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From: "David P. Quigley" <selinux@davequigley.com>
To: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Dave Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com>,
	trond.myklebust@netapp.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Matthew N. Dodd" <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>,
	Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>,
	Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>,
	Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model.
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 14:36:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <50A14FA9.8070606@davequigley.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121112163617.GN30713@fieldses.org>

On 11/12/2012 11:36 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 09:56:37AM -0500, Dave Quigley wrote:
>> On 11/12/2012 7:15 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
>>> On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 01:15:36AM -0500, David Quigley wrote:
>>>> From: David Quigley<dpquigl@davequigley.com>
>>>>
>>>> The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr
>>>> interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is
>>>> important to make sure the requested xattr
>>> I'm confused--clients can't request xattrs from NFS servers.  I must be
>>> reading this wrong, but I'm not sure what you meant.
>>>
>>> --b.
>>>
>> Generically clients can't use xattrs from NFS servers but the LSM
>> method for getting labels is through the xattr interface. THe point
>> of this is if someone selects security.capability that we don't
>> translate that into a call in labeled nfs to get the security label.
>> We only want label based LSMs to cause a getfattr on the server to
>> grab the label and populate the inode with that information.
>> Currently if you use security.selinux or security.smack then labeled
>> nfs will handle the translation of that into a get/setfattr on the
>> security_label attribute in NFSv4.
> OK, I think I understand: so this is to help the NFS client implement
> the necessary xattr interface for userspace that get and sets security
> labels on NFS filesystems?
>
> --b.

Exactly. The problem is we don't want to have LSM specific logic in so 
the best we can do is ask if the security.* xattr being accessed has the 
proper semantics to be used with Labeled NFS.

>
>>
>>>> actually is a MAC label. This allows
>>>> us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
>>>> something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd<Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe<Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene<PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung<Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
>>>> Signed-off-by: David Quigley<dpquigl@davequigley.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>   include/linux/security.h   | 14 ++++++++++++++
>>>>   security/capability.c      |  6 ++++++
>>>>   security/security.c        |  6 ++++++
>>>>   security/selinux/hooks.c   |  6 ++++++
>>>>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 +++++++++++
>>>>   5 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>>>> index c9f5eec..167bdd5 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>>>> @@ -1301,6 +1301,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
>>>>    *	@pages contains the number of pages.
>>>>    *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>>>>    *
>>>> + * @ismaclabel:
>>>> + *	Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
>>>> + *	represents a MAC label. Returns 0 if name is a MAC
>>>> + *	attribute otherwise returns non-zero.
>>>> + *	@name full extended attribute name to check against
>>>> + *	LSM as a MAC label.
>>>> + *
>>>>    * @secid_to_secctx:
>>>>    *	Convert secid to security context.  If secdata is NULL the length of
>>>>    *	the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
>>>> @@ -1581,6 +1588,7 @@ struct security_operations {
>>>>
>>>>   	int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
>>>>   	int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
>>>> +	int (*ismaclabel) (const char *name);
>>>>   	int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>>>>   	int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
>>>>   	void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>>>> @@ -1829,6 +1837,7 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
>>>>   int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
>>>>   int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
>>>>   int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>>>> +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
>>>>   int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>>>>   int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
>>>>   void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>>>> @@ -2512,6 +2521,11 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>>>>   	return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>   static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
>>>> index f1eb284..9071447 100644
>>>> --- a/security/capability.c
>>>> +++ b/security/capability.c
>>>> @@ -797,6 +797,11 @@ static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
>>>>   	return -EINVAL;
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>   static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>> @@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
>>>> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
>>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>>> index b4b2017..a7bee7b 100644
>>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>>> @@ -1047,6 +1047,12 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>>>>   	return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return security_ops->ismaclabel(name);
>>>> +}
>>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>>>> +
>>>>   int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>> index 22d9adf..f7c4899 100644
>>>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>> @@ -5401,6 +5401,11 @@ abort_change:
>>>>   	return error;
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>   static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
>>>> @@ -5639,6 +5644,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>>>>   	.getprocattr =			selinux_getprocattr,
>>>>   	.setprocattr =			selinux_setprocattr,
>>>>
>>>> +	.ismaclabel =			selinux_ismaclabel,
>>>>   	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
>>>>   	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
>>>>   	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
>>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> index 38be92c..82c3c72 100644
>>>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> @@ -3335,6 +3335,16 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
>>>>   #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>>>>
>>>>   /**
>>>> + * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
>>>> + * @name: Full xattr name to check.
>>>> + */
>>>> +static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +
>>>> +/**
>>>>    * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
>>>>    * @secid: incoming integer
>>>>    * @secdata: destination
>>>> @@ -3530,6 +3540,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
>>>>   	.audit_rule_free =		smack_audit_rule_free,
>>>>   #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>>>>
>>>> +	.ismaclabel =			smack_ismaclabel,
>>>>   	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
>>>>   	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
>>>>   	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
>>>> --
>>>> 1.7.11.7
>>>>


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "David P. Quigley" <selinux@davequigley.com>
To: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Dave Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com>,
	trond.myklebust@netapp.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Matthew N. Dodd" <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>,
	Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>,
	Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>,
	Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model.
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 14:36:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <50A14FA9.8070606@davequigley.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121112163617.GN30713@fieldses.org>

On 11/12/2012 11:36 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 09:56:37AM -0500, Dave Quigley wrote:
>> On 11/12/2012 7:15 AM, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
>>> On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 01:15:36AM -0500, David Quigley wrote:
>>>> From: David Quigley<dpquigl@davequigley.com>
>>>>
>>>> The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr
>>>> interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is
>>>> important to make sure the requested xattr
>>> I'm confused--clients can't request xattrs from NFS servers.  I must be
>>> reading this wrong, but I'm not sure what you meant.
>>>
>>> --b.
>>>
>> Generically clients can't use xattrs from NFS servers but the LSM
>> method for getting labels is through the xattr interface. THe point
>> of this is if someone selects security.capability that we don't
>> translate that into a call in labeled nfs to get the security label.
>> We only want label based LSMs to cause a getfattr on the server to
>> grab the label and populate the inode with that information.
>> Currently if you use security.selinux or security.smack then labeled
>> nfs will handle the translation of that into a get/setfattr on the
>> security_label attribute in NFSv4.
> OK, I think I understand: so this is to help the NFS client implement
> the necessary xattr interface for userspace that get and sets security
> labels on NFS filesystems?
>
> --b.

Exactly. The problem is we don't want to have LSM specific logic in so 
the best we can do is ask if the security.* xattr being accessed has the 
proper semantics to be used with Labeled NFS.

>
>>
>>>> actually is a MAC label. This allows
>>>> us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
>>>> something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd<Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe<Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene<PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung<Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
>>>> Signed-off-by: David Quigley<dpquigl@davequigley.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>   include/linux/security.h   | 14 ++++++++++++++
>>>>   security/capability.c      |  6 ++++++
>>>>   security/security.c        |  6 ++++++
>>>>   security/selinux/hooks.c   |  6 ++++++
>>>>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 +++++++++++
>>>>   5 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>>>> index c9f5eec..167bdd5 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>>>> @@ -1301,6 +1301,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
>>>>    *	@pages contains the number of pages.
>>>>    *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>>>>    *
>>>> + * @ismaclabel:
>>>> + *	Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
>>>> + *	represents a MAC label. Returns 0 if name is a MAC
>>>> + *	attribute otherwise returns non-zero.
>>>> + *	@name full extended attribute name to check against
>>>> + *	LSM as a MAC label.
>>>> + *
>>>>    * @secid_to_secctx:
>>>>    *	Convert secid to security context.  If secdata is NULL the length of
>>>>    *	the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
>>>> @@ -1581,6 +1588,7 @@ struct security_operations {
>>>>
>>>>   	int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
>>>>   	int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
>>>> +	int (*ismaclabel) (const char *name);
>>>>   	int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>>>>   	int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
>>>>   	void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>>>> @@ -1829,6 +1837,7 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
>>>>   int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
>>>>   int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
>>>>   int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>>>> +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
>>>>   int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
>>>>   int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
>>>>   void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
>>>> @@ -2512,6 +2521,11 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>>>>   	return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>   static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
>>>> index f1eb284..9071447 100644
>>>> --- a/security/capability.c
>>>> +++ b/security/capability.c
>>>> @@ -797,6 +797,11 @@ static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
>>>>   	return -EINVAL;
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>   static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>> @@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
>>>> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
>>>>   	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
>>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>>> index b4b2017..a7bee7b 100644
>>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>>> @@ -1047,6 +1047,12 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>>>>   	return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return security_ops->ismaclabel(name);
>>>> +}
>>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>>>> +
>>>>   int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>> index 22d9adf..f7c4899 100644
>>>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>> @@ -5401,6 +5401,11 @@ abort_change:
>>>>   	return error;
>>>>   }
>>>>
>>>> +static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>   static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
>>>>   {
>>>>   	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
>>>> @@ -5639,6 +5644,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>>>>   	.getprocattr =			selinux_getprocattr,
>>>>   	.setprocattr =			selinux_setprocattr,
>>>>
>>>> +	.ismaclabel =			selinux_ismaclabel,
>>>>   	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
>>>>   	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
>>>>   	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
>>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> index 38be92c..82c3c72 100644
>>>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>>> @@ -3335,6 +3335,16 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
>>>>   #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>>>>
>>>>   /**
>>>> + * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
>>>> + * @name: Full xattr name to check.
>>>> + */
>>>> +static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +
>>>> +/**
>>>>    * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
>>>>    * @secid: incoming integer
>>>>    * @secdata: destination
>>>> @@ -3530,6 +3540,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
>>>>   	.audit_rule_free =		smack_audit_rule_free,
>>>>   #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>>>>
>>>> +	.ismaclabel =			smack_ismaclabel,
>>>>   	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
>>>>   	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
>>>>   	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
>>>> --
>>>> 1.7.11.7
>>>>


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  reply	other threads:[~2012-11-12 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 162+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-11-12  6:15 Labeled NFS [v5] David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 01/13] Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12 12:13   ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 14:52     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12 14:52       ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12 12:15   ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 14:56     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12 14:56       ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12 16:36       ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 19:36         ` David P. Quigley [this message]
2012-11-12 19:36           ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 21:43           ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-13  0:12             ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-13  0:12               ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 03/13] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 04/13] SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 05/13] KConfig: Add KConfig entries for Labeled NFS David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12 14:45   ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 14:57     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12 14:57       ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 06/13] NFSv4: Add label recommended attribute and NFSv4 flags David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 07/13] NFSv4: Introduce new label structure David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12 15:13   ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 15:32     ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 15:32       ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 16:05       ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 16:53         ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 16:53           ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 17:50           ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 08/13] NFSv4: Extend fattr bitmaps to support all 3 words David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 09/13] NFS:Add labels to client function prototypes David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 10/13] NFS: Add label lifecycle management David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12 15:33   ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 15:36     ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 15:36       ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 11/13] NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 12/13] NFS: Extend NFS xattr handlers to accept the security namespace David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 13/13] NFSD: Server implementation of MAC Labeling David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley
2012-11-12 16:31   ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 15:23 ` Labeled NFS [v5] J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 15:34   ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 15:34     ` David P. Quigley
2012-11-12 16:09     ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 20:56       ` Steve Dickson
2012-11-13  1:39         ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-13  1:39           ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-13 12:55           ` Steve Dickson
2012-11-14  4:32             ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-14  4:32               ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-14 13:45               ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-14 13:50                 ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 13:50                   ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 13:59                   ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-14 14:01                     ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 14:01                       ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 14:04                     ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 14:04                       ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 14:24                       ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-14 14:30                         ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 14:30                           ` David Quigley
2012-11-15 16:00                           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-15 16:00                             ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-15 20:28                             ` David Quigley
2012-11-15 20:28                               ` David Quigley
2012-11-16  3:34                               ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-16  3:34                                 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-16  3:43                                 ` David Quigley
2012-11-16  3:43                                   ` David Quigley
2012-11-16  4:58                                   ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-16  4:58                                     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-16  4:59                                   ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-16  4:59                                     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-14 13:56               ` David Quigley
2012-11-14 13:56                 ` David Quigley
2012-11-12 16:33 ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-12 20:44   ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12 20:44     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-12 22:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-12 22:23   ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-13  3:16   ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-13  3:16     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-20 21:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-20 21:09   ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-21  0:04   ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-21  0:04     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-21  0:29     ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-21  0:29       ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-21  0:32     ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-21  0:32       ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-21  0:37       ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-21  0:37         ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-21  2:52         ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-21  2:52           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-21  3:28           ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-21  3:28             ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-28 18:57             ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-29  1:14               ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-29  1:14                 ` Dave Quigley
2012-11-29  2:08                 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-29 22:28                   ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-29 22:28                     ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-29 22:49                     ` David Quigley
2012-11-29 22:49                       ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  0:02                       ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  0:02                         ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  0:07                     ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  0:07                       ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  0:34                       ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-30  0:34                         ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-30  0:46                         ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  0:46                           ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  1:50                           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-30  1:50                             ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-30  2:02                             ` David Quigley
2012-11-30  2:02                               ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 12:14                               ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-30 12:57                                 ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 12:57                                   ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 13:17                                   ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 13:17                                     ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 13:28                                     ` Stephen Smalley
2012-11-30 13:28                                       ` Stephen Smalley
2012-11-30 13:35                                       ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 13:35                                         ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 13:50                                         ` Stephen Smalley
2012-11-30 13:50                                           ` Stephen Smalley
2012-11-30 14:02                                           ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 14:02                                             ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 16:21                                             ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-30 16:21                                               ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-30 16:28                                               ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 16:28                                                 ` David Quigley
2012-12-03 18:27                                             ` Casey Schaufler
2012-12-03 18:27                                               ` Casey Schaufler
2012-11-30 16:55                                           ` J. Bruce Fields
2012-11-30 16:59                                             ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 16:59                                               ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 13:20                                 ` David Quigley
2012-11-30 13:20                                   ` David Quigley
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2012-12-17 15:42 [PATCH 00/13] NFSv4: Label NFS Patches Steve Dickson
2012-12-17 15:43 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson
2013-05-13 19:11 [PATCH 00/13] lnfs: linux-3.10-rc1 release Steve Dickson
2013-05-13 19:11 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson
2013-05-16 15:56 Froe e71bf1d708e1294b3bae64d04f03228b3625f2a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Steve Dickson
2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson
2013-05-16 15:56   ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-20 21:15   ` Eric Paris
2013-05-20 21:15     ` Eric Paris
2013-05-20 21:15     ` Eric Paris
2013-05-22 16:50 [PATCH 00/13] lnfs: 3.10-rc2 release Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson

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