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From: Joshua Brindle <brindle@quarksecurity.com>
To: Victor Porton <porton@narod.ru>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: Create new NetFilter table
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2014 14:39:05 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52D04C59.20406@quarksecurity.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1171389381947@web15m.yandex.ru>

Victor Porton wrote:
> I propose to create a new NetFilter table dedicated to rules created programmatically (not by explicit admin's iptables command).
>
> Otherwise an admin could be tempted to say `iptables -F security` which would probably break rules created for example by sandboxing software (which may follow same-origin policy to restrict one particular program to certain domain and port only). Note that in this case `iptables -F security` is a security risk (sandbox breaking)?
>
> New table could be possibly be called:
>
> - temp
> - temporary
> - auto
> - automatic
> - volatile
> - daemon
> - system
> - sys
>
> In iptables docs it should be said that this table should not be manipulated manually.

Is it possible that the solution to your sandboxing problem is seccomp 
filter?

http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/

You'd filter out any syscall that can make outbound connections and then 
only pass already opened sockets to the sandboxed threads?

seccomp filter was actually created for sandboxing, so that user 
applications could voluntarily shed the ability to call certain syscalls 
before handling untrusted data.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joshua Brindle <brindle@quarksecurity.com>
To: Victor Porton <porton@narod.ru>
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Create new NetFilter table
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2014 14:39:05 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52D04C59.20406@quarksecurity.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1171389381947@web15m.yandex.ru>

Victor Porton wrote:
> I propose to create a new NetFilter table dedicated to rules created programmatically (not by explicit admin's iptables command).
>
> Otherwise an admin could be tempted to say `iptables -F security` which would probably break rules created for example by sandboxing software (which may follow same-origin policy to restrict one particular program to certain domain and port only). Note that in this case `iptables -F security` is a security risk (sandbox breaking)?
>
> New table could be possibly be called:
>
> - temp
> - temporary
> - auto
> - automatic
> - volatile
> - daemon
> - system
> - sys
>
> In iptables docs it should be said that this table should not be manipulated manually.

Is it possible that the solution to your sandboxing problem is seccomp 
filter?

http://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/

You'd filter out any syscall that can make outbound connections and then 
only pass already opened sockets to the sandboxed threads?

seccomp filter was actually created for sandboxing, so that user 
applications could voluntarily shed the ability to call certain syscalls 
before handling untrusted data.


  reply	other threads:[~2014-01-10 19:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-01-10 19:25 Create new NetFilter table Victor Porton
2014-01-10 19:39 ` Joshua Brindle [this message]
2014-01-10 19:39   ` Joshua Brindle
2014-01-10 19:52   ` Victor Porton
2014-01-10 19:52     ` Victor Porton
2014-01-10 19:58 ` David Lang
2014-01-12 19:52 ` Luis Ressel

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