From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>
To: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
Anthony Liguori <aliguori@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
Dean Nelson <dnelson@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH uq/master -v2 2/2] KVM, MCE, unpoison memory address across reboot
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2011 09:22:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4D53A032.9000702@web.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1297297678.17407.3.camel@yhuang-dev>
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On 2011-02-10 01:27, Huang Ying wrote:
> On Wed, 2011-02-09 at 16:00 +0800, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>> On 2011-02-09 04:00, Huang Ying wrote:
>>> In Linux kernel HWPoison processing implementation, the virtual
>>> address in processes mapping the error physical memory page is marked
>>> as HWPoison. So that, the further accessing to the virtual
>>> address will kill corresponding processes with SIGBUS.
>>>
>>> If the error physical memory page is used by a KVM guest, the SIGBUS
>>> will be sent to QEMU, and QEMU will simulate a MCE to report that
>>> memory error to the guest OS. If the guest OS can not recover from
>>> the error (for example, the page is accessed by kernel code), guest OS
>>> will reboot the system. But because the underlying host virtual
>>> address backing the guest physical memory is still poisoned, if the
>>> guest system accesses the corresponding guest physical memory even
>>> after rebooting, the SIGBUS will still be sent to QEMU and MCE will be
>>> simulated. That is, guest system can not recover via rebooting.
>>
>> Yeah, saw this already during my test...
>>
>>>
>>> In fact, across rebooting, the contents of guest physical memory page
>>> need not to be kept. We can allocate a new host physical page to
>>> back the corresponding guest physical address.
>>
>> I just wondering what would be architecturally suboptimal if we simply
>> remapped on SIGBUS directly. Would save us at least the bookkeeping.
>
> Because we can not change the content of memory silently during guest OS
> running, this may corrupts guest OS data structure and even ruins disk
> contents. But during rebooting, all guest OS state are discarded.
I was not talking about remapping more than just the pages that became
inaccessible, just like you do now. But I guess the problem is rather
that insane guests continuing to access those pages before reboot should
also still receive MCEs.
Jan
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>
To: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
Dean Nelson <dnelson@redhat.com>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
"qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
Anthony Liguori <aliguori@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Subject: [Qemu-devel] Re: [PATCH uq/master -v2 2/2] KVM, MCE, unpoison memory address across reboot
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2011 09:22:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4D53A032.9000702@web.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1297297678.17407.3.camel@yhuang-dev>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1954 bytes --]
On 2011-02-10 01:27, Huang Ying wrote:
> On Wed, 2011-02-09 at 16:00 +0800, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>> On 2011-02-09 04:00, Huang Ying wrote:
>>> In Linux kernel HWPoison processing implementation, the virtual
>>> address in processes mapping the error physical memory page is marked
>>> as HWPoison. So that, the further accessing to the virtual
>>> address will kill corresponding processes with SIGBUS.
>>>
>>> If the error physical memory page is used by a KVM guest, the SIGBUS
>>> will be sent to QEMU, and QEMU will simulate a MCE to report that
>>> memory error to the guest OS. If the guest OS can not recover from
>>> the error (for example, the page is accessed by kernel code), guest OS
>>> will reboot the system. But because the underlying host virtual
>>> address backing the guest physical memory is still poisoned, if the
>>> guest system accesses the corresponding guest physical memory even
>>> after rebooting, the SIGBUS will still be sent to QEMU and MCE will be
>>> simulated. That is, guest system can not recover via rebooting.
>>
>> Yeah, saw this already during my test...
>>
>>>
>>> In fact, across rebooting, the contents of guest physical memory page
>>> need not to be kept. We can allocate a new host physical page to
>>> back the corresponding guest physical address.
>>
>> I just wondering what would be architecturally suboptimal if we simply
>> remapped on SIGBUS directly. Would save us at least the bookkeeping.
>
> Because we can not change the content of memory silently during guest OS
> running, this may corrupts guest OS data structure and even ruins disk
> contents. But during rebooting, all guest OS state are discarded.
I was not talking about remapping more than just the pages that became
inaccessible, just like you do now. But I guess the problem is rather
that insane guests continuing to access those pages before reboot should
also still receive MCEs.
Jan
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-02-10 8:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-02-09 3:00 [PATCH uq/master -v2 2/2] KVM, MCE, unpoison memory address across reboot Huang Ying
2011-02-09 3:00 ` [Qemu-devel] " Huang Ying
2011-02-09 8:00 ` Jan Kiszka
2011-02-09 8:00 ` [Qemu-devel] " Jan Kiszka
2011-02-10 0:27 ` Huang Ying
2011-02-10 0:27 ` [Qemu-devel] " Huang Ying
2011-02-10 8:22 ` Jan Kiszka [this message]
2011-02-10 8:22 ` Jan Kiszka
2011-02-10 8:52 ` Jan Kiszka
2011-02-10 8:52 ` [Qemu-devel] " Jan Kiszka
2011-02-11 1:20 ` Huang Ying
2011-02-11 1:20 ` [Qemu-devel] " Huang Ying
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