From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, adurbin@google.com,
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>,
jln@google.com, wad@google.com,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 13:48:56 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <524B3538.9010406@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1380656245-29975-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On 10/01/2013 12:37 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Refactor the CPU flags handling out of the cpucheck routines so that
> they can be reused by the future ASLR routines (in order to detect CPU
> features like RDRAND and RDTSC).
>
> This reworks has_eflag() and has_fpu() to be used on both 32-bit and
> 64-bit, and refactors the calls to cpuid to make them PIC-safe on 32-bit.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Please flag the ones that specifically touch the boot code so that is
clear. Neither the title or the description makes that at all clear,
and at first reading is fairly confusing as a result.
-hpa
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, adurbin@google.com,
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>,
jln@google.com, wad@google.com,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 13:48:56 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <524B3538.9010406@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1380656245-29975-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On 10/01/2013 12:37 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Refactor the CPU flags handling out of the cpucheck routines so that
> they can be reused by the future ASLR routines (in order to detect CPU
> features like RDRAND and RDTSC).
>
> This reworks has_eflag() and has_fpu() to be used on both 32-bit and
> 64-bit, and refactors the calls to cpuid to make them PIC-safe on 32-bit.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Please flag the ones that specifically touch the boot code so that is
clear. Neither the title or the description makes that at all clear,
and at first reading is fairly confusing as a result.
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-01 20:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-01 19:37 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 20:48 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2013-10-01 20:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-01 21:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-01 21:09 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 20:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-01 20:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-01 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-01 21:18 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 0:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-02 0:38 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-02 1:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-02 1:06 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-02 7:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 7:51 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 7:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 7:48 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-02 9:13 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-03 0:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-03 0:33 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-03 13:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Anderson
2013-10-03 13:47 ` Dave Anderson
2013-10-07 1:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-07 1:59 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-07 13:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Anderson
2013-10-07 13:21 ` Dave Anderson
2013-10-08 9:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-08 9:52 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-08 13:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Anderson
2013-10-08 13:38 ` Dave Anderson
2013-10-09 10:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-09 10:04 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-09 14:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-09 14:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-09 18:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-09 18:06 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 5:07 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization Ingo Molnar
2013-10-02 5:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-02 5:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-02 5:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-02 5:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-02 5:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-02 5:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-02 5:30 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-02 5:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 5:36 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=524B3538.9010406@zytor.com \
--to=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=adurbin@google.com \
--cc=digitaleric@google.com \
--cc=jln@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=minipli@googlemail.com \
--cc=wad@google.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.