From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: memaccess: skipping mem_access_send_req
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2015 17:03:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5527F44E.6090302@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <DA845EDCE27355428C520DC5B8DC05CE763FB38550@GEORGE.Emea.Arm.com>
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On 10/04/15 16:04, Gareth Stockwell wrote:
>
> My understanding of memaccess is that it provides the following
> functionality:
>
>
>
> 1. Modify permission values in the page table of the target domain.
>
> 2. When the domain generates an illegal access, the exception handler
> delegates to memaccess, which pauses the VCPU and records the event in
> a ring buffer.
>
> 3. Some permission values are special in that they automatically
> mutate to a different value following the first access; others are
> persistently applied.
>
>
>
> We would like to use memaccess to perform (1) - but rather than
> pausing the VCPU in (2), instead simply directly inject the exception
> into the VCPU. I can see two ways of doing this:
>
>
>
> a) Implement an observer of the ring buffer, which triggers injection
> of the exception and unpausing of the VCPU.
>
> b) Define new xenmem_access_t values which cause the exception handler
> to reinject rather than adding a message to the ring buffer.
>
>
>
> (a) seems cumbersome, and requires multiple context switches in order
> to handle the exception.
>
> (b) therefore looks preferable, and I think should be fairly simple to
> implement on top of https://github.com/tklengyel/xen/tree/arm_memaccess15.
>
>
>
> Does this sound reasonable? Or is there a better way of modifying
> access permissions for a specific pfn range of a target domain?
>
Are you perhaps looking for something similar to Intel #VE support?
(although I guess you are looking at ARM rather than x86)
It is not safe to always re-inject back into the vcpu, especially if the
permission changes were around the guest kernel stack, but a restricted
subset ought to be safe to bounce straight in.
~Andrew
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-04-10 16:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-04-10 15:04 memaccess: skipping mem_access_send_req Gareth Stockwell
2015-04-10 15:11 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-04-10 15:23 ` Julien Grall
2015-04-15 9:18 ` Ian Campbell
2015-04-10 15:28 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2015-04-10 16:03 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-04-17 9:35 ` Gareth Stockwell
2015-04-15 9:26 ` Ian Campbell
2015-04-17 9:35 ` Gareth Stockwell
2015-04-17 10:31 ` Ian Campbell
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