From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations
Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2013 15:15:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51FADDE4.8080805@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1875185.QyWUQZtYy0@sifl>
On 8/1/2013 2:30 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thursday, August 01, 2013 11:52:14 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 8/1/2013 11:35 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> Okay, so if I understand everything correctly, there are no new entries in
>>> /proc relating specifically to NetLabel, XFRM, or Secmark; although there
>>> are new LSM specific entries for the general /proc entries that exist
>>> now. Yes?
>> That's correct.
>>
>> There is /sys/kernel/security/present, which tells you which LSM is going to
>> show up in /proc/.../attr/current.
>>
>> Should we have /sys/kernel/security/XFRM, /sys/kernel/security/secmark,
>> /sys/kernel/security/NetLabel and /sys/kernel/security/SO_PEERCRED?
> Maybe.
>
> While they might be helpful, I'm not 100% certain they are needed and further
> I'm not sure they are the "right" solution at this point. Any thoughts, both
> for and against, are welcome.
>
What might be a more correct solution? Assuming, of course, that there's
a real problem.
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations
Date: Thu, 01 Aug 2013 15:15:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51FADDE4.8080805@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1875185.QyWUQZtYy0@sifl>
On 8/1/2013 2:30 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thursday, August 01, 2013 11:52:14 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 8/1/2013 11:35 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> Okay, so if I understand everything correctly, there are no new entries in
>>> /proc relating specifically to NetLabel, XFRM, or Secmark; although there
>>> are new LSM specific entries for the general /proc entries that exist
>>> now. Yes?
>> That's correct.
>>
>> There is /sys/kernel/security/present, which tells you which LSM is going to
>> show up in /proc/.../attr/current.
>>
>> Should we have /sys/kernel/security/XFRM, /sys/kernel/security/secmark,
>> /sys/kernel/security/NetLabel and /sys/kernel/security/SO_PEERCRED?
> Maybe.
>
> While they might be helpful, I'm not 100% certain they are needed and further
> I'm not sure they are the "right" solution at this point. Any thoughts, both
> for and against, are welcome.
>
What might be a more correct solution? Assuming, of course, that there's
a real problem.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-01 22:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-07-25 18:22 [PATCH v14 0/6] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 1/6] LSM: Security blob abstraction Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-29 21:15 ` Kees Cook
2013-07-30 1:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-30 1:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 2/6] LSM: Move the capability LSM into the hook handlers Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 3/6] LSM: Explicit individual LSM associations Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-29 20:51 ` Kees Cook
2013-07-30 1:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-30 1:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-30 22:08 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-30 22:08 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 16:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-31 16:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-31 19:39 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 19:39 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 21:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-31 21:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 18:35 ` Paul Moore
2013-08-01 18:35 ` Paul Moore
2013-08-01 18:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 18:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 21:30 ` Paul Moore
2013-08-01 21:30 ` Paul Moore
2013-08-01 22:15 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2013-08-01 22:15 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 22:18 ` Paul Moore
2013-08-01 22:18 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 4/6] LSM: List based multiple LSM hooks Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 5/6] LSM: SO_PEERSEC configuration options Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-30 21:47 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-30 21:47 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 15:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-31 15:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-31 17:56 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-31 17:56 ` Paul Moore
2013-07-25 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 6/6] LSM: Multiple LSM Documentation and cleanup Casey Schaufler
2013-07-25 18:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-26 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap
2013-07-28 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-07-28 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 2:48 ` [PATCH v14 0/6] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs Balbir Singh
2013-08-01 17:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 17:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-06 3:28 ` Balbir Singh
2013-08-06 6:30 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-06 22:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-06 22:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-06 22:36 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-27 2:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-27 2:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-28 15:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-05 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2013-09-06 6:44 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-09-06 6:44 ` Casey Schaufler
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