From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Leif Lindholm" <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
"Mark Salter" <msalter@redhat.com>,
"Daniel Kiper" <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 11:16:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <57599668.20000@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160608100713.GU2658@codeblueprint.co.uk>
On 06/08/2016 05:07 AM, Matt Fleming wrote:
> (Sorry for the delay)
No worries, thanks for all the feedback.
>
> On Thu, 26 May, at 08:45:58AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>
>> The patch in question is patch 6/18 where PAGE_KERNEL is changed to
>> include the _PAGE_ENC attribute (the encryption mask). This now
>> makes FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL contain the encryption mask while
>> FIXMAP_PAGE_IO does not. In this way, anything mapped using the
>> early_ioremap call won't be mapped encrypted.
>
> There are semantics attached to early_ioremap() that do not apply in
> this case; that you're mapping an MMIO region but for EFI we just care
> about noting where the firmware (not the kernel) populated the region
> with data. Similar problems exist for other early boot code such as
> the devicetree stuff.
>
> early_ioremap() is not the answer.
>
> What you really want is just some way to distinguish kernel-owned
> regions from those owned by "somebody else".
>
> I have no problem updating early_memremap() to take a @flags argument
> to make that distinction, provided that the naming is generic and not
> tied to AMD's SME technology via an "sme" prefix/suffix.
So maybe something along the lines of an enum that would have entries
(initially) like KERNEL_DATA (equal to zero) and EFI_DATA. Others could
be added later as needed.
Would you then want to allow the protection attributes to be updated
by architecture specific code through something like a __weak function?
In the x86 case I can add this function as a non-SME specific function
that would initially just have the SME-related mask modification in it.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> And making it generic should allow it to be easily sprinkled into the
> shared architecture code in drivers/firmware/efi/ without issue.
>
> I'm going to follow up with some additional comments/questions on
> PATCH 10.
>
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Leif Lindholm" <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
"Mark Salter" <msalter@redhat.com>,
"Daniel Kiper" <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 11:16:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <57599668.20000@amd.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20160609161640.b5EDdHQrDeXuv867FM-cky5OCSN-rjnkOC6GBBl4SrQ@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160608100713.GU2658@codeblueprint.co.uk>
On 06/08/2016 05:07 AM, Matt Fleming wrote:
> (Sorry for the delay)
No worries, thanks for all the feedback.
>
> On Thu, 26 May, at 08:45:58AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>
>> The patch in question is patch 6/18 where PAGE_KERNEL is changed to
>> include the _PAGE_ENC attribute (the encryption mask). This now
>> makes FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL contain the encryption mask while
>> FIXMAP_PAGE_IO does not. In this way, anything mapped using the
>> early_ioremap call won't be mapped encrypted.
>
> There are semantics attached to early_ioremap() that do not apply in
> this case; that you're mapping an MMIO region but for EFI we just care
> about noting where the firmware (not the kernel) populated the region
> with data. Similar problems exist for other early boot code such as
> the devicetree stuff.
>
> early_ioremap() is not the answer.
>
> What you really want is just some way to distinguish kernel-owned
> regions from those owned by "somebody else".
>
> I have no problem updating early_memremap() to take a @flags argument
> to make that distinction, provided that the naming is generic and not
> tied to AMD's SME technology via an "sme" prefix/suffix.
So maybe something along the lines of an enum that would have entries
(initially) like KERNEL_DATA (equal to zero) and EFI_DATA. Others could
be added later as needed.
Would you then want to allow the protection attributes to be updated
by architecture specific code through something like a __weak function?
In the x86 case I can add this function as a non-SME specific function
that would initially just have the SME-related mask modification in it.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> And making it generic should allow it to be easily sprinkled into the
> shared architecture code in drivers/firmware/efi/ without issue.
>
> I'm going to follow up with some additional comments/questions on
> PATCH 10.
>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Leif Lindholm" <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
"Mark Salter" <msalter@redhat.com>,
"Daniel Kiper" <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 11:16:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <57599668.20000@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160608100713.GU2658@codeblueprint.co.uk>
On 06/08/2016 05:07 AM, Matt Fleming wrote:
> (Sorry for the delay)
No worries, thanks for all the feedback.
>
> On Thu, 26 May, at 08:45:58AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>
>> The patch in question is patch 6/18 where PAGE_KERNEL is changed to
>> include the _PAGE_ENC attribute (the encryption mask). This now
>> makes FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL contain the encryption mask while
>> FIXMAP_PAGE_IO does not. In this way, anything mapped using the
>> early_ioremap call won't be mapped encrypted.
>
> There are semantics attached to early_ioremap() that do not apply in
> this case; that you're mapping an MMIO region but for EFI we just care
> about noting where the firmware (not the kernel) populated the region
> with data. Similar problems exist for other early boot code such as
> the devicetree stuff.
>
> early_ioremap() is not the answer.
>
> What you really want is just some way to distinguish kernel-owned
> regions from those owned by "somebody else".
>
> I have no problem updating early_memremap() to take a @flags argument
> to make that distinction, provided that the naming is generic and not
> tied to AMD's SME technology via an "sme" prefix/suffix.
So maybe something along the lines of an enum that would have entries
(initially) like KERNEL_DATA (equal to zero) and EFI_DATA. Others could
be added later as needed.
Would you then want to allow the protection attributes to be updated
by architecture specific code through something like a __weak function?
In the x86 case I can add this function as a non-SME specific function
that would initially just have the SME-related mask modification in it.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> And making it generic should allow it to be easily sprinkled into the
> shared architecture code in drivers/firmware/efi/ without issue.
>
> I'm going to follow up with some additional comments/questions on
> PATCH 10.
>
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-09 16:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 227+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
[not found] ` <20160322130058.GA16528-5NIqAleC692hcjWhqY66xCZi+YwRKgec@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160427143951.GH21011-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160426225604.13567.55443.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrV+JzPZjrrqkhWSVfvKQt62Aq8NSW=ZvfdiAi8XKoLi8A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:01 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:41 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07 ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:07 ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:03 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 16:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160426225740.13567.85438.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <20160510134358.GR2839-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-12 18:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-09 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 13:51 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <20160613135110.GC2658-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <57615561.4090502-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-17 15:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 7:17 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 16:27 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
[not found] ` <20160429162757.GA1191-he5eyhs8q0BAdwtm4QZOy9BPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10 ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-01 22:10 ` Huang, Kai
[not found] ` <f37dd7de-23ad-f70f-c32d-a32f116215ce-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160426225904.13567.538.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
[not found] ` <20160426225553.13567.19459.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30 6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
[not found] ` <94D0CD8314A33A4D9D801C0FE68B402963918FDA-wwDBVnaDRpYSZAcGdq5asR6epYMZPwEe5NbjCUgZEJk@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-04-26 22:45 Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:47 ` Tom Lendacky
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