From: dwalsh@redhat.com (Daniel J Walsh)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod
Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2011 05:55:02 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4E6B33F6.9000000@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4E6A3719.60208@tresys.com>
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On 09/09/2011 11:56 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 09/09/11 07:22, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> Now this boolean controls sys_module, so we always transition but
>> we can turn off the ability to insert modules into the kernel.
>>
>> This is much simpler then what we had before.
>>
>> If you like this I have a similar patch for
>> secure_mode_loadpolicy
>
> So with the current implementation, there are conditional module
> loaders and unconditional module loaders. Do we really want to
> make all module loading conditional? I'm fine with that, but are
> there reasons to keep the current conditional/unconditional
> behavior? If so we can still keep that functionality, but
> implement it similar to this patch.
>
I think this should be unconditional. If you want to shutoff loading
kernel modules, this patch will do it even with unconfined programs
running. It would be a pain to run with this system, but at least the
users know that at a certain state of the machine no kernel modules
can be loaded.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-09-10 9:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-09-09 11:22 [refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod Daniel J Walsh
2011-09-09 15:56 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2011-09-10 9:55 ` Daniel J Walsh [this message]
2011-09-13 17:17 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2011-09-13 17:33 ` Daniel J Walsh
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