[refpolicy] In Fedora policy we have simplified the secure_mode_insmod

[dwalsh@redhat.com (Daniel J Walsh)]

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On 09/13/2011 01:17 PM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 09/10/11 05:55, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> On 09/09/2011 11:56 AM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>>> On 09/09/11 07:22, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>>>> Now this boolean controls sys_module, so we always transition
>>>> but we can turn off the ability to insert modules into the
>>>> kernel.
>>>> 
>>>> This is much simpler then what we had before.
>>>> 
>>>> If you like this I have a similar patch for 
>>>> secure_mode_loadpolicy
>> 
>>> So with the current implementation, there are conditional
>>> module loaders and unconditional module loaders.  Do we really
>>> want to make all module loading conditional?  I'm fine with
>>> that, but are there reasons to keep the current
>>> conditional/unconditional behavior?  If so we can still keep
>>> that functionality, but implement it similar to this patch.
>> 
>> I think this should be unconditional.  If you want to shutoff
>> loading kernel modules, this patch will do it even with
>> unconfined programs running.  It would be a pain to run with this
>> system, but at least the users know that at a certain state of
>> the machine no kernel modules can be loaded.
> 
> Then there is an issue with the patch.  Currently unconfined
> domains have sys_module and its not controlled by the boolean.  I'm
> fine with stripping this permission from unconfined domains.
> 

I think it makes sense.  If we have the boolean it should work for
targeted policy with or without the unconfined.pp installed.

We also have setup secure_mode_policyload like this in Fedora 16.

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