From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <netdev@parisplace.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, mingo@redhat.com,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, indan@nul.nu,
pmoore@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: seccomp and ptrace. what is the correct order?
Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 12:13:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4FBA93C1.1070308@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFLxGvxtK7Dqw_PDqkMjNYzWyYdqx5CRYLB4+o=S5zHy2CgiTQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 05/21/2012 11:47 AM, richard -rw- weinberger wrote:
> On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 8:21 PM, Eric Paris <netdev@parisplace.org> wrote:
>> Is that what we want? Do we want to do the permission check based on
>> what a process ask at syscall enter or do we want to do the permission
>> check based on what the kernel is actually going to do on behalf of
>> the process?
>
> I think we want the latter.
> A system call emulator like UserModeLinux would benefit from that.
>
Are you sure? This would mean that a seccomp program used by the
process to intercept its own system calls via SIGSYS would give
completely different results under UML than under native...
-hpa
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <netdev@parisplace.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, mingo@redhat.com,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, indan@nul.nu,
pmoore@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: seccomp and ptrace. what is the correct order?
Date: Mon, 21 May 2012 12:13:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4FBA93C1.1070308@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFLxGvxtK7Dqw_PDqkMjNYzWyYdqx5CRYLB4+o=S5zHy2CgiTQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 05/21/2012 11:47 AM, richard -rw- weinberger wrote:
> On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 8:21 PM, Eric Paris <netdev@parisplace.org> wrote:
>> Is that what we want? Do we want to do the permission check based on
>> what a process ask at syscall enter or do we want to do the permission
>> check based on what the kernel is actually going to do on behalf of
>> the process?
>
> I think we want the latter.
> A system call emulator like UserModeLinux would benefit from that.
>
Are you sure? This would mean that a seccomp program used by the
process to intercept its own system calls via SIGSYS would give
completely different results under UML than under native...
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-05-21 19:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-05-21 18:21 [kernel-hardening] seccomp and ptrace. what is the correct order? Eric Paris
2012-05-21 18:21 ` Eric Paris
2012-05-21 18:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roland McGrath
2012-05-21 18:25 ` Roland McGrath
2012-05-21 18:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-21 19:20 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-21 19:20 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-22 16:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-05-22 16:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 16:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-05-22 16:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 17:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Al Viro
2012-05-22 17:39 ` Al Viro
2012-05-22 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-05-22 20:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 20:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 20:34 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-05-22 20:48 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 21:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Al Viro
2012-05-22 21:07 ` Al Viro
2012-05-22 21:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roland McGrath
2012-05-22 21:17 ` Roland McGrath
2012-05-22 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 21:18 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 22:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Al Viro
2012-05-22 22:20 ` Al Viro
2012-05-22 21:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 21:09 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 21:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-05-22 21:14 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 21:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 21:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 16:07 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:07 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:07 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/3] seccomp: Don't allow tracers to abuse RET_TRACE Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:07 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 17:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 17:54 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 18:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-05-24 18:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 20:17 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 16:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/3] arch/x86: move secure_computing after ptrace Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:08 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:08 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 3/3] arch/*: move secure_computing after trace Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:08 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:13 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 16:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 18:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roland McGrath
2012-05-24 18:07 ` Roland McGrath
2012-05-24 18:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 18:27 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 18:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 18:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 19:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 19:39 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 22:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-05-24 22:00 ` Andrew Morton
2012-05-25 1:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-05-25 1:55 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 23:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2012-05-24 23:40 ` James Morris
2012-05-24 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-24 23:43 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-24 23:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 23:56 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-25 0:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-25 0:26 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-25 0:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-25 0:38 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-25 0:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-25 0:55 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-21 18:47 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: seccomp and ptrace. what is the correct order? richard -rw- weinberger
2012-05-21 18:47 ` richard -rw- weinberger
2012-05-21 19:13 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2012-05-21 19:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
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