From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 01:05:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A70C9D.8060102@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453740953-18109-1-git-send-email-labbott@fedoraproject.org>
On 01/25/2016 11:55 AM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of page poisoning/sanitization for all arches. It
> takes advantage of the existing implementation for
> !ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC arches. This is a different approach than what
> the Grsecurity patches were taking but should provide equivalent functionality.
>
> For those who aren't familiar with this, the goal of sanitization is to reduce
> the severity of use after free and uninitialized data bugs. Memory is cleared
> on free so any sensitive data is no longer available. Discussion of
> sanitization was brough up in a thread about CVEs
> (lkml.kernel.org/g/<20160119112812.GA10818@mwanda>)
>
> I eventually expect Kconfig names will want to be changed and or moved if this
> is going to be used for security but that can happen later.
>
> Credit to Mathias Krause for the version in grsecurity
>
> Laura Abbott (3):
> mm/debug-pagealloc.c: Split out page poisoning from debug page_alloc
> mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
> mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning
>
> Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++
> include/linux/mm.h | 13 +++
> include/linux/poison.h | 4 +
> mm/Kconfig.debug | 35 +++++++-
> mm/Makefile | 5 +-
> mm/debug-pagealloc.c | 127 +----------------------------
> mm/page_alloc.c | 10 ++-
> mm/page_poison.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 8 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 mm/page_poison.c
>
Should poisoning of this kind be using kasan rather than "old fashioned"
poisoning?
Thanks,
Sasha
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 01:05:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A70C9D.8060102@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453740953-18109-1-git-send-email-labbott@fedoraproject.org>
On 01/25/2016 11:55 AM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of page poisoning/sanitization for all arches. It
> takes advantage of the existing implementation for
> !ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC arches. This is a different approach than what
> the Grsecurity patches were taking but should provide equivalent functionality.
>
> For those who aren't familiar with this, the goal of sanitization is to reduce
> the severity of use after free and uninitialized data bugs. Memory is cleared
> on free so any sensitive data is no longer available. Discussion of
> sanitization was brough up in a thread about CVEs
> (lkml.kernel.org/g/<20160119112812.GA10818@mwanda>)
>
> I eventually expect Kconfig names will want to be changed and or moved if this
> is going to be used for security but that can happen later.
>
> Credit to Mathias Krause for the version in grsecurity
>
> Laura Abbott (3):
> mm/debug-pagealloc.c: Split out page poisoning from debug page_alloc
> mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
> mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning
>
> Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++
> include/linux/mm.h | 13 +++
> include/linux/poison.h | 4 +
> mm/Kconfig.debug | 35 +++++++-
> mm/Makefile | 5 +-
> mm/debug-pagealloc.c | 127 +----------------------------
> mm/page_alloc.c | 10 ++-
> mm/page_poison.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 8 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 mm/page_poison.c
>
Should poisoning of this kind be using kasan rather than "old fashioned"
poisoning?
Thanks,
Sasha
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 01:05:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A70C9D.8060102@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453740953-18109-1-git-send-email-labbott@fedoraproject.org>
On 01/25/2016 11:55 AM, Laura Abbott wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This is an implementation of page poisoning/sanitization for all arches. It
> takes advantage of the existing implementation for
> !ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC arches. This is a different approach than what
> the Grsecurity patches were taking but should provide equivalent functionality.
>
> For those who aren't familiar with this, the goal of sanitization is to reduce
> the severity of use after free and uninitialized data bugs. Memory is cleared
> on free so any sensitive data is no longer available. Discussion of
> sanitization was brough up in a thread about CVEs
> (lkml.kernel.org/g/<20160119112812.GA10818@mwanda>)
>
> I eventually expect Kconfig names will want to be changed and or moved if this
> is going to be used for security but that can happen later.
>
> Credit to Mathias Krause for the version in grsecurity
>
> Laura Abbott (3):
> mm/debug-pagealloc.c: Split out page poisoning from debug page_alloc
> mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
> mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning
>
> Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++
> include/linux/mm.h | 13 +++
> include/linux/poison.h | 4 +
> mm/Kconfig.debug | 35 +++++++-
> mm/Makefile | 5 +-
> mm/debug-pagealloc.c | 127 +----------------------------
> mm/page_alloc.c | 10 ++-
> mm/page_poison.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 8 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 mm/page_poison.c
>
Should poisoning of this kind be using kasan rather than "old fashioned"
poisoning?
Thanks,
Sasha
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-26 6:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-25 16:55 [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/3] mm/debug-pagealloc.c: Split out page poisoning from debug page_alloc Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 6:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 6:26 ` Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 6:26 ` Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 20:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 20:25 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 20:25 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/3] mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 6:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 6:39 ` Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 6:39 ` Jianyu Zhan
2016-01-26 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 20:27 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 20:27 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/3] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 16:55 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-25 20:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2016-01-25 20:16 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-25 22:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-25 22:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-26 1:33 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 1:33 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 6:05 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2016-01-26 6:05 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages Sasha Levin
2016-01-26 6:05 ` Sasha Levin
2016-01-26 20:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 20:34 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 20:34 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-26 9:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2016-01-26 9:08 ` Mathias Krause
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