From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Shawn Chang <citypw@gmail.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Hardening memory maunipulation.
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 15:09:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <554156A1.3010903@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1430321975-13626-1-git-send-email-citypw@gmail.com>
On 04/29/2015 08:39 AM, Shawn Chang wrote:
> From: Shawn C <citypw@gmail.com>
>
> Hi kernel maintainers,
>
> It won't allow the address above the TASK_SIZE being mmap'ed( or mprotect'ed).
> This patch is from PaX/Grsecurity.
>
> Thanks for your review time!
Does this actually reduce the attack surface of anything?
These functions all search for vmas. If there's a vma outside of the
user range, we have a problem.
Also, that use of TASK_SIZE is IMO ridiculous. Shouldn't be TASK_SIZE_MAX?
--Andy, who is annoyed every time another pointless TIF_IA32 reference,
even hidden in a macro, makes it into the kernel
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Shawn Chang <citypw@gmail.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Hardening memory maunipulation.
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 15:09:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <554156A1.3010903@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1430321975-13626-1-git-send-email-citypw@gmail.com>
On 04/29/2015 08:39 AM, Shawn Chang wrote:
> From: Shawn C <citypw@gmail.com>
>
> Hi kernel maintainers,
>
> It won't allow the address above the TASK_SIZE being mmap'ed( or mprotect'ed).
> This patch is from PaX/Grsecurity.
>
> Thanks for your review time!
Does this actually reduce the attack surface of anything?
These functions all search for vmas. If there's a vma outside of the
user range, we have a problem.
Also, that use of TASK_SIZE is IMO ridiculous. Shouldn't be TASK_SIZE_MAX?
--Andy, who is annoyed every time another pointless TIF_IA32 reference,
even hidden in a macro, makes it into the kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-04-29 22:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-04-29 15:39 [PATCH] Hardening memory maunipulation Shawn Chang
2015-04-29 15:39 ` Shawn Chang
2015-04-29 22:09 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2015-04-29 22:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
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