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From: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Make /dev/urandom scalable
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2015 12:00:44 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56041E2C.2030602@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150924131235.GB6841@thunk.org>

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On 2015-09-24 09:12, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 07:37:39AM -0400, Austin S Hemmelgarn wrote:
>> Using /dev/urandom directly, yes that doesn't make sense because it
>> consistent returns non-uniformly random numbers when used to generate larger
>> amounts of entropy than the blocking pool can source
>
> Why do you think this is the case?   Reproduction, please?
>
> 					- Ted
Aside from the literature scattered across the web and the fact that it 
fails Dieharder tests way more than a high quality RNG should (even a 
good one should fail from time to time, one that never does is 
inherently flawed for other reasons, but I've had cases where I've done 
thousands of dieharder runs, and it failed almost 10% of the time, while 
stuff like mt19937 fails in otherwise identical tests only about 1-2% of 
the time)?  I will admit that it is significantly better than any libc 
implementation of rand() that I've seen, and many other PRNG's (notably 
including being significantly more random than the FIPS 140 DRBG's), but 
it does not do as well (usually) as stuff like OpenBSD's /dev/aranedom 
(which is way more processor intensive as well from what I've seen) or 
some of the high quality RNG's found in the GSL.

And it's also worth noting that this is with regards to systems that are 
consistently getting significantly less entropy into the blocking pool 
than is being sourced from the non-blocking pool by userspace (that is 
greater than a 100 times or so).

In short, I would not trust it as a CSPRNG (although I wouldn't trust 
most things touted as CSPRNG's either), or even for important 
simulations that need _lots_ of random numbers.  I'm not saying that it 
shouldn't be used for stuff like seeding other PRNG's however (and TBH, 
I do trust it more for that than I trust stuff like RDSEED or RDRAND).


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  reply	other threads:[~2015-09-24 16:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-22 23:16 [PATCH 1/3] Make /dev/urandom scalable Andi Kleen
2015-09-22 23:16 ` [PATCH 2/3] random: Make input to output pool balancing per cpu Andi Kleen
2015-09-22 23:16 ` [PATCH 3/3] random: Add pool name to urandom_read trace point Andi Kleen
2015-09-22 23:25 ` [PATCH 1/3] Make /dev/urandom scalable Andi Kleen
2015-09-23 10:32 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2015-09-23 21:54   ` Andi Kleen
2015-09-23 19:40 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-09-23 23:28   ` Andi Kleen
2015-09-24 11:37     ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-09-24 13:12       ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-09-24 16:00         ` Austin S Hemmelgarn [this message]
2015-09-24 16:52           ` Jeff Epler
2015-09-24 19:11             ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-09-24 20:00               ` Jeff Epler
2015-09-24 20:14               ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-09-25 11:41                 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-09-25 19:07                   ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-09-25 20:24                     ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-09-29 12:06                       ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-09-29 11:57                     ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-09-23 21:10 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-09-23 21:25   ` Andi Kleen
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-09-24 17:19 Updated scalable urandom patchkit Andi Kleen
2015-09-24 17:19 ` [PATCH 1/3] Make /dev/urandom scalable Andi Kleen
2015-09-30 14:40   ` Rasmus Villemoes
2015-10-06 22:05 Andi Kleen
2016-02-10 23:01 Scalable random patchkit revisited Andi Kleen
2016-02-10 23:01 ` [PATCH 1/3] Make /dev/urandom scalable Andi Kleen
2016-03-01  5:17 Andi Kleen

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