* [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() @ 2017-01-27 15:25 ` Nayna Jain 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Nayna Jain @ 2017-01-27 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid access beyond response buffer length. Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; struct tpm_buf buf; void *marker; - unsigned int count = 0; + void *end; + void *pcr_select_offset; + unsigned int count; + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; + u32 resp_len; int rc; - int i; + int i = 0; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); if (rc) @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) } marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; + + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + pcr_select_offset = marker + + offsetof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection, size_of_select); + if (pcr_select_offset >= end) { + rc = -EFAULT; + break; + } + memcpy(&pcr_selection, marker, sizeof(pcr_selection)); chip->active_banks[i] = be16_to_cpu(pcr_selection.hash_alg); - marker = marker + sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection); + sizeof_pcr_selection = sizeof(pcr_selection.hash_alg) + + sizeof(pcr_selection.size_of_select) + + sizeof(u8) * pcr_selection.size_of_select; + marker = marker + sizeof_pcr_selection; } out: - if (count < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) - chip->active_banks[count] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; + if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) + chip->active_banks[i] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); -- 2.5.0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() @ 2017-01-27 15:25 ` Nayna Jain 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Nayna Jain @ 2017-01-27 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: tpmdd-devel Cc: peterhuewe, tpmdd, jarkko.sakkinen, jgunthorpe, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, Nayna Jain This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid access beyond response buffer length. Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; struct tpm_buf buf; void *marker; - unsigned int count = 0; + void *end; + void *pcr_select_offset; + unsigned int count; + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; + u32 resp_len; int rc; - int i; + int i = 0; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); if (rc) @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) } marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; + + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + pcr_select_offset = marker + + offsetof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection, size_of_select); + if (pcr_select_offset >= end) { + rc = -EFAULT; + break; + } + memcpy(&pcr_selection, marker, sizeof(pcr_selection)); chip->active_banks[i] = be16_to_cpu(pcr_selection.hash_alg); - marker = marker + sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection); + sizeof_pcr_selection = sizeof(pcr_selection.hash_alg) + + sizeof(pcr_selection.size_of_select) + + sizeof(u8) * pcr_selection.size_of_select; + marker = marker + sizeof_pcr_selection; } out: - if (count < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) - chip->active_banks[count] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; + if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) + chip->active_banks[i] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); -- 2.5.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <1485530749-22948-1-git-send-email-nayna-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() 2017-01-27 15:25 ` Nayna Jain @ 2017-01-29 14:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen -1 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-01-29 14:40 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Nayna Jain Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid > access beyond response buffer length. > > Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> This validation looks broken to me. > --- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; > struct tpm_buf buf; > void *marker; > - unsigned int count = 0; > + void *end; > + void *pcr_select_offset; > + unsigned int count; > + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; > + u32 resp_len; Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in the TPM driver. > int rc; > - int i; > + int i = 0; Why do you need to initialize it? > > rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); > if (rc) > @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > } > > marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; > + > + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); > + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? > + > for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { > + pcr_select_offset = marker + > + offsetof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection, size_of_select); > + if (pcr_select_offset >= end) { > + rc = -EFAULT; > + break; > + } > + > memcpy(&pcr_selection, marker, sizeof(pcr_selection)); > chip->active_banks[i] = be16_to_cpu(pcr_selection.hash_alg); > - marker = marker + sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection); > + sizeof_pcr_selection = sizeof(pcr_selection.hash_alg) + > + sizeof(pcr_selection.size_of_select) + > + sizeof(u8) * pcr_selection.size_of_select; Remove "sizeof(u8) * ". > + marker = marker + sizeof_pcr_selection; > } > > out: > - if (count < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) > - chip->active_banks[count] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; > + if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) > + chip->active_banks[i] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; > > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > > -- > 2.5.0 > I'm sorry but this commit is changing too much. You need to redo the whole commit and resend the patch set with these fixes. You can keep Reviewed-by and Tested-by in 1/2 but have to remove them from 2/2. /Jarkko ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() @ 2017-01-29 14:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-01-29 14:40 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Nayna Jain Cc: tpmdd-devel, peterhuewe, tpmdd, jgunthorpe, linux-security-module, linux-kernel On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid > access beyond response buffer length. > > Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> This validation looks broken to me. > --- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; > struct tpm_buf buf; > void *marker; > - unsigned int count = 0; > + void *end; > + void *pcr_select_offset; > + unsigned int count; > + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; > + u32 resp_len; Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in the TPM driver. > int rc; > - int i; > + int i = 0; Why do you need to initialize it? > > rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); > if (rc) > @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > } > > marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; > + > + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); > + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? > + > for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { > + pcr_select_offset = marker + > + offsetof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection, size_of_select); > + if (pcr_select_offset >= end) { > + rc = -EFAULT; > + break; > + } > + > memcpy(&pcr_selection, marker, sizeof(pcr_selection)); > chip->active_banks[i] = be16_to_cpu(pcr_selection.hash_alg); > - marker = marker + sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection); > + sizeof_pcr_selection = sizeof(pcr_selection.hash_alg) + > + sizeof(pcr_selection.size_of_select) + > + sizeof(u8) * pcr_selection.size_of_select; Remove "sizeof(u8) * ". > + marker = marker + sizeof_pcr_selection; > } > > out: > - if (count < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) > - chip->active_banks[count] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; > + if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) > + chip->active_banks[i] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; > > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > > -- > 2.5.0 > I'm sorry but this commit is changing too much. You need to redo the whole commit and resend the patch set with these fixes. You can keep Reviewed-by and Tested-by in 1/2 but have to remove them from 2/2. /Jarkko ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <20170129144037.sdqd4vutt73isz2i-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() 2017-01-29 14:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-01-29 17:18 ` Nayna -1 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Nayna @ 2017-01-29 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f On 01/29/2017 08:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: >> This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid >> access beyond response buffer length. >> >> Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> >> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> > > This validation looks broken to me. > >> --- >> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- >> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 >> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) >> struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; >> struct tpm_buf buf; >> void *marker; >> - unsigned int count = 0; >> + void *end; >> + void *pcr_select_offset; >> + unsigned int count; >> + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; >> + u32 resp_len; > > Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in > the TPM driver. Sure will update. > >> int rc; >> - int i; >> + int i = 0; > > Why do you need to initialize it? Because in out: count is replaced with i. And it is replaced because now for loop can break even before reaching count, because of new buffer checks. > >> >> rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); >> if (rc) >> @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) >> } >> >> marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; >> + >> + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); >> + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; > > What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? Isn't this check need to be done in tpm_transmit_cmd for all responses ? Though, it seems it is not done there as well. And to understand what do we expect max buffer length. PAGE_SIZE or TPM_BUFSIZE ? > >> + >> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { >> + pcr_select_offset = marker + >> + offsetof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection, size_of_select); >> + if (pcr_select_offset >= end) { >> + rc = -EFAULT; >> + break; >> + } >> + >> memcpy(&pcr_selection, marker, sizeof(pcr_selection)); >> chip->active_banks[i] = be16_to_cpu(pcr_selection.hash_alg); >> - marker = marker + sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection); >> + sizeof_pcr_selection = sizeof(pcr_selection.hash_alg) + >> + sizeof(pcr_selection.size_of_select) + >> + sizeof(u8) * pcr_selection.size_of_select; > > Remove "sizeof(u8) * ". Sure. > >> + marker = marker + sizeof_pcr_selection; >> } >> >> out: >> - if (count < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) >> - chip->active_banks[count] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; >> + if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) >> + chip->active_banks[i] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; >> >> tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); >> >> -- >> 2.5.0 >> > > I'm sorry but this commit is changing too much. You need to redo the > whole commit and resend the patch set with these fixes. You can keep > Reviewed-by and Tested-by in 1/2 but have to remove them from 2/2. Sure, will do. Thanks & Regards, - Nayna > > /Jarkko > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() @ 2017-01-29 17:18 ` Nayna 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Nayna @ 2017-01-29 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: tpmdd-devel, peterhuewe, tpmdd, jgunthorpe, linux-security-module, linux-kernel On 01/29/2017 08:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: >> This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid >> access beyond response buffer length. >> >> Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > This validation looks broken to me. > >> --- >> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- >> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 >> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) >> struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; >> struct tpm_buf buf; >> void *marker; >> - unsigned int count = 0; >> + void *end; >> + void *pcr_select_offset; >> + unsigned int count; >> + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; >> + u32 resp_len; > > Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in > the TPM driver. Sure will update. > >> int rc; >> - int i; >> + int i = 0; > > Why do you need to initialize it? Because in out: count is replaced with i. And it is replaced because now for loop can break even before reaching count, because of new buffer checks. > >> >> rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); >> if (rc) >> @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) >> } >> >> marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; >> + >> + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); >> + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; > > What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? Isn't this check need to be done in tpm_transmit_cmd for all responses ? Though, it seems it is not done there as well. And to understand what do we expect max buffer length. PAGE_SIZE or TPM_BUFSIZE ? > >> + >> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { >> + pcr_select_offset = marker + >> + offsetof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection, size_of_select); >> + if (pcr_select_offset >= end) { >> + rc = -EFAULT; >> + break; >> + } >> + >> memcpy(&pcr_selection, marker, sizeof(pcr_selection)); >> chip->active_banks[i] = be16_to_cpu(pcr_selection.hash_alg); >> - marker = marker + sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection); >> + sizeof_pcr_selection = sizeof(pcr_selection.hash_alg) + >> + sizeof(pcr_selection.size_of_select) + >> + sizeof(u8) * pcr_selection.size_of_select; > > Remove "sizeof(u8) * ". Sure. > >> + marker = marker + sizeof_pcr_selection; >> } >> >> out: >> - if (count < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) >> - chip->active_banks[count] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; >> + if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) >> + chip->active_banks[i] = TPM2_ALG_ERROR; >> >> tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); >> >> -- >> 2.5.0 >> > > I'm sorry but this commit is changing too much. You need to redo the > whole commit and resend the patch set with these fixes. You can keep > Reviewed-by and Tested-by in 1/2 but have to remove them from 2/2. Sure, will do. Thanks & Regards, - Nayna > > /Jarkko > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <588E23EF.2050202-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() 2017-01-29 17:18 ` Nayna @ 2017-01-29 21:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen -1 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-01-29 21:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Nayna Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, tpmdd-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 10:48:39PM +0530, Nayna wrote: > > > On 01/29/2017 08:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > > > This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid > > > access beyond response buffer length. > > > > > > Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> > > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org> > > > > This validation looks broken to me. > > > > > --- > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- > > > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; > > > struct tpm_buf buf; > > > void *marker; > > > - unsigned int count = 0; > > > + void *end; > > > + void *pcr_select_offset; > > > + unsigned int count; > > > + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; > > > + u32 resp_len; > > > > Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in > > the TPM driver. > > Sure will update. > > > > > > int rc; > > > - int i; > > > + int i = 0; > > > > Why do you need to initialize it? > > Because in out: count is replaced with i. > And it is replaced because now for loop can break even before reaching > count, because of new buffer checks. > > > > > > > > rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); > > > if (rc) > > > @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > } > > > > > > marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; > > > + > > > + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); > > > + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; > > > > What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? > > Isn't this check need to be done in tpm_transmit_cmd for all responses ? > Though, it seems it is not done there as well. > > And to understand what do we expect max buffer length. PAGE_SIZE or > TPM_BUFSIZE ? Oops. You are correct it is done there: if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length)) return -EFAULT; So need to do this. /Jarkko /Jarkko ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() @ 2017-01-29 21:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-01-29 21:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Nayna Cc: tpmdd-devel, peterhuewe, tpmdd, jgunthorpe, linux-security-module, linux-kernel On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 10:48:39PM +0530, Nayna wrote: > > > On 01/29/2017 08:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > > > This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid > > > access beyond response buffer length. > > > > > > Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > > > This validation looks broken to me. > > > > > --- > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- > > > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; > > > struct tpm_buf buf; > > > void *marker; > > > - unsigned int count = 0; > > > + void *end; > > > + void *pcr_select_offset; > > > + unsigned int count; > > > + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; > > > + u32 resp_len; > > > > Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in > > the TPM driver. > > Sure will update. > > > > > > int rc; > > > - int i; > > > + int i = 0; > > > > Why do you need to initialize it? > > Because in out: count is replaced with i. > And it is replaced because now for loop can break even before reaching > count, because of new buffer checks. > > > > > > > > rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); > > > if (rc) > > > @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > } > > > > > > marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; > > > + > > > + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); > > > + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; > > > > What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? > > Isn't this check need to be done in tpm_transmit_cmd for all responses ? > Though, it seems it is not done there as well. > > And to understand what do we expect max buffer length. PAGE_SIZE or > TPM_BUFSIZE ? Oops. You are correct it is done there: if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length)) return -EFAULT; So need to do this. /Jarkko /Jarkko ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() 2017-01-29 21:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen (?) @ 2017-01-30 2:58 ` Nayna 2017-01-30 21:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen -1 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread From: Nayna @ 2017-01-30 2:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: tpmdd-devel, peterhuewe, tpmdd, jgunthorpe, linux-security-module, linux-kernel On 01/30/2017 02:50 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 10:48:39PM +0530, Nayna wrote: >> >> >> On 01/29/2017 08:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: >>> On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: >>>> This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid >>>> access beyond response buffer length. >>>> >>>> Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >>>> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >>> >>> This validation looks broken to me. >>> >>>> --- >>>> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- >>>> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >>>> index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 >>>> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >>>> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >>>> @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) >>>> struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; >>>> struct tpm_buf buf; >>>> void *marker; >>>> - unsigned int count = 0; >>>> + void *end; >>>> + void *pcr_select_offset; >>>> + unsigned int count; >>>> + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; >>>> + u32 resp_len; >>> >>> Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in >>> the TPM driver. >> >> Sure will update. >> >>> >>>> int rc; >>>> - int i; >>>> + int i = 0; >>> >>> Why do you need to initialize it? >> >> Because in out: count is replaced with i. >> And it is replaced because now for loop can break even before reaching >> count, because of new buffer checks. >>> >>>> >>>> rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); >>>> if (rc) >>>> @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) >>>> } >>>> >>>> marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; >>>> + >>>> + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); >>>> + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; >>> >>> What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? >> >> Isn't this check need to be done in tpm_transmit_cmd for all responses ? >> Though, it seems it is not done there as well. >> >> And to understand what do we expect max buffer length. PAGE_SIZE or >> TPM_BUFSIZE ? > > Oops. You are correct it is done there: > > if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length)) > return -EFAULT; > > So need to do this. To be sure, means nothing need to be done in this. Right ? And guess this was the only thing you meant by broken for this patch. I will do other two smaller changes as I send the whole new patchset. Thanks & Regards, - Nayna > > /Jarkko > > /Jarkko > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() 2017-01-30 2:58 ` Nayna @ 2017-01-30 21:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2017-01-30 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Nayna Cc: tpmdd-devel, peterhuewe, tpmdd, jgunthorpe, linux-security-module, linux-kernel On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 08:28:30AM +0530, Nayna wrote: > > > On 01/30/2017 02:50 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 10:48:39PM +0530, Nayna wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 01/29/2017 08:10 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 10:25:49AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > > > > > This patch add validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation to avoid > > > > > access beyond response buffer length. > > > > > > > > > > Suggested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > > > > > > > This validation looks broken to me. > > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- > > > > > 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > > > index 4aad84c..02c1ea7 100644 > > > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > > > @@ -1008,9 +1008,13 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > > > struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection; > > > > > struct tpm_buf buf; > > > > > void *marker; > > > > > - unsigned int count = 0; > > > > > + void *end; > > > > > + void *pcr_select_offset; > > > > > + unsigned int count; > > > > > + u32 sizeof_pcr_selection; > > > > > + u32 resp_len; > > > > > > > > Very cosmetic but we almos almost universally use the acronym 'rsp' in > > > > the TPM driver. > > > > > > Sure will update. > > > > > > > > > > > > int rc; > > > > > - int i; > > > > > + int i = 0; > > > > > > > > Why do you need to initialize it? > > > > > > Because in out: count is replaced with i. > > > And it is replaced because now for loop can break even before reaching > > > count, because of new buffer checks. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY); > > > > > if (rc) > > > > > @@ -1034,15 +1038,29 @@ static ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > > > } > > > > > > > > > > marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9]; > > > > > + > > > > > + resp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]); > > > > > + end = &buf.data[resp_len]; > > > > > > > > What if the response contains larger length than the buffer size? > > > > > > Isn't this check need to be done in tpm_transmit_cmd for all responses ? > > > Though, it seems it is not done there as well. > > > > > > And to understand what do we expect max buffer length. PAGE_SIZE or > > > TPM_BUFSIZE ? > > > > Oops. You are correct it is done there: > > > > if (len != be32_to_cpu(header->length)) > > return -EFAULT; > > > > So need to do this. > > To be sure, means nothing need to be done in this. Right ? This is correct. > And guess this was the only thing you meant by broken for this patch. > > I will do other two smaller changes as I send the whole new patchset. > > Thanks & Regards, > - Nayna /Jarkko ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-01-30 21:47 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2017-01-27 15:25 [PATCH] tpm: add buffer access validation in tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() Nayna Jain
2017-01-27 15:25 ` Nayna Jain
[not found] ` <1485530749-22948-1-git-send-email-nayna-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-29 14:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-01-29 14:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20170129144037.sdqd4vutt73isz2i-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-29 17:18 ` Nayna
2017-01-29 17:18 ` Nayna
[not found] ` <588E23EF.2050202-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-01-29 21:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-01-29 21:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2017-01-30 2:58 ` Nayna
2017-01-30 21:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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