From: Scotty Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
wmealing@redhat.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] SROP Mitigation: Sigreturn Cookies
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 15:36:49 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56FAF571.3040802@eng.utah.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUxfPBawXNvKZgOnxhkaesw-b4PqCFUZbkRdaaqpjqnPQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 03/29/2016 03:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 12:53 PM, Scott Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu> wrote:
>> Sigreturn-oriented programming is a new attack vector in userland
>> where an attacker crafts a fake signal frame on the stack and calls
>> sigreturn. The kernel will extract the fake signal frame, which
>> contains attacker controlled "saved" registers. The kernel will then
>> transfer control to the attacker controlled userland instruction pointer.
>>
>> To prevent SROP attacks the kernel needs to know or be able to dervive
>> whether a sigreturn it is processing is in response to a legitimate
>> signal the kernel previously delivered.
>>
>> Further information and test code can be found in Documentation/security
>> and this excellent article:
>> http://lwn.net/Articles/676803/
>>
>> These patches implement the necessary changes to generate a cookie
>> which will be placed above signal frame upon signal delivery to userland.
>> The cookie is generated using a per-process random value xor'd with
>> the address where the cookie will be stored on the stack.
>>
>> Upon a sigreturn the kernel will extract the cookie from userland,
>> recalculate what the original cookie should be and verify that the two
>> do not differ. If the two differ the kernel will terminate the process
>> with a SIGSEGV.
>>
>> This prevents SROP by adding a value that the attacker cannot guess,
>> but the kernel can verify. Therefore an attacker cannot use sigreturn as
>> a method to control the flow of a process.
>>
>
> Has anyone verified that this doesn't break CRIU cross-machine (or
> cross-boot) migration and that this doesn't break dosemu? You're
> changing the ABI here.
>
I haven't yet I'll do that to verify it breaks -- I'm pretty sure under some
conditions it will break CRIU. That's why we added the sysctl to turn it off.
Should I have mentioned this in the main commit that it possibly breaks CRIU/DOSEMU?
I went ahead and added that to the Documentation.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Scotty Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
wmealing@redhat.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] SROP Mitigation: Sigreturn Cookies
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 15:36:49 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56FAF571.3040802@eng.utah.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUxfPBawXNvKZgOnxhkaesw-b4PqCFUZbkRdaaqpjqnPQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 03/29/2016 03:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 12:53 PM, Scott Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu> wrote:
>> Sigreturn-oriented programming is a new attack vector in userland
>> where an attacker crafts a fake signal frame on the stack and calls
>> sigreturn. The kernel will extract the fake signal frame, which
>> contains attacker controlled "saved" registers. The kernel will then
>> transfer control to the attacker controlled userland instruction pointer.
>>
>> To prevent SROP attacks the kernel needs to know or be able to dervive
>> whether a sigreturn it is processing is in response to a legitimate
>> signal the kernel previously delivered.
>>
>> Further information and test code can be found in Documentation/security
>> and this excellent article:
>> http://lwn.net/Articles/676803/
>>
>> These patches implement the necessary changes to generate a cookie
>> which will be placed above signal frame upon signal delivery to userland.
>> The cookie is generated using a per-process random value xor'd with
>> the address where the cookie will be stored on the stack.
>>
>> Upon a sigreturn the kernel will extract the cookie from userland,
>> recalculate what the original cookie should be and verify that the two
>> do not differ. If the two differ the kernel will terminate the process
>> with a SIGSEGV.
>>
>> This prevents SROP by adding a value that the attacker cannot guess,
>> but the kernel can verify. Therefore an attacker cannot use sigreturn as
>> a method to control the flow of a process.
>>
>
> Has anyone verified that this doesn't break CRIU cross-machine (or
> cross-boot) migration and that this doesn't break dosemu? You're
> changing the ABI here.
>
I haven't yet I'll do that to verify it breaks -- I'm pretty sure under some
conditions it will break CRIU. That's why we added the sysctl to turn it off.
Should I have mentioned this in the main commit that it possibly breaks CRIU/DOSEMU?
I went ahead and added that to the Documentation.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-29 21:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-29 19:53 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/4] SROP Mitigation: Sigreturn Cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/4] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 23:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-31 20:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-31 20:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-31 22:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-03-31 22:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-31 22:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-31 22:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/4] x86: SROP Mitigation: Implement Signal Cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/4] Sysctl: SROP Mitigation: Add Sysctl argument to disable SROP Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2016-03-29 19:59 ` Andi Kleen
2016-03-29 20:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 20:46 ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 20:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andi Kleen
2016-03-29 20:53 ` Andi Kleen
2016-03-29 19:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 4/4] Documentation: SROP Mitigation: Add documentation for SROP cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 19:53 ` Scott Bauer
2016-03-29 20:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Brian Gerst
2016-03-29 20:12 ` Brian Gerst
2016-04-24 16:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-04-24 16:27 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-29 21:29 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] SROP Mitigation: Sigreturn Cookies Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 21:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 21:36 ` Scotty Bauer [this message]
2016-03-29 21:36 ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 21:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 22:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 22:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 23:14 ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-31 20:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-31 20:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-04-01 12:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyrill Gorcunov
2016-04-01 12:57 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2016-03-29 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-04-24 16:14 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-24 16:14 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-29 22:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 22:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 22:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-29 23:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 23:11 ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-03-29 23:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Scotty Bauer
2016-03-29 23:34 ` Scotty Bauer
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=56FAF571.3040802@eng.utah.edu \
--to=sbauer@eng.utah.edu \
--cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=wmealing@redhat.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.