From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: kevin.tian@intel.com, keir@xen.org, jbeulich@suse.com,
jun.nakajima@intel.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, tim@xen.org,
dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com, suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 16/20] x86/VPMU: Handle PMU interrupts for PV guests
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 14:57:45 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5421C2A9.6010701@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140923183139.GR3007@laptop.dumpdata.com>
On 09/23/2014 02:31 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>> {
>> - struct vcpu *v = current;
>> - struct vpmu_struct *vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(v);
>> + struct vcpu *sampled = current, *sampling;
>> + struct vpmu_struct *vpmu;
>> +
>> + /* dom0 will handle interrupt for special domains (e.g. idle domain) */
>> + if ( sampled->domain->domain_id >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
>> + {
>> + sampling = choose_hwdom_vcpu();
>> + if ( !sampling )
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> + else
>> + sampling = sampled;
>> +
>> + vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(sampling);
>> + if ( !is_hvm_domain(sampling->domain) )
>> + {
>> + /* PV(H) guest */
>> + const struct cpu_user_regs *cur_regs;
>> +
>> + if ( !vpmu->xenpmu_data )
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + if ( vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu_flags & PMU_CACHED )
>> + return 1;
>> +
>> + if ( is_pvh_domain(sampled->domain) &&
>> + !vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->do_interrupt(regs) )
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /* PV guest will be reading PMU MSRs from xenpmu_data */
> OK, with that nice comment I was thinking that:
>> + vpmu_set(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE | VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
>> + vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->arch_vpmu_save(sampling);
> would be the one that writes the values to pmu.r.regs, but so far
> in this patchset that is not the case. It does write to the pmu.c (contexts)
> but that is not ..
>
>> + vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE | VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
>> +
>> + /* Store appropriate registers in xenpmu_data */
>> + if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(sampling->domain) )
>> + {
>> + /*
>> + * 32-bit dom0 cannot process Xen's addresses (which are 64 bit)
>> + * and therefore we treat it the same way as a non-privileged
>> + * PV 32-bit domain.
>> + */
>> + struct compat_pmu_regs *cmp;
>> +
>> + cur_regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
>> +
>> + cmp = (void *)&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
> .. what we read from here. Did I miss a patch?
>
>> + cmp->eip = cur_regs->rip;
>> + cmp->esp = cur_regs->rsp;
>> + cmp->cs = cur_regs->cs;
>> + if ( (cmp->cs & 3) == 1 )
>> + cmp->cs &= ~3;
>> + }
>> + else
>> + {
>> + struct xen_pmu_regs *r = &vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
> Ditto here.
>
> Perhaps a comment stating _who_ (or _what_) is responsible for populating
> the 'pmu.r.regs' structure?
There are different registers --- PMU MSRs and GPRs. Comment "PV guest
will be reading PMU MSRs from xenpmu_data" was in reference to guest
accessing MSRs that are cached in pmu.c(ontext) as opposed to doing
rd/wrmsr and trapping to hypervisor.. That's why we do arch_vpmu_save():
to save PMU MSRs into the shared page.
pmu.r(egisters) are sampled VCPU's GPRs and are filled in this routine.
Does this answer your question?
>
>> +
>> + /* Non-privileged domains are always in XENPMU_MODE_SELF mode */
>> + if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_SELF) ||
>> + (!is_hardware_domain(sampled->domain) &&
>> + !is_idle_vcpu(sampled)) )
>> + cur_regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
>> + else
>> + cur_regs = regs;
>> +
>> + r->rip = cur_regs->rip;
>> + r->rsp = cur_regs->rsp;
>> +
>> + if ( !is_pvh_domain(sampled->domain) )
>> + {
>> + r->cs = cur_regs->cs;
>> + if ( sampled->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode )
>> + r->cs &= ~3;
>> + }
>> + else
>> + {
>> + struct segment_register seg_cs;
>> +
>> + hvm_get_segment_register(sampled, x86_seg_cs, &seg_cs);
>> + r->cs = seg_cs.sel;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + vpmu->xenpmu_data->domain_id = DOMID_SELF;
>> + vpmu->xenpmu_data->vcpu_id = sampled->vcpu_id;
>> + vpmu->xenpmu_data->pcpu_id = smp_processor_id();
>> +
>> + vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu_flags |= PMU_CACHED;
>> + vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
> Right, especially as core2_vpmu_do_interrupt (which is called earlier)
> does:
>
> vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc = apic_read(APIC_LVTPC) & ~APIC_LVT_MASKED;
> apic_write_around(APIC_LVTPC, vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc);
>
> So here we mask it
>
>> + apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc);
> Hm, so for Intel we would do _two_ apic_writes ?
Yes, this is due to Intel's masking of LVTPC during interrupt (AMD does
not do this). So the Intel's handler will re-enable PMU interrupts.
I could have made Intel's apic_write conditional upon PV(H) vs. HVM but
I thought that do_interrupt() should always return an unmasked PMU in
generic code so that both Intel and AMD "look" the same.
I'll ignore the rest of your comments since I think that's what you told
me to ;-)
-boris
>
> Anyhow, we mask it here..
> .. snip..
>> case XENPMU_lvtpc_set:
>> - if ( current->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data == NULL )
>> + curr = current;
>> + if ( curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data == NULL )
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - vpmu_lvtpc_update(current->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtpc);
>> + vpmu_lvtpc_update(curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtpc);
>> + ret = 0;
>> + break;
>> +
>> + case XENPMU_flush:
>> + curr = current;
>> + curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu_flags &= ~PMU_CACHED;
>> + vpmu_lvtpc_update(curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtpc);
> And this code does:
>
> +void vpmu_lvtpc_update(uint32_t val)
> +{
> + struct vpmu_struct *vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(current);
> +
> + vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc = PMU_APIC_VECTOR | (val & APIC_LVT_MASKED);
> + apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc);
> +}
> +
>
> And we over-write vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc with the new value. The 'val'
> here is important as it may have APIC_LVT_MASKED or not. We get that
> from ' curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtp ' but I am
> not seeing who sets it. I was thinking the XENPMU_lvtpc_set but that
> calls vpmu_lvtpc_update which will update the vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc
> with the APIC_LVT_MASKED if set.
>
> So who sets it?
>
> Anyhow, with it being zero, that means the APIC_LVT_MASKED is unset, so
> interrupts are free to go, and here:
>
>> + vpmu_load(curr);
> We do another 'apic_write_around' with the hw_lapic_lvtpc value. So two
> apci_writes to unmask it. (Or mask it back if the l.lapic_lvtpc has
> APIC_LVT_MASKED set).
>
> Should the XENPMU_flush check if:
>
> - The PMU_CACHED bit is set (and if not then -EAGAIN?)
> - The APIC_LVT_MASKED was set (and if so, then unmaks it). If it is
> not set, then no need to do apic_write?
>
> ?
>> ret = 0;
>> break;
>> }
>> diff --git a/xen/include/public/pmu.h b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
>> index 68a5fb8..a1886a5 100644
>> --- a/xen/include/public/pmu.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>> #define XENPMU_init 4
>> #define XENPMU_finish 5
>> #define XENPMU_lvtpc_set 6
>> +#define XENPMU_flush 7 /* Write cached MSR values to HW */
>> /* ` } */
>>
>> /* Parameters structure for HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op call */
>> @@ -61,6 +62,12 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pmu_params_t);
>> */
>> #define XENPMU_FEATURE_INTEL_BTS 1
>>
>> +/*
>> + * PMU MSRs are cached in the context so the PV guest doesn't need to trap to
>> + * the hypervisor
>> + */
>> +#define PMU_CACHED 1
>> +
>> /* Shared between hypervisor and PV domain */
>> struct xen_pmu_data {
>> uint32_t domain_id;
>> --
>> 1.8.1.4
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Xen-devel mailing list
>> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
>> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-23 18:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-22 23:57 [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 00/20] x86/PMU: Xen PMU PV(H) support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 01/20] common/symbols: Export hypervisor symbols to privileged guest Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:28 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 02/20] x86/VPMU: Manage VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE flag in vpmu_save_force() Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:44 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 15:06 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:26 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 03/20] x86/VPMU: Set MSR bitmaps only for HVM/PVH guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 04/20] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu macros a bit more efficient Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 05/20] intel/VPMU: Clean up Intel VPMU code Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 06/20] vmx: Merge MSR management routines Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:48 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 07/20] x86/VPMU: Handle APIC_LVTPC accesses Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 08/20] intel/VPMU: MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL should be initialized to zero Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 09/20] x86/VPMU: Add public xenpmu.h Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 10/20] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu not HVM-specific Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 11/20] x86/VPMU: Interface for setting PMU mode and flags Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:55 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 18:58 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 19:24 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 20:47 ` Daniel De Graaf
2014-09-23 21:06 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-24 8:31 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 12/20] x86/VPMU: Initialize PMU for PV(H) guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:59 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 13/20] x86/VPMU: Save VPMU state for PV guests during context switch Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:01 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 15:10 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:18 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 14/20] x86/VPMU: When handling MSR accesses, leave fault injection to callers Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 15/20] x86/VPMU: Add support for PMU register handling on PV guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:08 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 15:49 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 16/20] x86/VPMU: Handle PMU interrupts for " Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 17:18 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 17:36 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:31 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 18:36 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 18:57 ` Boris Ostrovsky [this message]
2014-09-23 19:07 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 17/20] x86/VPMU: Merge vpmu_rdmsr and vpmu_wrmsr Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:38 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 18/20] x86/VPMU: Add privileged PMU mode Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:40 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:58 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 19/20] x86/VPMU: NMI-based VPMU support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:52 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 19:18 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 19:27 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:58 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 20/20] x86/VPMU: Move VPMU files up from hvm/ directory Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:53 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
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