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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/MSI-X: be more careful during teardown
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:05:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55191FEA.4000800@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5512F2C2020000780006D941@mail.emea.novell.com>

On 25/03/15 16:39, Jan Beulich wrote:
> When a device gets detached from a guest, pciback will clear its
> command register, thus disabling both memory and I/O decoding. The
> disabled memory decoding, however, has an effect on the MSI-X table
> accesses the hypervisor does: These won't have the intended effect
> anymore. Even worse, for PCIe devices (but not SR-IOV virtual
> functions) such accesses may (will?) be treated as Unsupported
> Requests, causing respective errors to be surfaced, potentially in the
> form of NMIs that may be fatal to the hypervisor or Dom0 is different
> ways. Hence rather than carrying out these accesses, we should avoid
> them where we can, and use alternative (e.g. PCI config space based)
> mechanisms to achieve at least the same effect.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2015-03-30 10:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-25 16:34 [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/MSI-X: XSA-120 follow-up Jan Beulich
2015-03-25 16:39 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/MSI-X: be more careful during teardown Jan Beulich
2015-03-30 10:05   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-04-02 16:49   ` Stefano Stabellini
2015-04-13  9:11     ` Jan Beulich
2015-04-13 10:50       ` Stefano Stabellini
2015-04-13 11:21         ` Jan Beulich
2015-04-13 12:01           ` Stefano Stabellini
2015-04-13 12:47             ` Jan Beulich
2015-04-13 15:09               ` Stefano Stabellini
2015-04-14 13:47       ` Ian Campbell
2015-03-25 16:39 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X Jan Beulich
2015-04-10 20:02   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2015-04-13  9:05     ` Jan Beulich
2015-04-15 17:41       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2015-04-16  7:43         ` Jan Beulich
2015-04-16 18:21           ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2015-04-17  7:09             ` Jan Beulich
2015-04-17 14:01         ` Jan Beulich
2015-03-25 16:40 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/MSI-X: reduce fiddling with control register during restore Jan Beulich
2015-03-25 16:40 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] x86/MSI-X: cleanup Jan Beulich

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