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* [PATCH] iproute2: allow to specify truncation bits on auth algo
@ 2011-01-11 16:32 Nicolas Dichtel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Nicolas Dichtel @ 2011-01-11 16:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Hemminger, netdev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 541 bytes --]

Hi,

here is a patch against iproute2 to allow user to set a state with a specific 
auth length.

Example:
$ ip xfrm state add src 10.16.0.72 dst 10.16.0.121 proto ah spi 0x10000000 
auth-trunc "sha256" "azertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn123456" 96 mode tunnel
$ ip xfrm state
src 10.16.0.72 dst 10.16.0.121
         proto ah spi 0x10000000 reqid 0 mode tunnel
         replay-window 0
         auth-trunc hmac(sha256) 
0x617a6572747975696f707173646667686a6b6c6d77786376626e313233343536 96
         sel src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 0.0.0.0/0

Regards,
Nicolas

[-- Attachment #2: 0001-iproute2-allow-to-specify-truncation-bits-on-auth-a.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 5435 bytes --]

>From 522ed7348cdf3b6f501af2a5a5d989de1696565a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 06:48:12 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] iproute2: allow to specify truncation bits on auth algo

Attribute XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC can be used to specify
truncation bits, so we add a new algo type: auth-trunc.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
---
 ip/ipxfrm.c     |   28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 ip/xfrm_state.c |   48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ip/ipxfrm.c b/ip/ipxfrm.c
index 9753822..e01cadb 100644
--- a/ip/ipxfrm.c
+++ b/ip/ipxfrm.c
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ const char *strxf_xfrmproto(__u8 proto)
 static const struct typeent algo_types[]= {
 	{ "enc", XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT }, { "auth", XFRMA_ALG_AUTH },
 	{ "comp", XFRMA_ALG_COMP }, { "aead", XFRMA_ALG_AEAD },
+	{ "auth-trunc", XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC },
 	{ NULL, -1 }
 };
 
@@ -570,6 +571,25 @@ static void xfrm_aead_print(struct xfrm_algo_aead *algo, int len,
 	fprintf(fp, "%s", _SL_);
 }
 
+static void xfrm_auth_trunc_print(struct xfrm_algo_auth *algo, int len,
+				  FILE *fp, const char *prefix)
+{
+	struct {
+		struct xfrm_algo algo;
+		char key[algo->alg_key_len / 8];
+	} base;
+
+	memcpy(base.algo.alg_name, algo->alg_name, sizeof(base.algo.alg_name));
+	base.algo.alg_key_len = algo->alg_key_len;
+	memcpy(base.algo.alg_key, algo->alg_key, algo->alg_key_len / 8);
+
+	__xfrm_algo_print(&base.algo, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC, len, fp, prefix, 0);
+
+	fprintf(fp, " %d", algo->alg_trunc_len);
+
+	fprintf(fp, "%s", _SL_);
+}
+
 static void xfrm_tmpl_print(struct xfrm_user_tmpl *tmpls, int len,
 			    __u16 family, FILE *fp, const char *prefix)
 {
@@ -677,12 +697,18 @@ void xfrm_xfrma_print(struct rtattr *tb[], __u16 family,
 		fprintf(fp, "\tmark %d/0x%x\n", m->v, m->m);
 	}
 
-	if (tb[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH]) {
+	if (tb[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH] && !tb[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC]) {
 		struct rtattr *rta = tb[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH];
 		xfrm_algo_print((struct xfrm_algo *) RTA_DATA(rta),
 				XFRMA_ALG_AUTH, RTA_PAYLOAD(rta), fp, prefix);
 	}
 
+	if (tb[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC]) {
+		struct rtattr *rta = tb[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC];
+		xfrm_auth_trunc_print((struct xfrm_algo_auth *) RTA_DATA(rta),
+				      RTA_PAYLOAD(rta), fp, prefix);
+	}
+
 	if (tb[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD]) {
 		struct rtattr *rta = tb[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD];
 		xfrm_aead_print((struct xfrm_algo_aead *)RTA_DATA(rta),
diff --git a/ip/xfrm_state.c b/ip/xfrm_state.c
index 38d4039..550a965 100644
--- a/ip/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/ip/xfrm_state.c
@@ -90,11 +90,12 @@ static void usage(void)
 
 	fprintf(stderr, "ALGO-LIST := [ ALGO-LIST ] | [ ALGO ]\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "ALGO := ALGO_TYPE ALGO_NAME ALGO_KEY "
-			"[ ALGO_ICV_LEN ]\n");
+			"[ ALGO_ICV_LEN | ALGO_TRUNC_LEN ]\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "ALGO_TYPE := [ ");
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s | ", strxf_algotype(XFRMA_ALG_AEAD));
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s | ", strxf_algotype(XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT));
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s | ", strxf_algotype(XFRMA_ALG_AUTH));
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s | ", strxf_algotype(XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC));
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s ", strxf_algotype(XFRMA_ALG_COMP));
 	fprintf(stderr, "]\n");
 
@@ -340,6 +341,7 @@ static int xfrm_state_modify(int cmd, unsigned flags, int argc, char **argv)
 			case XFRMA_ALG_AEAD:
 			case XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT:
 			case XFRMA_ALG_AUTH:
+			case XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC:
 			case XFRMA_ALG_COMP:
 			{
 				/* ALGO */
@@ -347,11 +349,12 @@ static int xfrm_state_modify(int cmd, unsigned flags, int argc, char **argv)
 					union {
 						struct xfrm_algo alg;
 						struct xfrm_algo_aead aead;
+						struct xfrm_algo_auth auth;
 					} u;
 					char buf[XFRM_ALGO_KEY_BUF_SIZE];
 				} alg = {};
 				int len;
-				__u32 icvlen;
+				__u32 icvlen, trunclen;
 				char *name;
 				char *key;
 				char *buf;
@@ -368,6 +371,7 @@ static int xfrm_state_modify(int cmd, unsigned flags, int argc, char **argv)
 					ealgop = *argv;
 					break;
 				case XFRMA_ALG_AUTH:
+				case XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC:
 					if (aalgop)
 						duparg("ALGOTYPE", *argv);
 					aalgop = *argv;
@@ -395,21 +399,33 @@ static int xfrm_state_modify(int cmd, unsigned flags, int argc, char **argv)
 				buf = alg.u.alg.alg_key;
 				len = sizeof(alg.u.alg);
 
-				if (type != XFRMA_ALG_AEAD)
-					goto parse_algo;
-
-				if (!NEXT_ARG_OK())
-					missarg("ALGOICVLEN");
-				NEXT_ARG();
-				if (get_u32(&icvlen, *argv, 0))
-					invarg("\"aead\" ICV length is invalid",
-					       *argv);
-				alg.u.aead.alg_icv_len = icvlen;
-
-				buf = alg.u.aead.alg_key;
-				len = sizeof(alg.u.aead);
+				switch (type) {
+				case XFRMA_ALG_AEAD:
+					if (!NEXT_ARG_OK())
+						missarg("ALGOICVLEN");
+					NEXT_ARG();
+					if (get_u32(&icvlen, *argv, 0))
+						invarg("\"aead\" ICV length is invalid",
+						       *argv);
+					alg.u.aead.alg_icv_len = icvlen;
+
+					buf = alg.u.aead.alg_key;
+					len = sizeof(alg.u.aead);
+					break;
+				case XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC:
+					if (!NEXT_ARG_OK())
+						missarg("ALGOTRUNCLEN");
+					NEXT_ARG();
+					if (get_u32(&trunclen, *argv, 0))
+						invarg("\"auth\" trunc length is invalid",
+						       *argv);
+					alg.u.auth.alg_trunc_len = trunclen;
+
+					buf = alg.u.auth.alg_key;
+					len = sizeof(alg.u.auth);
+					break;
+				}
 
-parse_algo:
 				xfrm_algo_parse((void *)&alg, type, name, key,
 						buf, sizeof(alg.buf));
 				len += alg.u.alg.alg_key_len;
-- 
1.5.6.5


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH] ipsec: fix IPv4 AH alignment on 32 bits
@ 2011-01-28  4:51 Herbert Xu
  2011-01-28  8:51 ` Nicolas Dichtel
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2011-01-28  4:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Miller; +Cc: nicolas.dichtel, netdev, christophe.gouault

David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> wrote:
>
> We cannot just start rejecting the old 8-byte alignment on input if
> Linux has been using an 8-byte alignment since day one.
> 
> If you want this change to be considered seriously, you need to relax
> the AH4 input check.

I second your sentiment.  However, in this particular case it
would appear that our old implementation was also overly strict
in rejecting 32-bit alignment so even if we relax it now it still
wouldn't work with an old implementation once we reduce the padding
on output (unless you traffic was one-way only).

So perhaps an SA configuration flag is needed?

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2011-02-28 15:48 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2011-01-11 16:32 [PATCH] iproute2: allow to specify truncation bits on auth algo Nicolas Dichtel
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2011-01-28  4:51 [RFC PATCH] ipsec: fix IPv4 AH alignment on 32 bits Herbert Xu
2011-01-28  8:51 ` Nicolas Dichtel
2011-01-28 19:46   ` David Miller
2011-02-02 16:30     ` [PATCH] iproute2: allow to specify truncation bits on auth algo Nicolas Dichtel
2011-02-02 16:34       ` Nicolas Dichtel
2011-02-28 13:46         ` Nicolas Dichtel
2011-02-28 15:48           ` Stephen Hemminger

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