From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
To: Edward Shishkin <edward.shishkin@gmail.com>
Cc: ReiserFS Mailing List <reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH #3] reiserfs: Fix permissions on .reiserfs_priv
Date: Thu, 08 Apr 2010 16:55:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4BBE42A9.2010506@suse.com> (raw)
Commit 677c9b2e393a0cd203bd54e9c18b012b2c73305a removed the magic
from the lookup code to hide the .reiserfs_priv directory since it
was getting loaded at mount-time instead. The intent was that the
entry would be hidden from the user via a poisoned d_compare, but
this was faulty.
This introduced a security issue where unpriviledged users could
access and modify extended attributes or ACLs belonging to other
users, including root.
This patch resolves the issue by properly hiding .reiserfs_priv. This
was the intent of the xattr poisoning code, but it appears to have
never worked as expected. This is fixed by using d_revalidate instead
of d_compare.
This patch makes -oexpose_privroot a no-op. I'm fine leaving it this
way. The effort involved in working out the corner cases wrt permissions
and caching outweigh the benefit of the feature.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
---
fs/reiserfs/dir.c | 2 --
fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 17 ++++-------------
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/reiserfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/dir.c
@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ static inline bool is_privroot_deh(struc
struct reiserfs_de_head *deh)
{
struct dentry *privroot = REISERFS_SB(dir->d_sb)->priv_root;
- if (reiserfs_expose_privroot(dir->d_sb))
- return 0;
return (dir == dir->d_parent && privroot->d_inode &&
deh->deh_objectid == INODE_PKEY(privroot->d_inode)->k_objectid);
}
--- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr.c
@@ -972,21 +972,13 @@ int reiserfs_permission(struct inode *in
return generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
}
-/* This will catch lookups from the fs root to .reiserfs_priv */
-static int
-xattr_lookup_poison(struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *q1, struct qstr *name)
+static int xattr_hide_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
- struct dentry *priv_root = REISERFS_SB(dentry->d_sb)->priv_root;
- if (container_of(q1, struct dentry, d_name) == priv_root)
- return -ENOENT;
- if (q1->len == name->len &&
- !memcmp(q1->name, name->name, name->len))
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ return -EPERM;
}
static const struct dentry_operations xattr_lookup_poison_ops = {
- .d_compare = xattr_lookup_poison,
+ .d_revalidate = xattr_hide_revalidate,
};
int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct super_block *s)
@@ -1000,8 +992,7 @@ int reiserfs_lookup_privroot(struct supe
strlen(PRIVROOT_NAME));
if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
REISERFS_SB(s)->priv_root = dentry;
- if (!reiserfs_expose_privroot(s))
- s->s_root->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops;
+ dentry->d_op = &xattr_lookup_poison_ops;
if (dentry->d_inode)
dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE;
} else
next reply other threads:[~2010-04-08 20:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-04-08 20:55 Jeff Mahoney [this message]
2010-04-08 21:38 ` [PATCH #3] reiserfs: Fix permissions on .reiserfs_priv Edward Shishkin
2010-04-08 22:39 ` Matt McCutchen
2010-04-09 0:04 ` Jeff Mahoney
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