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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
	yoshihiro.yunomae.ez@hitachi.com, mtosatti@redhat.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, peterx@redhat.com,
	Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>,
	linux-trace-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] host and guest kernel trace merging
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 18:13:52 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56DDB6D0.7020308@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160307112627.3b94c671@gandalf.local.home>



On 07/03/2016 17:26, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > > How's the connection set up. That is, how does it know the commands are
> > > coming from the host? And how does it know that the commands from the
> > > host is from a trusted source? If the host is compromised, is there
> > > anything keeping an intruder from controlling the guest?  
> > 
> > qemu-guest-agent uses a virtio channel, so only the host can be driving
> > that channel.  But how can a guest know that it trusts the host? It
> > can't.  A compromised host implicitly compromises all guests, and that's
> > always been the case.  At least qemu-guest-agent doesn't make the window
> > any larger.
>
> I should have been a bit more clear about what I meant by "host is
> compromised". I should have asked, what about untrusted tasks on the
> host. Is the channel protected where only admin users can access it?

The other side of the channel is typically a socket or a pty, so it's
protected by file permissions, SELinux, and the like.

Paolo

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
	yoshihiro.yunomae.ez@hitachi.com, mtosatti@redhat.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, peterx@redhat.com,
	Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>,
	linux-trace-users@vger.kernel.org,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] host and guest kernel trace merging
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 18:13:52 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56DDB6D0.7020308@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160307112627.3b94c671@gandalf.local.home>



On 07/03/2016 17:26, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > > How's the connection set up. That is, how does it know the commands are
> > > coming from the host? And how does it know that the commands from the
> > > host is from a trusted source? If the host is compromised, is there
> > > anything keeping an intruder from controlling the guest?  
> > 
> > qemu-guest-agent uses a virtio channel, so only the host can be driving
> > that channel.  But how can a guest know that it trusts the host? It
> > can't.  A compromised host implicitly compromises all guests, and that's
> > always been the case.  At least qemu-guest-agent doesn't make the window
> > any larger.
>
> I should have been a bit more clear about what I meant by "host is
> compromised". I should have asked, what about untrusted tasks on the
> host. Is the channel protected where only admin users can access it?

The other side of the channel is typically a socket or a pty, so it's
protected by file permissions, SELinux, and the like.

Paolo

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-07 17:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-03 19:35 [RFC] host and guest kernel trace merging Luiz Capitulino
2016-03-03 19:35 ` [Qemu-devel] " Luiz Capitulino
2016-03-04 11:19 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-04 13:23   ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-04 13:23     ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-04 13:23     ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 15:17     ` [Qemu-devel] " Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-07 15:17       ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-07 15:49       ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 15:49         ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 16:10         ` Eric Blake
2016-03-07 16:26           ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 16:26             ` Steven Rostedt
2016-03-07 17:13             ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2016-03-07 17:13               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-24  5:16     ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24  5:16       ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24 13:02       ` Luiz Capitulino
2016-03-24 13:02         ` Luiz Capitulino
2016-03-25  1:53         ` Peter Xu
2016-03-25  1:53           ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24  8:42   ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24  8:42     ` Peter Xu
2016-03-24 10:13     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-24 10:13       ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2016-03-25  2:22       ` Peter Xu
2016-03-25  2:22         ` Peter Xu

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