From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>, davem@davemloft.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: sctp: check proc_dointvec result in proc_sctp_do_auth
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 13:28:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A2E570.7000404@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1403127991-18114-1-git-send-email-dborkman@redhat.com>
On 06/18/2014 05:46 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> When writing to the sysctl field net.sctp.auth_enable, it can well
> be that the user buffer we handed over to proc_dointvec() via
> proc_sctp_do_auth() handler contains something other than integers.
>
> In that case, we would set an uninitialized 4-byte value from the
> stack to net->sctp.auth_enable that can be leaked back when reading
> the sysctl variable, and it can unintentionally turn auth_enable
> on/off based on the stack content since auth_enable is interpreted
> as a boolean.
>
> Fix it up by making sure proc_dointvec() returned sucessfully.
>
> Fixes: b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint")
> Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
> ---
> net/sctp/sysctl.c | 3 +--
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> index dcb1959..8a5b5c2 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> @@ -444,8 +444,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> tbl.data = &net->sctp.auth_enable;
>
> ret = proc_dointvec(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
> -
> - if (write) {
> + if (write && ret = 0) {
> struct sock *sk = net->sctp.ctl_sock;
>
> net->sctp.auth_enable = new_value;
>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
-vlad
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>, davem@davemloft.net
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: sctp: check proc_dointvec result in proc_sctp_do_auth
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 09:28:16 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53A2E570.7000404@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1403127991-18114-1-git-send-email-dborkman@redhat.com>
On 06/18/2014 05:46 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> When writing to the sysctl field net.sctp.auth_enable, it can well
> be that the user buffer we handed over to proc_dointvec() via
> proc_sctp_do_auth() handler contains something other than integers.
>
> In that case, we would set an uninitialized 4-byte value from the
> stack to net->sctp.auth_enable that can be leaked back when reading
> the sysctl variable, and it can unintentionally turn auth_enable
> on/off based on the stack content since auth_enable is interpreted
> as a boolean.
>
> Fix it up by making sure proc_dointvec() returned sucessfully.
>
> Fixes: b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint")
> Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
> ---
> net/sctp/sysctl.c | 3 +--
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> index dcb1959..8a5b5c2 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
> @@ -444,8 +444,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
> tbl.data = &net->sctp.auth_enable;
>
> ret = proc_dointvec(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
> -
> - if (write) {
> + if (write && ret == 0) {
> struct sock *sk = net->sctp.ctl_sock;
>
> net->sctp.auth_enable = new_value;
>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
-vlad
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-19 13:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-18 21:46 [PATCH net] net: sctp: check proc_dointvec result in proc_sctp_do_auth Daniel Borkmann
2014-06-18 21:46 ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-06-19 13:05 ` Neil Horman
2014-06-19 13:05 ` Neil Horman
2014-06-19 13:28 ` Vlad Yasevich [this message]
2014-06-19 13:28 ` Vlad Yasevich
2014-06-20 4:31 ` David Miller
2014-06-20 4:31 ` David Miller
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