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* [PATCH V2] Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security
@ 2024-01-03  3:14 Yuxuan Hu
  2024-01-03  3:56 ` [V2] " bluez.test.bot
  2024-01-03  8:44 ` [PATCH V2] " Paul Menzel
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Yuxuan Hu @ 2024-01-03  3:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: marcel, johan.hedberg, luiz.dentz
  Cc: linux-bluetooth, linux-kernel, baijiaju1990, sy2239101, 20373622,
	buaazhr

During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the
RFCOMM layer,we discovered this bug.By comparing the packetsfrom a normal
connection and disconnection process with the testcase that triggered a
KASAN report, we analyzed the cause of this bug as follows:

1. In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a
`Read Encryption Key Size` type of `HCI_CMD` packet(Command Opcode: 0x1408)
to the controller to inquire the length of encryption key.After receiving
this packet, the controller immediately replies with a Command Complete
packet (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the Encryption Key Size.

2. In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this
packet was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP
layers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected.

3. After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described
in point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function.
However, by this time `struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;`
had already been released, and when the function executed
`return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);`,
specifically when accessing `conn->hcon`, a null-ptr-deref error occurred.

To fix this bug, check if `sk->sk_state` is BT_CLOSED before calling
rfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx.

Signed-off-by: Yuxuan Hu <20373622@buaa.edu.cn>
---
V1 -> V2: Removed the direct check for `conn` being null in rfcomm_check_security

 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
index 053ef8f25fae..1d34d8497033 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
@@ -1941,7 +1941,7 @@ static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_process_rx(struct rfcomm_session *s)
 	/* Get data directly from socket receive queue without copying it. */
 	while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue))) {
 		skb_orphan(skb);
-		if (!skb_linearize(skb)) {
+		if (!skb_linearize(skb) && sk->sk_state != BT_CLOSED) {
 			s = rfcomm_recv_frame(s, skb);
 			if (!s)
 				break;
-- 
2.25.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH V2] Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security
@ 2024-01-03  4:06 Yuxuan Hu
  2024-01-03  4:34 ` [V2] " bluez.test.bot
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Yuxuan Hu @ 2024-01-03  4:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: marcel, johan.hedberg, luiz.dentz
  Cc: linux-bluetooth, linux-kernel, baijiaju1990, sy2239101, 20373622,
	buaazhr

During our fuzz testing of the connection and disconnection process at the
RFCOMM layer,we discovered this bug.By comparing the packetsfrom a normal
connection and disconnection process with the testcase that triggered a
KASAN report, we analyzed the cause of this bug as follows:

1. In the packets captured during a normal connection, the host sends a
`Read Encryption Key Size` type of `HCI_CMD` packet(Command Opcode: 0x1408)
to the controller to inquire the length of encryption key.After receiving
this packet, the controller immediately replies with a Command Complete
packet (Event Code: 0x0e) to return the Encryption Key Size.

2. In our fuzz test case, the timing of the controller's response to this
packet was delayed to an unexpected point: after the RFCOMM and L2CAP
layers had disconnected but before the HCI layer had disconnected.

3. After receiving the Encryption Key Size Response at the time described
in point 2, the host still called the rfcomm_check_security function.
However, by this time `struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->conn;`
had already been released, and when the function executed
`return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type, d->out);`,
specifically when accessing `conn->hcon`, a null-ptr-deref error occurred.

To fix this bug, check if `sk->sk_state` is BT_CLOSED before calling
rfcomm_recv_frame in rfcomm_process_rx.

Signed-off-by: Yuxuan Hu <20373622@buaa.edu.cn>
---
V1 -> V2: Check earlier on rfcomm_process_rx

 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
index 053ef8f25fae..1d34d8497033 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c
@@ -1941,7 +1941,7 @@ static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_process_rx(struct rfcomm_session *s)
 	/* Get data directly from socket receive queue without copying it. */
 	while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue))) {
 		skb_orphan(skb);
-		if (!skb_linearize(skb)) {
+		if (!skb_linearize(skb) && sk->sk_state != BT_CLOSED) {
 			s = rfcomm_recv_frame(s, skb);
 			if (!s)
 				break;
-- 
2.25.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2024-01-03  9:20 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2024-01-03  3:14 [PATCH V2] Bluetooth: rfcomm: Fix null-ptr-deref in rfcomm_check_security Yuxuan Hu
2024-01-03  3:56 ` [V2] " bluez.test.bot
2024-01-03  8:44 ` [PATCH V2] " Paul Menzel
2024-01-03  9:19   ` Yuxuan-Hu
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-01-03  4:06 Yuxuan Hu
2024-01-03  4:34 ` [V2] " bluez.test.bot

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