod_selinux.if
>
> We needed to remain a minimum set of privileges on the bounded domains because
> they also perform as a part of the daemon process, although they are restricted
> to access to the web contents or database objects.
> (Thus, it allows webapp_type to write on log files, for example.)
>
> In my hope, if we can have a interface to assign the minimum set of privileges
> on the bounded domain, it will be helpfull for authors of web applications
> which provide its own security policy. It will enables them to focus on writing
> their policy for web contents.
One possible idea is to define a new attribute (e.g httpd_server_type) which
contains httpd_t and other domains for built-in web applications.
A minimum set of privileges to perform as a web server process is allowed
on the httpd_server_type, and rest of permissions are allowed on individual
types.
Or, add a new template/interface to allow minimum privilges to perform as
a web server process (e.g httpd_server_domain), then httpd_t and other
domains for built-in web applications uses this template/interface.
Anyway, the mod_selinux currently copies and pastes a part of policies for
apache, but it is not basically good due to the code duplication.
I would like to get any comments prior to the pushing the package to Fedora.
Thanks,
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com (KaiGai Kohei)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [RFC] mod_selinux security policy
Date: Thu, 07 May 2009 12:56:51 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4A025C03.50907@ak.jp.nec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <49F69A33.2070601@ak.jp.nec.com>
KaiGai Kohei wrote:
> Folks,
>
> Nowadays, I'm also under development for a loadable module on apache/httpd,
> named as mod_selinux.so. It enables to launch web-applications with an
> individual security context based on http-authenticated users.
> It internally uses a one-time worker thread for each connections to perform
> as a restrictive domain bounded to httpd_t due to the hard-wired rule for
> multi-threading process.
>
> In the LCA2009 demonstration, all we can show was individual MCS category
> per http-users because of lack of TE policy.
> The following ugly policy is an example of TE policy for mod_selinux.so.
>
> http://code.google.com/p/sepgsql/source/browse/misc/mod_selinux/mod_selinux.te
> http://code.google.com/p/sepgsql/source/browse/misc/mod_selinux/mod_selinux.if
>
> We needed to remain a minimum set of privileges on the bounded domains because
> they also perform as a part of the daemon process, although they are restricted
> to access to the web contents or database objects.
> (Thus, it allows webapp_type to write on log files, for example.)
>
> In my hope, if we can have a interface to assign the minimum set of privileges
> on the bounded domain, it will be helpfull for authors of web applications
> which provide its own security policy. It will enables them to focus on writing
> their policy for web contents.
One possible idea is to define a new attribute (e.g httpd_server_type) which
contains httpd_t and other domains for built-in web applications.
A minimum set of privileges to perform as a web server process is allowed
on the httpd_server_type, and rest of permissions are allowed on individual
types.
Or, add a new template/interface to allow minimum privilges to perform as
a web server process (e.g httpd_server_domain), then httpd_t and other
domains for built-in web applications uses this template/interface.
Anyway, the mod_selinux currently copies and pastes a part of policies for
apache, but it is not basically good due to the code duplication.
I would like to get any comments prior to the pushing the package to Fedora.
Thanks,
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-05-07 3:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-04-28 5:54 [RFC] mod_selinux security policy KaiGai Kohei
2009-04-28 5:54 ` [refpolicy] " KaiGai Kohei
2009-05-07 3:56 ` KaiGai Kohei [this message]
2009-05-07 3:56 ` KaiGai Kohei
2009-05-08 6:29 ` [PATCH] An interface to allow web-apps minimum privileges (Re: [RFC] mod_selinux security policy) KaiGai Kohei
2009-05-08 6:29 ` [refpolicy] " KaiGai Kohei
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