Re: [PATCH net v2] net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions

[Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>]

On 07/22/2014 09:22 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
> SCTP authentication enabled:
> 
> Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
> CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
> task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
> PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
> LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
> pc : [<c024bb80>]    lr : [<c00f32dc>]    psr: 40000013
> sp : c6f538e8  ip : 00000000  fp : c6f53924
> r10: c6f50d80  r9 : 00000000  r8 : 00010000
> r7 : 00000000  r6 : c7be4000  r5 : 00000000  r4 : c6f56254
> r3 : c00c8170  r2 : 00000001  r1 : 00000008  r0 : c6f1e660
> Flags: nZcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
> Control: 0005397f  Table: 06f28000  DAC: 00000015
> Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
> Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
> [...]
> Backtrace:
> [<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
> [<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
> [<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
> [<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
> [<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
> [<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
> [<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
> [<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
> 
> While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
> ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
> we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
> auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
> kind.
> 
> Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
> needed can be found in RFC4895:
> 
>   SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
>   blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
>   lifetime of an SCTP association.
> 
>   Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
>   method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
>   the original peer that started the association and not by a
>   malicious attacker.
> 
> To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
> peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
> authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
> parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
> 
>   ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
>   <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
>   -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
>   <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
> 
> RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
> number and the peer's random number *after* the association
> has been established. The local and peer's random number along
> with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
> calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
> 
> Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
> SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
> and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
> sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
> thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
> 
>   ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
>   <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
>   <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
>   -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
>   ...
> 
> Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
> the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
> 
>   In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
>   of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
>   the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
>   RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
>   Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
>   has been established.
> 
> In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
> 
>   B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
>      association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
>      started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
>      INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
>      being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
>      The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
>      state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
>      the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
>      running and send a COOKIE ACK.
> 
> In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
> same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
> Action B of section 5.2.4.
> 
> Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
> case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
> side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
> peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
> association to update the existing one.
> 
> Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
> the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
> However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
> asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
> that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
> return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
> leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
> authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
> 
> That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
> 
>   <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
> 
> ... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
> sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
> being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
> 
> Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
> endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
> asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
> and dereferences it in ...
> 
>   crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
> 
> ... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
> called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
> and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
> sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
> the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
> its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
> in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
> are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
> SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
> *updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
> association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
> since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
> was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
> throw away each time.
> 
> The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
> value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
> so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
> sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
> the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
> 
> Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
> Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>

Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>

> ---
>  v1 -> v2, more notes:
> 
>   I've only updated the commit description for now, this bug seems
>   clear to me that we would need to fix it; since RFC4895 mentions
>   it explicitly that on collisions, we need to *update* these params
>   accordingly as we would do so in RFC2960. So in other words, this
>   can be explained by having an *inconsistency* when doing the update
>   as auth_capable is *tightly coupled* with peer_random, peer_chunks,
>   peer_hmacs and eventually the asoc_shared_key creation.
> 
>   For the rest, I went through the code and currently could not
>   find where we could oops if we don't have the others for now.

It don't think we'd oops specifically, but requested/supported features could
end up being disabled (like add-ip).

-vlad

> It
>   needs more time and testing however. It's also not too clear from
>   RFC2960/RFC4960 what needs to be carried over in addition: so we
>   know "The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED state
>   but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from the State
>   Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may running and send
>   a COOKIE ACK." and we know that we need to update all AUTH related
>   members, which we do *now*.
> 
>   In addition, we also need to fix AUTH + COOKIE_ECHO collisions,
>   as they currently cannot be resolved properly into a handshake.
> 
>  net/sctp/associola.c | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
> index 9de23a2..06a9ee6 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/associola.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
> @@ -1097,6 +1097,7 @@ void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc,
>  	asoc->c = new->c;
>  	asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
>  	asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
> +	asoc->peer.auth_capable = new->peer.auth_capable;
>  	asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
>  	sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
>  			 asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);
>