* [kernel-hardening] status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
@ 2015-11-24 19:19 Kees Cook
2015-11-29 22:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Richard Weinberger
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2015-11-24 19:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Weinberger; +Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Hi,
While not strictly a _kernel_ self-protection mechanism, it's still
something that I'd love to see upstream, so I'll ping about its status
here too. :) Any updates on the brute force detector? (Last week I had
someone suggest making this a "respawn cgroup" or something, if it's
not workable as-is.) Anything we can help with?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [kernel-hardening] Re: status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
2015-11-24 19:19 [kernel-hardening] status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE Kees Cook
@ 2015-11-29 22:54 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-30 20:15 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Richard Weinberger @ 2015-11-29 22:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook; +Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Am 24.11.2015 um 20:19 schrieb Kees Cook:
> Hi,
>
> While not strictly a _kernel_ self-protection mechanism, it's still
> something that I'd love to see upstream, so I'll ping about its status
> here too. :) Any updates on the brute force detector? (Last week I had
> someone suggest making this a "respawn cgroup" or something, if it's
> not workable as-is.) Anything we can help with?
I can revive my patch and resend. Maybe it helps to collect
new ideas (or NAKs ;)).
Thanks,
//richard
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [kernel-hardening] Re: status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
2015-11-29 22:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Richard Weinberger
@ 2015-11-30 20:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-21 20:33 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2015-11-30 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Weinberger; +Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 2:54 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote:
> Am 24.11.2015 um 20:19 schrieb Kees Cook:
>> Hi,
>>
>> While not strictly a _kernel_ self-protection mechanism, it's still
>> something that I'd love to see upstream, so I'll ping about its status
>> here too. :) Any updates on the brute force detector? (Last week I had
>> someone suggest making this a "respawn cgroup" or something, if it's
>> not workable as-is.) Anything we can help with?
>
> I can revive my patch and resend. Maybe it helps to collect
> new ideas (or NAKs ;)).
That would be great. Start by sending the series to kernel-hardening.
We can comment on it before you send a version to lkml. (i.e. try to
avoid NAKs...) :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [kernel-hardening] Re: status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
2015-11-30 20:15 ` Kees Cook
@ 2016-04-21 20:33 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2016-04-21 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Weinberger; +Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 12:15 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 2:54 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote:
>> Am 24.11.2015 um 20:19 schrieb Kees Cook:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> While not strictly a _kernel_ self-protection mechanism, it's still
>>> something that I'd love to see upstream, so I'll ping about its status
>>> here too. :) Any updates on the brute force detector? (Last week I had
>>> someone suggest making this a "respawn cgroup" or something, if it's
>>> not workable as-is.) Anything we can help with?
>>
>> I can revive my patch and resend. Maybe it helps to collect
>> new ideas (or NAKs ;)).
>
> That would be great. Start by sending the series to kernel-hardening.
> We can comment on it before you send a version to lkml. (i.e. try to
> avoid NAKs...) :)
Hi!
Any updates on this? I think with the latest userspace ASLR
improvements from Android, this is becoming a more urgently needed
features. :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2016-04-21 20:33 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2015-11-24 19:19 [kernel-hardening] status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE Kees Cook
2015-11-29 22:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Richard Weinberger
2015-11-30 20:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-21 20:33 ` Kees Cook
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