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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com, chuck.lever@oracle.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 21:06:12 -0800 (PST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55722.57422.qm@web36602.mail.mud.yahoo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080220160646.4715.7268.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>


--- David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:

> Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
> performed by a task by duplicating a security record, modifying it and then
> using task_struct::act_as to point to it when performing operations on behalf
> of a task.
> 
> This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access
> the
> cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with
> a
> potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
> security data.
> 
> This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
> 
>  (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
>      with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
> 
>  (*) security_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security
>      datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task
>      creates.
> 
> ...

> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -976,6 +976,36 @@ static int smack_task_dup_security(struct task_security
> *sec)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> + * smack_task_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a security
> record
> + * @p points to the task that nominated @secid.
> + * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
> + * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
> + *
> + * Set the security data for a kernel service.
> + */
> +static int smack_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_struct *p,
> +				    struct task_security *sec, u32 secid)
> +{
> +	return -ENOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_task_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a security
> record
> + * @p points to the task that nominated @inode.
> + * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
> + * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
> + *
> + * Set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
> + * objective context of the specified inode
> + */
> +static int smack_task_create_files_as(struct task_struct *p,
> +				      struct task_security *sec,
> +				      struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	return -ENOTSUPP;
> +}

Hum. ENOTSUPP is not not very satisfying, is it? I will have to
think on this a bit.

> +
> +/**
>   * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
>   * @p: the task object
>   * @pgid: unused
> @@ -2444,6 +2474,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
>  	.task_alloc_security = 		smack_task_alloc_security,
>  	.task_free_security = 		smack_task_free_security,
>  	.task_dup_security =		smack_task_dup_security,
> +	.task_kernel_act_as =		smack_task_kernel_act_as,
> +	.task_create_files_as =		smack_task_create_files_as,
>  	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
>  	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
>  	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,

Except for the fact that the hooks don't do anything this
looks fine. I'm not sure that I would want these hooks to
do anything, it requires additional thought to determine if
there is a good behavior for them.

Thank you.


Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com, chuck.lever@oracle.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 21:06:12 -0800 (PST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55722.57422.qm@web36602.mail.mud.yahoo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080220160646.4715.7268.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>


--- David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:

> Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
> performed by a task by duplicating a security record, modifying it and then
> using task_struct::act_as to point to it when performing operations on behalf
> of a task.
> 
> This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access
> the
> cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with
> a
> potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
> security data.
> 
> This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
> 
>  (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
>      with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
> 
>  (*) security_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security
>      datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task
>      creates.
> 
> ...

> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -976,6 +976,36 @@ static int smack_task_dup_security(struct task_security
> *sec)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> + * smack_task_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a security
> record
> + * @p points to the task that nominated @secid.
> + * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
> + * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
> + *
> + * Set the security data for a kernel service.
> + */
> +static int smack_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_struct *p,
> +				    struct task_security *sec, u32 secid)
> +{
> +	return -ENOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_task_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a security
> record
> + * @p points to the task that nominated @inode.
> + * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
> + * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
> + *
> + * Set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
> + * objective context of the specified inode
> + */
> +static int smack_task_create_files_as(struct task_struct *p,
> +				      struct task_security *sec,
> +				      struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	return -ENOTSUPP;
> +}

Hum. ENOTSUPP is not not very satisfying, is it? I will have to
think on this a bit.

> +
> +/**
>   * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
>   * @p: the task object
>   * @pgid: unused
> @@ -2444,6 +2474,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
>  	.task_alloc_security = 		smack_task_alloc_security,
>  	.task_free_security = 		smack_task_free_security,
>  	.task_dup_security =		smack_task_dup_security,
> +	.task_kernel_act_as =		smack_task_kernel_act_as,
> +	.task_create_files_as =		smack_task_create_files_as,
>  	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
>  	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
>  	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,

Except for the fact that the hooks don't do anything this
looks fine. I'm not sure that I would want these hooks to
do anything, it requires additional thought to determine if
there is a good behavior for them.

Thank you.


Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com, chuck.lever@oracle.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 21:06:12 -0800 (PST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55722.57422.qm@web36602.mail.mud.yahoo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080220160646.4715.7268.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>


--- David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:

> Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
> performed by a task by duplicating a security record, modifying it and then
> using task_struct::act_as to point to it when performing operations on behalf
> of a task.
> 
> This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access
> the
> cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with
> a
> potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
> security data.
> 
> This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
> 
>  (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
>      with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
> 
>  (*) security_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security
>      datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task
>      creates.
> 
> ...

> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -976,6 +976,36 @@ static int smack_task_dup_security(struct task_security
> *sec)
>  }
>  
>  /**
> + * smack_task_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a security
> record
> + * @p points to the task that nominated @secid.
> + * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
> + * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
> + *
> + * Set the security data for a kernel service.
> + */
> +static int smack_task_kernel_act_as(struct task_struct *p,
> +				    struct task_security *sec, u32 secid)
> +{
> +	return -ENOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smack_task_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a security
> record
> + * @p points to the task that nominated @inode.
> + * @sec points to the task security record to be modified.
> + * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
> + *
> + * Set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
> + * objective context of the specified inode
> + */
> +static int smack_task_create_files_as(struct task_struct *p,
> +				      struct task_security *sec,
> +				      struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	return -ENOTSUPP;
> +}

Hum. ENOTSUPP is not not very satisfying, is it? I will have to
think on this a bit.

> +
> +/**
>   * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
>   * @p: the task object
>   * @pgid: unused
> @@ -2444,6 +2474,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
>  	.task_alloc_security = 		smack_task_alloc_security,
>  	.task_free_security = 		smack_task_free_security,
>  	.task_dup_security =		smack_task_dup_security,
> +	.task_kernel_act_as =		smack_task_kernel_act_as,
> +	.task_create_files_as =		smack_task_create_files_as,
>  	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
>  	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
>  	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,

Except for the fact that the hooks don't do anything this
looks fine. I'm not sure that I would want these hooks to
do anything, it requires additional thought to determine if
there is a good behavior for them.

Thank you.


Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com

  reply	other threads:[~2008-02-22  5:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 165+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-02-20 16:05 [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching David Howells
2008-02-20 16:05 ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:05 ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 01/37] KEYS: Increase the payload size when instantiating a key David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 02/37] KEYS: Check starting keyring as part of search David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 03/37] KEYS: Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 04/37] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security label David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 05/37] Security: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-22  4:47   ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-22  4:47     ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 07/37] Security: De-embed task security record from task and use refcounting David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-22  4:57   ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-22  4:57     ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-22  4:57     ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 08/37] Security: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-22  5:06   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2008-02-22  5:06     ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-22  5:06     ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-22 13:06     ` David Howells
2008-02-22 13:06       ` David Howells
2008-02-22 13:06       ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 10/37] Security: Make NFSD work with detached security David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 11/37] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 12/37] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 13/37] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 14/37] FS-Cache: Generic filesystem caching facility David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 15/37] CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ia64 David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 16/37] CacheFiles: Be consistent about the use of mapping vs file->f_mapping in Ext3 David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 17/37] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single page of data to an inode David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 18/37] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitored David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 19/37] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 20/37] CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 21/37] NFS: Add comment banners to some NFS functions David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 22/37] NFS: Add FS-Cache option bit and debug bit David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 23/37] NFS: Permit local filesystem caching to be enabled for NFS David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 24/37] NFS: Register NFS for caching and retrieve the top-level index David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 25/37] NFS: Define and create server-level objects David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 26/37] NFS: Define and create superblock-level objects David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 27/37] NFS: Define and create inode-level cache objects David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 28/37] NFS: Use local disk inode cache David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 29/37] NFS: Invalidate FsCache page flags when cache removed David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 30/37] NFS: Add some new I/O event counters for FS-Cache events David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 31/37] NFS: FS-Cache page management David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 32/37] NFS: Add read context retention for FS-Cache to call back with David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 33/37] NFS: nfs_readpage_async() needs to be accessible as a fallback for local caching David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 34/37] NFS: Read pages from FS-Cache into an NFS inode David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 35/37] NFS: Store pages from an NFS inode into a local cache David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 36/37] NFS: Display local caching state David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 37/37] NFS: Add mount options to enable local caching on NFS David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 19:58 ` [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching Serge E. Hallyn
2008-02-20 19:58   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-02-20 20:11   ` David Howells
2008-02-20 20:11     ` David Howells
2008-02-20 20:11     ` David Howells
2008-02-20 20:18   ` James Carter
2008-02-21  3:07 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-21 12:31   ` David Howells
2008-02-21 12:31     ` David Howells
2008-02-21 12:31     ` David Howells
2008-02-21 14:55   ` David Howells
2008-02-21 14:55     ` David Howells
2008-02-21 14:55     ` David Howells
2008-02-21 15:17     ` Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 22:44     ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-21 22:44       ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-21 22:52       ` Muntz, Daniel
2008-02-22  0:07       ` David Howells
2008-02-22  0:07         ` David Howells
2008-02-22  0:07         ` David Howells
2008-02-22  0:57         ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-22  0:57           ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-22 12:48           ` David Howells
2008-02-22 12:48             ` David Howells
2008-02-22 12:48             ` David Howells
2008-02-22 22:25             ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-22 22:25               ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-23  1:22               ` David Howells
2008-02-23  1:22                 ` David Howells
2008-02-23  1:22                 ` David Howells
2008-02-21 23:33     ` David Howells
2008-02-21 23:33       ` David Howells
2008-02-21 23:33       ` David Howells
2008-02-22 13:52       ` Chris Mason
2008-02-22 16:12         ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:12           ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:12           ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:47         ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:47           ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:47           ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:14       ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:14         ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:14         ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <200802251401.16413.phillips@phunq.net>
2008-02-25 23:19         ` David Howells
2008-02-25 23:19           ` David Howells
2008-02-25 23:19           ` David Howells
2008-02-26  0:43           ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26  0:43             ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26  2:00             ` David Howells
2008-02-26  2:00               ` David Howells
2008-02-26  2:00               ` David Howells
2008-02-26 10:26               ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26 14:33                 ` David Howells
2008-02-26 14:33                   ` David Howells
2008-02-26 14:33                   ` David Howells
2008-02-26 19:43                   ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26 19:43                     ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26 21:09                     ` David Howells
2008-02-26 21:09                       ` David Howells
2008-02-26 21:09                       ` David Howells
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2008-02-08 16:51 David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52   ` David Howells

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