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From: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: refpolicy@oss1.tresys.com, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [refpolicy] SELinux UBAC question
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2010 08:39:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4CE3DB1B.2010602@tresys.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201011171354.03646.roberto.sassu@polito.it>

On 11/17/10 07:54, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> i'm using the Fedora 13 operating system with shipped SELinux policy.
> I want to add a basic protection for regular users by using the UBAC feature and
> letting them to log on the system with the confined domain 'user_t'.
> A problem that i have found when using the policy with this feature enabled
> is that root logs on the system with user 'unconfined_u' or 'root' and files created
> or updated after doing an administrative task cannot be accessed by regular users.
> In order to have the system working i have to execute root processes that
> make changes on the system with user 'system_u'.

This should only be the case for user files and domains.  Other system
files, such as those in /etc, should be unaffected.

> One solution to overcome this issue may be to add an exception to the policy,
> as done for the 'system_u' user, so that UBAC will be applied only to SELinux users
> tied to regular users, living other users 'sysadm_u', 'staff_u', 'root', 'unconfined_u'
> unprotected.
> Does this is the right way to modify the policy in order to enforce the protection
> required or there are other alternatives?

It depends on your security goals.  If that still meets your goals, then
yes.  I would not include this upstream as it requires separation of all
users.

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: cpebenito@tresys.com (Christopher J. PeBenito)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] SELinux UBAC question
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2010 08:39:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4CE3DB1B.2010602@tresys.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201011171354.03646.roberto.sassu@polito.it>

On 11/17/10 07:54, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> i'm using the Fedora 13 operating system with shipped SELinux policy.
> I want to add a basic protection for regular users by using the UBAC feature and
> letting them to log on the system with the confined domain 'user_t'.
> A problem that i have found when using the policy with this feature enabled
> is that root logs on the system with user 'unconfined_u' or 'root' and files created
> or updated after doing an administrative task cannot be accessed by regular users.
> In order to have the system working i have to execute root processes that
> make changes on the system with user 'system_u'.

This should only be the case for user files and domains.  Other system
files, such as those in /etc, should be unaffected.

> One solution to overcome this issue may be to add an exception to the policy,
> as done for the 'system_u' user, so that UBAC will be applied only to SELinux users
> tied to regular users, living other users 'sysadm_u', 'staff_u', 'root', 'unconfined_u'
> unprotected.
> Does this is the right way to modify the policy in order to enforce the protection
> required or there are other alternatives?

It depends on your security goals.  If that still meets your goals, then
yes.  I would not include this upstream as it requires separation of all
users.

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com

  reply	other threads:[~2010-11-17 13:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-11-17 12:54 SELinux UBAC question Roberto Sassu
2010-11-17 12:54 ` [refpolicy] " Roberto Sassu
2010-11-17 13:39 ` Christopher J. PeBenito [this message]
2010-11-17 13:39   ` Christopher J. PeBenito

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