From: Oren Laadan <orenl-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
To: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
kernel list
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Bastian Blank <bastian-yyjItF7Rl6lg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
LSM
<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman"
<ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>,
Michael Kerrisk
<mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan
<adobriyan-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2011 23:22:12 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4D2BDAF4.9040908@cs.columbia.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110110225151.GA18944@localhost>
On 01/10/2011 05:51 PM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Bastian Blank (bastian-yyjItF7Rl6lg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org):
>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 09:13:34PM +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>>> + const struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
>>> +
>>> + if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
>>> + /* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
>>> + capability to the target user ns or you don't */
>>> + if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> + return 1;
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + /* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
>>> + if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> + !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + return 1;
>>
>> Isn't that equal to this?
>>
>> if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>> return 1;
>>
>> if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
>> (cred->euid == tcred->suid ||
>> cred->euid == tcred->uid ||
>> cred->uid == tcred->suid ||
>> cred->uid == tcred->uid))
>> return 1;
>>
>> return 0;
>>
>> I would consider this much easier to read.
>
> Unfortunately, it's actually not equivalent. when capable()
> returns success, then it sets the current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV.
> If permission is granted based on userids and the capability
> isn't needed, then we don't want to needlessly set PF_SUPERPRIV.
A bit off-topic: does this means that c/r needs to save and
restore this process flag ?
>
> That's why I'm going to such lengths to call capable() as a last
> resort.
IMHO, worth a one line comment in the code ...
Oren.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Oren Laadan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>
To: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Bastian Blank <bastian@waldi.eu.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2011 23:22:12 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4D2BDAF4.9040908@cs.columbia.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110110225151.GA18944@localhost>
On 01/10/2011 05:51 PM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Bastian Blank (bastian@waldi.eu.org):
>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 09:13:34PM +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
>>> + const struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
>>> +
>>> + if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
>>> + /* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
>>> + capability to the target user ns or you don't */
>>> + if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> + return 1;
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + /* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
>>> + if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> + (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> + (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) &&
>>> + (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) &&
>>> + !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + return 1;
>>
>> Isn't that equal to this?
>>
>> if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
>> return 1;
>>
>> if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
>> (cred->euid == tcred->suid ||
>> cred->euid == tcred->uid ||
>> cred->uid == tcred->suid ||
>> cred->uid == tcred->uid))
>> return 1;
>>
>> return 0;
>>
>> I would consider this much easier to read.
>
> Unfortunately, it's actually not equivalent. when capable()
> returns success, then it sets the current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV.
> If permission is granted based on userids and the capability
> isn't needed, then we don't want to needlessly set PF_SUPERPRIV.
A bit off-topic: does this means that c/r needs to save and
restore this process flag ?
>
> That's why I'm going to such lengths to call capable() as a last
> resort.
IMHO, worth a one line comment in the code ...
Oren.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-01-11 4:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-01-10 21:11 userns: targeted capabilities v3 Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 2/7] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 3/7] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 4/7] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110110211334.GD22564-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-10 21:52 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-10 21:52 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-10 22:51 ` Serge Hallyn
2011-01-10 23:23 ` Bastian Blank
[not found] ` <20110110232335.GA27029-0IJIQSrh9RL9UF0aPl6fsj8Kkb2uy4ct@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-11 1:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-11 1:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110111013152.GA23860-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-14 14:50 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-14 14:50 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-15 0:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110115003114.GA24569-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-15 11:30 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-15 11:30 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-15 14:12 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110115113025.GB18682-0IJIQSrh9RL9UF0aPl6fsj8Kkb2uy4ct@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-15 14:12 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110114145001.GB20945-0IJIQSrh9RL9UF0aPl6fsj8Kkb2uy4ct@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-15 0:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 23:23 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-11 4:22 ` Oren Laadan [this message]
2011-01-11 4:22 ` Oren Laadan
[not found] ` <4D2BDAF4.9040908-eQaUEPhvms7ENvBUuze7eA@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-11 4:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-11 4:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110110215240.GA21351-0IJIQSrh9RL9UF0aPl6fsj8Kkb2uy4ct@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-10 22:51 ` Serge Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110110211135.GA22446-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 2/7] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 3/7] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 4/7] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 5/7] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 5/7] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-10 21:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110110211406.GF22564-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-10 21:59 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-10 21:59 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-10 22:56 ` Serge Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110110215937.GB21351-0IJIQSrh9RL9UF0aPl6fsj8Kkb2uy4ct@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-10 22:56 ` Serge Hallyn
2011-01-11 5:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-11 5:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20110111052759.GA24970-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2011-01-14 15:02 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-14 15:02 ` Bastian Blank
2011-01-10 21:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
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