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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security/selinux: decrement sizeof size in strncmp
Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2009 03:06:17 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4AFE1EA9.60102@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19857.1258147396@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>

Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Nov 2009 18:11:55 PST, Casey Schaufler said:
>   
>> James Morris wrote:
>>     
>>> Do you see potential for a buffer overrun in this case?
>>>       
>
>   
>> No, but I hate arguing with people who think that every time
>> they see strcmp that they have found a security flaw.
>>     
>
> How do you feel about people who think every time they see strcmp()
> "Oh crap, something that needs auditing"? ;)
>   

They have my deep sympathy. Which is why I'm advocating leaving
the perfectly functional and correct use of strncmp() as it is.

> The biggest problem with strcmp() is that even if it got audited when that code
> went in, it's prone to unaudited breakage when somebody changes something in
> some other piece of code, quite often in some other .c file in some other
> directory.
>
> Julia, is there a way to use coccinelle to detect unsafe changes like that?  Or
> is expressing those semantics too difficult?
>
>
>   


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security/selinux: decrement sizeof size in strncmp
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 19:06:17 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4AFE1EA9.60102@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19857.1258147396@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>

Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Nov 2009 18:11:55 PST, Casey Schaufler said:
>   
>> James Morris wrote:
>>     
>>> Do you see potential for a buffer overrun in this case?
>>>       
>
>   
>> No, but I hate arguing with people who think that every time
>> they see strcmp that they have found a security flaw.
>>     
>
> How do you feel about people who think every time they see strcmp()
> "Oh crap, something that needs auditing"? ;)
>   

They have my deep sympathy. Which is why I'm advocating leaving
the perfectly functional and correct use of strncmp() as it is.

> The biggest problem with strcmp() is that even if it got audited when that code
> went in, it's prone to unaudited breakage when somebody changes something in
> some other piece of code, quite often in some other .c file in some other
> directory.
>
> Julia, is there a way to use coccinelle to detect unsafe changes like that?  Or
> is expressing those semantics too difficult?
>
>
>   


  parent reply	other threads:[~2009-11-14  3:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-11-12  7:49 [PATCH 3/4] security/selinux: decrement sizeof size in strncmp Julia Lawall
2009-11-12  7:49 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12  8:16 ` James Morris
2009-11-12  8:16   ` James Morris
2009-11-12 14:53   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-11-12 14:53     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-11-12 14:57     ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 14:57       ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 16:21       ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-12 16:21         ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-12 18:28         ` David Wagner
2009-11-12 21:41         ` James Morris
2009-11-12 21:41           ` James Morris
2009-11-12 21:59           ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 21:59             ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 23:56             ` David Wagner
2009-11-13  2:11           ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-13  2:11             ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-13 20:32             ` David Wagner
2009-11-13 21:23             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-13 21:23               ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-13 21:26               ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-13 21:26                 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-13 23:08                 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-13 23:08                   ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-14  0:41                   ` David Wagner
2009-11-14  5:08                     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-14 15:22                   ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-14 15:22                     ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-13 23:06               ` David Wagner
2009-11-14  3:06               ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2009-11-14  3:06                 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-14  3:44                 ` David Wagner
2009-11-14  3:48                   ` Joe Perches
2009-11-14  5:12                     ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-14  5:26                       ` Joe Perches
2009-11-14  7:20                         ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-15  7:45                           ` Raja R Harinath
2009-11-15 18:44                             ` Casey Schaufler

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